Francis v. Social Security Administration
6:04-cv-02277 | W.D. La. | Sep 28, 2005
REcEl\/ED
SEP 2 8 2005
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LAFAYETTE, LOU|SIANA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE-OPELOUSAS DIVISION
SHAWN A. FRANCIS * CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-2277
VERSUS * MAGISTRATE JUDGE HILL
COMMISSIONER OF * BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
SOCIAL SECURITY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Pending before the undersigned is the Motion to Remand filed by defendant,
Jo Arme B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner”). (rec. doc. 13). Plairitif`f, Shawn W. Francis (“Francis”), has filed
opposition (rec. doc. 15). Based on the following reasons, the Motion is DENIEI).
In the Motion to Rernand, the Commissioner seeks an order from this Court
remanding this case for further administrative action pursuant to the fourth sentence
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(§). As grounds for the remand, the Commissioner states as
follows:
The ALJ found that Plaintiff Was disabled between May 3, 2000, and
January 15, 2002, and was therefore entitled to a closed period of
disability (Tr. 17). Conversely, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
disabled after January 15, 2002 (Tr. 19). ln concluding that Plaintiff
was no longer disabled after January 15, 2002, however, the ALJ did
apply the medical improvement review standard in accordance With the
regulations.”
(rec. doc. 13, il I). According to the Commissioner, the Appeals Council has agreed
to accept a remand of this case.
Francis opposes the remand because the medical improvement review is “no
where to be found in the record.” (rec. doc. 15, p. 2). It is unclear whether the
Commissioner made a typographical error by failing to include “not” in its statement
that “the ALJ did apply the medical improvement standard” or whether Francis is
correct.
A district court may remand a case under § 405(g) only in two circumstances:
(1) pursuant to the fourth sentence, which authorizes a court to enter a judgment
affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or without
remanding the case for rehearing; and (2) pursuant to the sixth sentence, which allows
the court to remand where either the Commissioner requests a remand before
answering the complaint or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for
good cause not presented before the agency. fstre v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 51 7, 519(5th Cir.
2000); see also Waters v. Massanarz`, 2001 WL 1143149 (N.D. 'l`ex. Sept. 24, 2001).
The Commissioner asserts that the remand in this case is for further
administrative proceedings, which is considered a fourth sentence remand (rec. doc.
13, p. 2). However, the Court has not yet made a substantive ruling on the
correctness of the Commissioner’s decision, which is a necessary prerequisite to a
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sentence four remand. Melkonyan v. Sullz`van, 501 U.S. 89" date_filed="1991-06-10" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Melkonyan v. Sullivan">501 U.S. 89, 98-101, ill S.Ct. 2157,
115 L. Ed. 2d 78" date_filed="1991-06-10" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Melkonyan v. Sullivan">115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991); Istre, 208 F.3d at 519. The plaintiff has filed a brief in
support of the reversal of the Commissioner’s decision (rec. doc. 10), and the
defendant should have the opportunity to properly respond so that the Court may
make a determination on the merits.
Accordingly, the Commissioner’sMotion to Remand is DENIED, and that the
Commissioner be ORDERED to file a responsive brief on or before November 14,
2005, in the absence of which the Court will proceed to determine the petitioner’s
entitlement to benefits without be fit of the Commissioner’s brief.
Signed this£day of'L@, 2005, at Lafayette, Louisiana.
§ w /~M
C. MICHAEL HILL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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