Frank Michael Kendrick v. Peter Carlson, WardenFrank Michael Kendrick v. Peter Carlson, Warden
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Bowman
Frank Michael Kendrick appeals from the order of the District Court
1
adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge
2
and denying Kendrick’s
I.
In August 1983, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agents in Lima, Peru, received information that Kendrick and Richard Rankin were attempting to smuggle cocaine into the United States via Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles. The agents requested that authorities in the Netherlands Antilles search the men when they arrived on Curacao. On August 17, 1983, Curacao customs officers complying with this request uncovered a total of four kilograms of cocaine in Kendrick’s and Rankin’s luggage. Kendrick and Rankin were arrested, charged with drug trafficking offenses under the law of the Netherlands Antilles, and held in custody on Curacao pending trial.
In April 1984, Kendrick was convicted of importing cocaine in violation of the law of the Netherlands Antilles and received a five-year prison sentence. Rankin also was convicted and received a sentence of three and one-half years. Meanwhile, DEA agents in the United States continued to investígate Kendrick’s and Rankin’s drug trafficking activities. The agents discovered that Kendrick and Rankin were members of a loose-knit group that had imported hundreds of pounds of cocaine into the United States over a period of years. Federal prosecutors sought and obtained indictments against both men.
Authorities in the Netherlands Antilles cooperated closely with the DEA in its investigation, providing information and evidence to United States investigators and “loaning” Rankin to our government so that Rankin could testify for the United States and plead guilty to drug trafficking charges. When it came time to release Rankin, and later Kendrick, Curacao prison authorities placed the men on flights home to be met by members of the United States Marshal’s Service. The marshals immediately took the men into federal custody.-
Rankin was released from prison in the Netherlands Antilles on December 18, 1985; he received credit for the entire period of his incarceration in the Netherlands Antilles against his subsequent federal sentence. Kendrick was released from prison in the Netherlands Antilles on December 17, 1986. He subsequently pled guilty to operating a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of
The District Court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denied Kendrick’s petition. For reversal,- Kendrick argues: 1) the magistrate judge was disqualified from considering Kendrick’s case pursuant to
II.
Kendrick first argues that the magistrate judge to whom Kendrick’s petition was referred should have disqualified himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C;,
Initially, we note that the rules concerning disqualification based on prior government service are less stringent than those that apply to prior private employment. Whereas
There is general agreement that a United States Attorney serves as counsel to the government in all prosecutions brought in his district while he is in office and that he therefore is prohibited from later presiding over such cases as a judge.
See, e.g., United States v. Di Pasquale,
864 F.2d 271, 278-79 (3rd Cir.1988),
cert. denied,
492 U.S. 906, 109 S.Ct. 3216, 106 L.Ed.2d 566 (1989);
Barry v. United States,
528 F.2d 1094, 1099 n. 14 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied,
429 U.S. 826, 97 S.Ct. 81, 50 L.Ed.2d 88 (1976). The only case we have found on point, however, holds that this
per se
rule does not extend to disqualify a supervisory AUSA who had no involvement with a case brought in his district.
Di Pasquale,
864 F.2d at 278-79. We agree with the
Di Pasquale
court that an AUSA without any involvement in a case brought by other attorneys in his office is not required to disqualify himself from presiding over such a case under
The case before us is a very different case from
Mixon v. United States,
620 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam), on which Kendrick relies. In that case, the magistrate judge, while in government employment, had himself represented the government concerning the ease in controversy and thus clearly was . required to disqualify himself under the statute. By contrast, in the action before us, there is no allegation or evidence that the magistrate judge had any involvement in Kendrick’s case during the magistrate judge’s time in government service. We therefore hold that the magistrate judge was not required to disqualify himself under
III.
Kendrick next argues that he is entitled to credit against his federal sentence for the time he was incarcerated in Curacao under
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence. The- Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.
Id.
Kendrick reasons that the conduct underlying his’ conviction in the Netherlands Antilles is the same conduct that supports the federal continuing criminal enterprise offense’ to which he pled guilty, that the time he spent incarcerated in the Netherlands Antilles is thus time spent “in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which
The question then is whether the fact that
The purpose behind this amendment is to cover a condition where the defendant may have been arrested for a crime but subsequently is convicted of a lesser crime; thus, under the amendment, even though convicted of a lesser crime, he is given credit for the time spent in custody while awaiting trial on the charge of a greater crime. It would also permit the giving of credit for time spent in custody while awaiting trial where a defendant may have been originally arrested and held in custody on a State charge and eventually turned over to the Federal Government for prosecution of a Federal violation.
H.R.Rep. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2294-95. ’ ’
This legislative history suggests that the insertion of the phrase “or acts” was intended to ensure that defendants received credit for pretrial custody, even if arrested on a charge slightly different from the offense of ultimate conviction, and even if originally arrested and held in custody by another sovereign for an offense subsequently prosecuted as a federal crime. Nothing in the statute or the legislative history suggests, however, that Congress believed that the addition of the words “or acts” would eliminate the ability of the federal government to impose punishment for a violation of federal law consecutive to any punishment imposed by another sovereign based on the same acts. See also Gilbert, 299 F.Supp. at 695-96 (noting that Senator Ervin, one of the bill’s sponsors, indicated that the amendment inserting the phrase “or acts” was technical rather than substantive).
Ultimately, however, we do not base our interpretation-of
The ease law uniformly follows the rule that the above analysis suggests, and holds
The court below determined that Kendrick received credit against his foreign sentence for the entire forty-month period he was incarcerated in the Netherlands Antilles. In other words, the entire forty-month period constituted time during which Kendrick was serving a foreign sentence. Kendrick challenges this determination, arguing that “[without an evidentiary hearing, it is impossible to determine whether [he] was, in fact, given credit towards his Curacao sentence” for the time he spent in custody in the Netherlands Antilles prior to the date of his final sentencing. Appellant’s Brief at 14. We disagree. First, Kendrick’s
Second, even if we were to construe Kendrick’s argument as an assertion that he did not receive credit on his Netherlands Antilles sentence for the entire forty-month period at issue, the record does not show any genuine factual dispute that would entitle Kendrick to an evidentiary hearing. The federal district judge who accepted Kendrick’s plea and imposed the sentence Kendrick now is serving specifically found that “[o]n his five year [Netherlands Antilles] sentence, Mr. Kendrick served a total of 40 months and one day, from 8/17/83 through 12/17/86.”
United States v. Kendrick,
No. 86-CR-89-S, Order to Supplement Presentence Investigation, at 2 (W.D.Wis. June 23, 1988). That judge had an ample evidentiary basis for resolving this issue and his finding is entirely supported by the record. Because the record conclusively demonstrates that Kendrick is not entitled to relief, no evidentiary hearing is necessary.
See United States v. Johnson,
751 F.2d 291, 294 (8th Cir.1984) (holding that a
In short, Kendrick received credit against the sentence imposed on him by the Netherlands Antilles for the entire period he was incarcerated in that nation. As separate sovereigns, the Netherlands Antilles and the United States each is entitled to punish Kendrick for any of his drug trafficking activities that fall within its jurisdiction, even if this results in Kendrick being punished twice for the same conduct.
4
IV.
Alternatively, Kendrick argues that he is entitled to credit under
Federal prisoners seeking jail-time credit under
Although we are affirming the District Court’s denial of Kendrick’s claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and although both parties seem to assume that Kendrick will present this claim administratively, we note that the claim appears to us to be patently meritless. The fact that Kendrick received credit against his foreign sentence for the entire period he was in custody on Curacao would preclude him from also receiving credit against his federal sentence for any portion of that period of time, even if Kendrick originally was denied bail because of a so-called de facto detainer. See, e.g., Shields v. Daggett, 460 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir.1972) (per curiam).
V.
Finally, Kendrick argues that even if he is not entitled to credit against his sentence under
The fact that Rankin received credit as a result of a mistake is fatal to Kendrick’s equal protection claim, since “[m]ere error or mistake in judgment when applying a facially neutral statute does not violate the equal protection clause.”
E & T Realty v. Strickland,
830 F.2d 1107, 1114 (11th Cir.1987),
cert. denied,
485 U.S. 961, 108 S.Ct. 1225, 99 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988);
see also Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944). Rather, a plaintiff asserting an equal protection violation based on unequal application of a facially neutral statute must- show intentional discrimination.
Snowden,
321 U.S. at 8, 64 S.Ct. at 401. Were the rule otherwise, if government decisionmakers “erroneously applied [a statute] in a single case, they could never again apply it correctly without violating equal protection.”
E & T Realty,
830 F.2d at 1114. Kendrick has neither alleged nor produced any evidence of intentional dis
VI.
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the District Court denying Kendrick’s
Notes
. The Honorable Harry H. MacLaughlin, Senior United States District” Judge for the District of Minnesota.
. The Honorable Franklin L. Noel, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.
.
. Much of Kendrick‘s argument is directed towards showing that the acts for which the Netherlands Antilles and the United States have punished him are the same. Because of our holding, we need not, and do not, decide whether this is in fact so.