This is an appeal from a post-judgment order granting the motion of Appellee, Sterling Funeral Directors, Inc. (“corporation”), to cancel a lis pendens filed by Appellant, Leroy Francis (“Francis”). In two issues, Francis contends that the lis pendens was filed pursuant to section 12.007(a) of the Texas Property Code and that the trial court abused its discretion in canceling it. We affirm.
Background
In 1998, Francis, as a ten percent shareholder, filed a derivative action on behalf of the corporation against Gregory S. Sterling (“Sterling”), who owned ninety percent of the corporation. In January 1999, an order agreed to by both Francis and Sterling, appointed Leonard Pipkin (“Pip-kin”) as the receiver for the corporation. In November 1999, after a jury trial, the court entered a judgment in the derivative lawsuit. No appeal from this judgment was ever taken. Sterling was ordered to pay the corporation $169,147.00 and a further $10,000.00 to Francis for attorney’s fees. This final judgment specifically designated Pipkin as the receiver “to preserve the corporation’s assets and to avoid damages to the parties in interest.” In March 2000, the corporation, the administrators of Sterling’s estate, and Pipkin jointly filed a Motion to Expand Power of Receiver and to Approve the Sale of Assets.
The underlying purpose of a lis pendens is to put those interested in a particular tract of land on inquiry as to the facts and issues involved the suit or action concerned. Gene Hill Equip. Co. v. Merryman,
Analysis
In his first issue, Francis contends that his notice of lis pendens complied with section 12.007(a) of the Texas Property Code because his action involved title to real property. This section provides:
(a) After the plaintiffs statement in an eminent domain proceeding is filed or*196 during the pendency of an action involving title to real property, the establishment of an interest in real property, or the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property, a party to the action who is seeking affirmative relief may file for record with the county clerk of each county where a part of the property is located a notice that the action is pending.
Tex.PROp.Code Ann. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 1984).
Francis does not dispute that this is an action regarding the establishment of an interest in real property or the enforcement of an encumbrance against real property. Therefore, we will focus our analysis on whether title to real property was at issue. Francis relies upon Hughes v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr.,
In Hughes, the lis pendens notice was filed prior to the time that the minority shareholder had an opportunity to litigate his derivative lawsuit. Id. Here, Francis had already litigated his claims as a minority shareholder against the corporation and those causes of action had been merged into the judgment of November 9, 1999. Any causes of action he had regarding title were therefore dissolved into that judgment which became final when it was not appealed. See Jeanes v. Henderson,
The post-judgment order of May 12, 2000 from which Francis had previously filed an appeal, only involved the authority of the corporation’s receiver.
In issue two, Francis contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the release of notice of lis pendens on June 30. As stated above, the May 16 notice of lis pendens did not come within the provisions of Section 12.007(a) of the Property Code. A lis pendens trial without statutory authority is void. Moss v. Tennant,
The trial court’s Order Granting the Motion to Cancel Lis Pendens is affirmed.
Notes
. Sterling died on April 30, 1999. His daughters, Nicky D. Sterling and Sherra L. Sterling, became the co-administrators of the estate of Gregory S. Sterling.
. The court, in its May 12 order, had empowered the receiver to act in a liquidating manner by authorizing him to sell the assets of the corporation, which included real property. Francis wanted Pipkin to continue in his capacity as the corporation's receiver in a rehabilitative role, and timely filed his appeal to the May 12 order.