Wе granted this interlocutory appeal to consider the trial court’s denial of motions for summary judgment by defendant-appellants Frank Mayes & Associates, Inc., Frank D. Mayes, F. Chip Mayes (collectively “Mayes”), Malón D. Mimms, Malón D. Mimms, Jr., Mimms Family, L.R, Malón D. Mimms Family, L.P., and Mimms Enterprises, Inc. (collectively “Mimms”). Because plaintiff-appellee Louis E. Massood was either a trespasser or licensee on appellants’ property at the time of his injury and he has shown no breach of the limited duty owed to him, we reverse and direct that the trial court enter summary judgment in appellants’ favor.
The rеlevant facts of this case are not in dispute. Mayes leased a commercial building from Mimms to carry on its sound and light production business. The building was a warehouse with offices in the front section and a lowered ceiling over the office area. The attic or loft formed by the office ceiling was floored with plywood and used for the storage of old equipment. It had no рermanent means of access such as steps or a fixed ladder; it was reached, when necessary, with a folding ladder.
Defendant Shawn Martin, not a party to this appeal, is a sound еngineer who worked for Mayes as an independent contractor, working on sound equipment and preparing it for concerts and events. At the time of the incident, Massood had no connection with Mayes other than friendships with several people who worked for Mayes, including Massood’s roommate David Creed. Massood once painted a stage for Chip Mayes, but that was the only time he had ever been on the premises for a business purpose. He testified that he had been in the attic area on two earlier occasions visiting with his friends when they wеre “on break”; according to Massood, they just sat up there and talked.
On Saturday, August 12, 1995, Massood came to Mayes’s business tо meet Martin for lunch. Martin was the only person on the premises at the time. When he arrived, Massood immediately told Martin that he suspected Creed had stolen money and property from his house and had hidden them somewhere in the warehouse. Massood acknowledged that he was “mad”; Martin testified that Massood was “very heated” and “on a mission to find his stolen property.” Mаssood went through the office area and through a closed door marked “employees only” into the warehouse to look for the items. While Massood contends Martin gave him permission to enter the warehouse, Martin testified that he did not stop Massood because he did not want a confrontation.
Massood searched the warehouse briefly and then climbed up on a table or shelves to get into the attic area. As he walked toward the back of the attic, he stepped off the plywood flooring and between the ceiling joists. He fell thrоugh the ceiling below into a bathroom, injuring himself.
1. We must first consider Massood’s legal status while on the premises, because the duty of an owner or occupier of land to a person injured there depends upon the injured person’s status as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. The duty owed to an invitee on land is established by statute:
Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.
OCGA § 51-3-1. In contrast,
(a) A licensee is a person who: (1) Is neither a customer, a servant, nor a trespasser; (2) Does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises; and (3) Is permitted, expressly or impliedly, to go on the premises merely for his own interest, convenience, or gratification.
(b) The owner of the premises is liable to a licensee only for willful or wanton injury.
OCGA § 51-3-2.
But “[a] trespasser is one who, though peacefully or by mistake, wrongfully enters upon propеrty owned or occupied by another. [Cits.]”
Barber v. Steele,
The evidence presented here shows that Massood entered Mayes’s premises, went into a warehouse area marked “employees only,” and used a piece of furniture to climb up into a normally inaccessible attic to look for his personal property. At the time he fell through the bathroom ceiling, Massood clearly wаs not an invitee.
Massood testified that Martin gave him permission to search the warehouse and the loft, and he contends this gave him the status of a licensee. Martin denies this allegation, but thе factual dispute is immaterial to our decision here. 1 Whether the standard for liability to a licensee or to a trespasser is applied to the facts here, Massood cannot recover.
2. When an alleged injury is caused by a static condition, as opposed to dangerous active operations or active negligence, “no duty arises with referenсe to the licensee of keeping the usual condition of the premises up to any standard of safety, except that they must not contain a pitfall, a mantrap, or other things of that character.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Davis v. Scott,
“The doctrine of mantrap or pitfall is rested upon the theory that the owner is expecting a trespasser or a licenseе and has prepared
the premises to do him injury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 313. It is a “contrivance so dangerous in character as to imply a disregard of consequences or a willingness to inflict injury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. See, e.g.,
McKinsey v. Wade,
Massood contends the condition of the attic floor constituted a mantrap or pitfall, but every case cited by Massood is distinguished by the close proximity of the alleged mаntrap or pitfall to a well-traveled area where people reasonably could be expected to step accidentally aside and into the hazard. In
Central of Ga. R. v. Ledbetter,
In contrast, the attic from which Massood fell was virtually inaccessible by ordinary means and was located far from any area that passersby or casual visitors reasonably could be expected to traverse. And this passive and static condition in an ordinarily inaccessible attic does not demonstrate wilful or wanton conduct, since Massood “was not obliged or induced to step across it by any act of defendants.” Hawkins, supra at 314.
In summary, Massood came to appellants’ business on a weekend while the building was occupied only by an independent contraсtor. Then, on a personal errand wholly unconnected with Mayes’s business, he went into a warehouse restricted to employees, used a
piece of furniture to gain access tо an ordinarily inaccessible area, and then walked to the rear of that area, where he fell. His status at the time of his injury was that of a trespasser or at best a licensee, and аppellants were obligated only to refrain from wilfully or wantonly inflicting injury or knowingly allowing him to be injured by a mantrap or pitfall. No evidence was presented that appellants wilfully injured Massood or maintained a mantrap or pitfall in an area where he could have been expected to travel, and the trial court consequently erred in failing to grant appеllants’ motion for summary judgment.
Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins,
Judgment reversed.
Notes
Mayes argues that Martin’s knowledge or permission cannot be imputed to Mayes because the evidence is uncontroverted that Martin was an independent contractor and not Mayes’s agent or employee. But we do not reach this issue.
Cases of injuries occurring on land immediately adjacent to a public way involve a different standard.
See Intl. Paper Realty Co. v. Bethune,