This is a consolidated appeal from the dismissal of two class actions brought in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Plaintiffs, military veterans employed by the Cities of East Providence and Warwick, Rhode Island, brought these actions against their employers and state and city officials. The complaints allege that the defendants^ failure to properly administer a Rhode Island statute, providing for seniority credits for certain veterans, and the retroactive repeal of that statute, violated plaintiffs’ rights under the federal Constitution. Invoking 42 U.S.C. .§ 1983, plaintiffs seek damages, declaratory, and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
*611 BACKGROUND
Since this is an appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we accept the facts as stated in plaintiffs’ complaints, drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor.
See, e.g., Chongris v. Board of Appeals,
I. The Rhode Island Veterans Seniority Statutes
In 1945, the Rhode Island legislature adopted R.I.Gen.Laws §§ 30-21-2 and 30-21-3, providing for enhanced seniority in employment for returning war veterans. Section 30-21-2 provides:
Any member of the armed forces of the United States or any citizen of the United States who served in the armed forces of the United Nations during World War II shall, upon his reemployment by a prior employer within one year after his honorable discharge from said forces, upon proper proof of his service and the length thereof, be given by such employer in addition to the seniority rights he had when he left said employment, prior to his joining the armed forces, additional seniority rights equal to the time he served in said forces.
R.I.Gen.Laws § 30-21-2 (“Section 30-21-2”). Section 30-21-3 provides:
Seniority in new employment — Any member of the armed forces of the United States or any citizen of the United States who served in the armed forces of the United Nations during World War II shall, upon proper proof of his service and the length thereof, upon applying for employment within one year after his honorable discharge from said forces, shall [sic] possess and be given credit for seniority rights equal to the time he served in said forces.
R.I.Gen.Laws § 30-21-3 (“Section 30-21-3”).
The legislature also adopted R.I.Gen.Laws § 30-21-7, which provides that “Any one [sic] knowingly violating [Section 30-21-2 or 30-21-3] shall be guilty of a misdemean- or and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars.” Later, the legislature extended all Rhode Island statutes “granting benefits or privileges to veterans” to veterans of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, as well as veterans of any other “campaign or war, declared or undeclared,” in which the United States Armed Forces engages. See R.I.Gen.Laws § 30-22-3.
Since the adoption of Sections 30-21-2 and 30-21-3, plaintiffs say, the Rhode Island Department of Labor and other state officials have not enforced Section 30-21-3, granting seniority credit to veterans securing new employment. However, the State has enforced Section 30-21-2, granting seniority to veterans returning to prior employment. Likewise, municipal employers, including the defendants, have not granted enhanced seniority to newly-employed veterans under Section 30-21-3, but have granted enhanced seniority to re-employed veterans under Section 30-21-2. State and municipal officials, including the defendants, have failed to inform, and have misled, newly-employed veterans about their rights to seniority credit under Section 30-21-3. In contrast, plaintiffs allege, state officials have provided re-employed veterans with information concerning their rights to seniority credit under Section 30-21-2.
In June 1985, allegedly in response to the fact that municipal employers in Rhode Island were facing a plethora of requests for enhanced seniority from veterans who had recently discovered Section 30-21-3, the Rhode Island legislature repealed Section 30-21-3, giving the repeal retroactive effect. The Repeal Statute provides:
SECTION 1. Section 30-21-3 ... is hereby repealed in its entirety.
The provisions of this article are deemed to be severable and the invalidation of any particular provision or section hereof shall not be deemed to affect the validity of any other provisions or sections, all of which are deemed to be independent.
SECTION 2. This article shall take effect upon passage and shall be given retroactive effect.
*612 R.I.Pub.Law ch. 181, § 64 (“the Repeal Statute”). 1 Section 30-21-2, providing seniority credit for re-employed veterans, was left in effect.
II. Specific Allegations Concerning Plaintiffs Hoffman and Langlois
Plaintiff Hoffman served on active duty in the United States Air Force, during time of conflict from May 1972 to November 15, 1974, when he was honorably discharged. He applied for employment as a firefighter with the City of Warwick in December 1974, and at that time presented to the City proof of his military service and his honorable discharge. Hoffman’s, application was accepted, and on March 3, 1975, for the first time, he became an employee of the City of Warwick.
Langlois served on active duty in the United States Army during time of conflict from June 1964 to June 24, 1967, when he was honorably discharged. That year, he applied for employment with the City of East Providence, presenting proof of his military service and his honorable discharge. He was first employed by East Providence, as a police officer, on December 29, 1967.
At the time plaintiffs were hired by defendants Warwick and East Providence (the “Cities”), they were unaware of their right to seniority credit under Section 30-21-3. The Cities did not grant them seniority credit for their time spent in the service, either upon the commencement of their employment or thereafter. Neither the Cities nor any state official ever informed plaintiffs that they had any right to enhanced seniority under Section 30-21-3. Instead, veterans who had obtained new employment after leaving the service were led to believe that they had no rights to credit for their time in the service, other than a limited right to purchase certain retirement system credits.
In 1984, plaintiffs first became aware of the right to seniority credit extended to newly-employed veterans under Section 30-21-3. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs requested their municipal employers to grant them enhanced seniority pursuant to Section 30-21-3.
The City of Warwick declined Hoffman’s request, informing him that Section 30-21-3 provided no special rights to Hoffman or other veterans who obtained new employment after leaving the service. Hoffman then filed a grievance with the firefighters union, seeking to compel the City of Warwick to grant him seniority credit. The grievance was presented to the Warwick Board of Public Safety, which, for the most part, denied Hoffman’s request for enhanced seniority, in July 1985. The Board did, however, allow Hoffman enhanced seniority with respect to selection of assignment, vacation schedule, and other non-monetary benefits. It refused to grant him enhanced seniority with respect to salary or any other monetary benefit. In August 1985, the Board rescinded Hoffman’s limited grant of enhanced seniority, relying on the repeal of Section 30-21-3.
In response to Langlois’s and others’ requests for seniority credit under Section 30-21-3, the City of East Providence acknowledged that these employees satisfied the criteria of Section 30-21-3, and calculated certain benefits that would be due each Section 30-21-3 claimant. However, East Providence never conferred these benefits on Langlois or the other claimants. In June 1985, after enactment of the Repeal Statute, East Providence denied the requests for enhanced seniority relying on the Repeal Statute.
*613 III. Proceedings
In the Fall of 1985, the plaintiffs brought these actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. 2 Hoffman brought his complaint “individually and on behalf of all other [similarly situated] employees, retired employees and former employees of the City of Warwick,” naming as defendants the City of Warwick and various Warwick officials. Langlois brought his complaint “individually and on behalf of all other [similarly situated] employees, retired employees and former employees of the' City of East Providence,” 3 naming the City of East Providence as defendant. 4 The complaints allege that the Repeal Statute violated plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights under the Contract Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ failure to inform them of their Section 30-21-3 rights and to grant them enhanced seniority, prior to the enactment of the Repeal Statute, violated their due process and equal protection rights. 5
Plaintiffs contend that Section 30-21-3 bestowed upon them a right to enhanced seniority, which “vested” once they became employed by the Cities and presented proof of their honorable discharge from the armed services. They allege that had they been granted the seniority credit they were entitled to under Section 30-21-3, they would have begun and continued their employment at a higher salary, with increased rights in areas such as training, assignments, education, and promotion, and they would have received increased credit for purposes of retirement benefits. Plaintiffs seek damages, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Among other things, they request a declaratory judgment that the Rhode Island legislature’s repeal of Section 30-21-3 was unconstitutional, and an order requiring the Cities to retroactively adjust plaintiffs’ salaries and pension benefits and to pay all sums that would have become due to them absent the unlawful failure to grant seniority credit under Section 30-21-3. Plaintiffs also seek attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Upon learning that a similar challenge to the Repeal Statute was pending in the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the district court stayed all proceedings in this case until that case was decided: In
Brennan v. Kirby,
DISCUSSION
I. The Contract Clause
Plaintiffs argue that Section 30-21-3 conferred an enhanced seniority status upon them, “which became part of the individual employment contract between each veteran and his employer and which entitled the veteran to all perquisites of seniority accorded by the employer.” Repeal of Section 30-21-3 allegedly impaired that contract in violation of the Contract Clause, Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution. 6
The Contract Clause is applicable to
contracts
into which a state enters, but normally state statutory enactments do not of their own force create a contract with those whom the statute benefits.
See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,
The language and circumstances of Section 30-21-3 do not suggest a legislative intent to create private contractual rights. They evince, at most, an intent to create entitlements analogous to welfare and other government benefits.
Cf. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
To be sure, if prior to the repeal of Section 30-21-3, the Cities had contractually obligated themselves to grant enhanced seniority to plaintiffs, their breaking of such a contract pursuant to the Repeal Statute might have implicated the Contract Clause. However, plaintiffs have not alleged that they secured from their municipal employers a specific commitment to confer the enhanced seniority provided by Section 30-21-3. On the contrary, they complain of the Cities’ complete failure to extend to them any rights whatsoever un *615 der Section 30-21-3. As no contractual rights were affected, the Repeal Statute did not impair an existing contract, in violation of the Contract Clause.
II. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “private property” shall not “be taken for public use without just compensation.” U.S. Const., Amend. V. The Takings Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
The Cities argue that the plaintiffs’ claim that they have -been deprived of protected property rights is precluded by the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s determination that Section 30-21-3 merely created “floating expectancies” and not vested property rights. They contend that because any property interest in enhanced seniority arises from state law, of which the Rhode Island Supreme Court is the final arbiter, plaintiffs’ vested property rights claim is foreclosed by that tribunal’s decision in Brennan.
The Cities’ argument misconstrues the role of state law in determining the scope of protection afforded to property rights under the federal Constitution. That the property interest allegedly protected by the federal Due Process and Takings Clauses arises from state law does not mean that the state has the final say as to whether that interest is a property right for federal constitutional purposes. Rather, federal constitutional law determines whether the interest created by the state rises to the level of “property,” entitled to the various protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
Plaintiffs, therefore, contend that notwithstanding the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Section 30-21-3 conferred an enhanced seniority status upon them as soon as they were employed by their respective municipal employers (and had filed proper proof of service), and that this status either itself constituted a property right or gave rise to property rights which could not be retroactively taken from
*616
them. Plaintiffs rely on
United States v. Larionoff,
An initial difficulty with this argument is that, as already pointed out, plaintiffs have not shown that the State or their employers ever provided a contractual guarantee of the seniority benefits in Section 30-21-3. Lacking a contractual right to enhanced seniority, plaintiffs’ interest in the tangible benefits that flow from enhanced seniority is not analogous to a government employee’s interest in salary payments that have already accrued. For most of the time plaintiffs were themselves unaware of the seniority provision. They neither accepted their jobs, nor worked, in reliance upon it. No contractual nor quasi-contractual obligation came into being.
In the absence of a contractual right to enhanced seniority, it is clear that, at least as to prospective seniority benefits, any expectancy that seniority enhancement provided by Section 30-21-3 would continue to exist did not give rise to a property right protected by the Takings Clause. Noncontractual employee benefits that a recipient has not yet received, but has a mere expectation of receiving, are not property as to which the government, before repealing, must provide just compensation.
See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
Plaintiffs argue, however, that the Repeal Statute’s effects are not limited to cutting off
prospective
benefits: the statute also revokes benefits that plaintiffs earlier became entitled to, but never received, when they were first hired or, at least, when in 1984 they filed claims. To determine whether the retroactive effect of the Repeal Statute rendered it a taking requiring just compensation, we look at three factors the Supreme Court has found of “particular significance,” in assessing Takings Clause challenges: “(1) the economic impact of the [statute] on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the [statute] has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.”
Bowen v. Gilliard,
First, the Repeal Statute’s economic impact on the plaintiffs is not so severe as to render it a taking. Although the repeal deprived plaintiffs of a preference they previously were entitled to invoke, it did not deprive them of monetary benefits already paid over.
8
The Repeal Statute left them in the same employment relationship they had accepted when they were hired by the municipalities. At that time, they were not granted the benefit of enhanced seniority, nor were they' apparently aware of any such right. After the repeal, their position was no different economically from that of those employees who had not served in the military.
Cf. Pineman,
Second, since the statute does not deprive plaintiffs of contractual rights, it does not interfere with “investment-backed expectations.”
See Pineman,
Finally, the nature of the government action, under the Repeal Statute, was not to “physically invade or permanently appropriate any of the [plaintiffs’] assets for [the State’s] own use.”
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,
We hold, therefore, that the retroactive effect of the Repeal Statute did not give rise to compensation rights under the Takings Clause.
III. Substantive Due Process
Although the Repeal Statute did not deprive plaintiffs of a compensable property right, plaintiffs have alleged a tangible interest in the • seniority benefits conferred by Section 30-21-3 sufficient to invoke the general constitutional protection against arbitrary and irrational governmental action.
See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor,
We hold that the repeal of Section 30-21-3 passes rational basis review. Since plaintiffs do not argue that they relied on Section 30-21-3 in accepting employment with the Cities or in entering the service, there is no particular unfairness to them in the retroactive aspect of the Repeal Statute.
Cf. Usery,
Plaintiffs also argue that the Cities’ failure to afford them seniority credit and the State’s failure to enforce Section 30-21-3
prior to the repeal
was “arbitrary and capricious.” However, as we explain in our discussion of the equal protection issue, the pre-repeal administrative policy of not enforcing section 30-21-3 was supported by a rational basis, notwithstanding the fact that it violated state law.
See
Part VI, below. Consequently, the policy did
*619
not violate substantive due process.
See generally United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
IV. Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs claim a violation of procedural due process. For procedural due process purposes, a protected property interest in statutory benefits arises when state law creates a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to the benefits.
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth,
By-passing for the moment whether any due process claim lies against the municipal employers for their nonfeasance
prior
to the Repeal Statute, it is clear that the Repeal Statute itself did not violate procedural due process. Where the legislature enacts general legislation eliminating statutory rights or otherwise adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life, in the absence of any substantive con
*620
stitutional infirmity, “the legislative determination provides all the process that is due.”
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
Plaintiffs, however, argue that the Cities’ failure to accord them enhanced seniority status under Section 30-21-3, prior to the enactment of the Repeal Statute, constituted a denial of “benefits to which they had [a] contractual or statutory entitlement ..'. without due process of law.” Plaintiffs further point out that in denying these entitlements, the Cities “made no pretense of providing any pre- or post-deprivation hearings.”
We have already concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations fail to show a contractual entitlement to enhanced seniority or its accompanying benefits. On the other hand, plaintiffs’ alleged statutory entitlement to enhanced seniority status under Section 30-21-3 raises the question whether, prior to the enactment of the Repeal Statute, the Cities’ denial of enhanced seniority without a hearing constituted a deprivation of property without procedural due process. 11
The answer is “No.” Plaintiffs have not alleged that they were denied seniority enhancement because of a determination that particular persons did not satisfy the requirements of Section 30-21-3. On the contrary, plaintiffs have alleged and argued that the failure to grant them enhanced seniority was part of a uniform policy, followed by the Cities and the Rhode Island Department of Labor, of providing enhanced seniority rights under Section 30-21-2 for re-employed veterans, while not providing such rights, at all, to newly-employed veterans under Section 30-21-3. This policy was allegedly implemented shortly after Section 30-21-3 was adopted in 1945, long before the plaintiffs had obtained employment with the Cities. 12
When statutory benefits are denied or terminated pursuant to a class-wide policy determination, as opposed to an individual determination of eligibility, the Due Process Clause does not require the state to afford a hearing to each affected individual.
See Carson v. Block,
Nor do plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendants misled plaintiffs as to their rights under Section 30-21-3 give rise to a federal due process claim. Since this alleged wrongful conduct was followed on a class-wide basis, it amounts to no more than a failure to implement state law, which in itself does not violate the Due Process Clause.
See, e.g., Archie v. Racine,
V. Access to Courts
Plaintiffs argue that the Repeal Statute violates their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their “right of access to the courts,” by depriving them of any “opportunity for judicial redress,” for the violations of Section 30-21-3. We assume for present purposes that Rhode Island law would have recognized a private cause of action to compel the enforcement of Section 30-21-3.
See
R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-1-2 (“Whenever any person shall suffer any injury to his person, reputation or estate, by reason of the commission of any crime or offense, he may recover his damages for such injury in a civil action against the offender_”); R.I.Gen.Laws § 30-21-7 (making violation of section 30-21-3 a misdemeanor).
See also Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Employees Retirement System of Rhode Island,
VI. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs argue that the repeal of Section 30-21-3 violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating between veterans seeking new employment and those returning to prior employment. Where a statutory scheme adopts a classification
*622
that neither burdens a suspect class nor impinges on a fundamental right, the classification will withstand an Equal Protection challenge if it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
See, e.g., Pennell v. San Jose,
Plaintiffs do not argue that the Repeal Statute discriminates against a suspect class or impinges on a fundamental right. Rather, they claim that the repeal of Section 30-21-3 is sb arbitrary as not to pass muster under the deferential rational basis test. While repeal may serve the legitimate purpose of saving the State money, plaintiffs contend there is no rational basis for distinguishing between re-employed veterans and newly-employed veterans.
See Bishop v. Moran,
The state, however, has wide discretion in choosing the objects which it wishes to support at a particular moment. We cannot say that the distinction drawn here was arbitrary or irrational. As the Cities argue, the state could reasonably have concluded that limiting enhanced seniority to veterans returning to prior employment would serve the legitimate state purpose of enabling the Cities and other employers to engage in effective financial planning. An employer whose employees leave to enter the service may be able to anticipate how many such employees are likely to return and be entitled to enhanced seniority. It would be far more difficult, if not impossible, for an employer to anticipate how many of its new employees over a number of years will be veterans who would have been able to claim enhanced seniority. In addition to this legitimate administrative concern, the state could reasonably have concluded that persons who enter the service at the expense of an employment position that they already have, and will later return to, have a stronger equitable interest in seniority credit for their time in the service than do persons who enter the service and seek new employment upon their discharge.
13
Since the classification at issue reflects these rational considerations, it does not violate equal protection.
See Kollett v. Harris,
*623 Plaintiffs somewhat more persuasively argue that their equal protection rights were violated by the unequal administration of state law prior to the repeal of Section 30-21-3. They point out that the administrative policy, allegedly followed by the Cities and the Rhode Island Department of Labor, prior to the enactment of the Repeal Statute, of requiring enhanced seniority for re-employed veterans under Section 30-21-2, but not for newly-employed veterans under 30-21-3, was in flagrant disregard of existing state law.
However, the fact that withholding enhanced seniority to newly-employed veterans was, at that time, contrary to state law did not transform an otherwise rational distinction into a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As the Supreme Court has stated, in the context of an equal protection challenge:
[0]fficial action [of a state agency] is subject to constitutional infirmity to the same but no greater extent than if the action were taken by the state legislature. Its illegality under the state statute can neither add to nor subtract from its constitutional validity. Mere violation of a state statute does not infringe the federal Constitution. And state action, even though illegal under state law, can be no more and no less constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment than if it were sanctioned by the state legislature.
Snowden v. Hughes,
Whether the pre-repeal administrative policy of providing enhanced seniority for re-employed veterans but not for newly-employed veterans violated the Equal Protection Clause must, therefore, be determined by reference to the federal rationality standard, rather than by reference to Section 30-21-3.
See Stern,
Plaintiffs allege that the State’s refusal to enforce Section 30-21-3 was “willful, malicious, and criminal.” These allegations, however, do not remedy plaintiffs’ failure to show that the distinction between newly-employed and re-employed veterans is arbitrary or irrational under federal standards.
See Snowden v. Hughes,
We do not condone the State’s and the defendants’ failure to follow state law for a long time prior to the repeal of Section 30-21-3. The federal Constitution does not, however, provide a remedy for the state law violations alleged here.
See Archie v. Racine,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Costs to appellees.
Notes
. The Repeal Statute also contained a provision stating:
The remedy for any alleged violation of section 30-21-3 of the general laws including any pending cases providing for veterans’ benefits in connection with employment, including without limitation, any seniority rights, shall be limited to prospective injunctive relief and shall not include any award of darn-ages, back pay, attorneys' fees, or any retroactive redress for any alleged past violations. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has held
that this provision was intended to limit the remedies for Section 30-21-3 violations if the retroactive repeal of the section were invalidated.
See Brennan v. Kirby,
. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
. The record on appeal does not indicate whether the district court ever granted certification of the purported classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
. The complaints also named the State of Rhode Island and several State officials as defendants. The parties stipulated to dismissal of these defendants after the Supreme Court ruled that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under [42 U.S.C.] section 1983."
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,
— U.S.-,
.Plaintiffs’ complaints also contained allegations of civil rights violations, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and of Rhode Island statutory and constitutional violations. These have not been argued on appeal. The state law claims, moreover, also seem to be foreclosed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinion in
Brennan v. Kirby,
Hoffman's complaint contains 17 counts and 314 paragraphs. Langlois’s complaint contains 5 counts and 135 paragraphs. Both complaints are repetitive and disorganized. The district court's observations about the complaint in a related case are apt here:
A cursory reading of the complaint establishes beyond doubt that it violates both the letter and spirit of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). It contains neither a short nor a plain statement of the claims being made by plaintiffs. The Court must wade through paragraph after paragraph of excess verbosity to arrive at and then understand precisely what plaintiffs are attempting to assert as a cause of action.
West v. Bristol,
. The states are prohibited from passing any “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10.
.
See also Richardson v. Belcher,
. The only benefit which the complaint alleges was actually granted was the limited grant of seniority that the Warwick Board of Public Safety extended to Hoffman in July 1985, and rescinded the next month. Plaintiff Hoffman has not argued that the City of Warwick's rescission of this limited grant, which included no monetary benefits, constituted a Takings Clause violation.
. Whether the classification created by the Repeal Statute, distinguishing between re-employed veterans and newly-employed veterans, is supported by a rational basis is addressed in our discussion of the equal protection claim. See Part VI, below.
. The Supreme Court has characterized as an open question the issue of whether an
applicant
for government benefits, as opposed to someone already receiving benefits, is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of procedural due process. Compare
Lyng v. Payne,
. Our holding that plaintiffs have not been deprived of a property interest for Takings Clause purposes is not determinative of the issue whether they had a property interest for procedural due process purposes.
Cf. Richardson v. Belcher,
. The only exception to this policy, according to plaintiffs, was that several Rhode Island municipalities, but neither of the defendant Cities, did grant seniority credit under Section 30-21-3 in response to requests made by employees in 1984. The State itself never took action to enforce Section 30-21-3.
.
Ford Motor Co.
v.
Huffman,
. Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
. Similarly, we have held that whether a classification effected by administrative state action violates the Equal Protection Clause cannot be determined by reference to
federal statutory
standards. In
Izquierdo Prieto v. Mercado Rosa,
*624