65 P. 362 | Idaho | 1901
Lead Opinion
In this case we are called upon to review the proceedings of the trial court on appeal from the judgment thereof. It appears that William M. Francis and Sarah F. Francis are husband and wife. The complaint alleges that
We have set out the complaint, answer and cross-complaint in this action in almost their entirety, for the reason that judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. From the pleadings it will be observed that all the parties to this action reside upon what is known as the “Fort Hall Indian Reservation”; that the land upon which they reside, as well as the stream from which they procure their water for irrigation and domestic use; are also upon this reservation, and are not a part of the public domain, subject to entry and settlement, as provided by our public land laws. From the record it appears that the defendants entered into a contract with William M. and Sarah M. Francis by which they agreed to pay the attorney’s fee and costs in a certain case to be commenced in the district court between said William M. and Sarah M. Francis as plaintiffs and one Goodenough as defendant which action was for the purpose of settling the rights between said William M. and Sarah M. Francis to the use of the waters for irrigation and domestic purposes, of Little Cottonwood creek; that said action was commenced and tried in the district court of Bannock county, and the waters of said stream decreed to said parties; that said defendants thereafter paid said attorney’s fee and costs, amounting in all to the sum of $114.80; and that thereafter said William M. Francis did convey a one-half interest in the water decreed to him to these defendants, and that they took possession thereof, and used said water continuously for more than two years. We think this case clearly falls within the rule laid down in section 6008, which is as follows: “The preceding section 6007 must not be construed to affect the power of a testator in the disposition of his real property by a last will and testament. Nor to prevent any trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law. Nor to abridge the power of any court to compel the specific performance of an agreement in case of part performance thereof.” For a construction of this section, see Stowell v. Tucker, ante, p. 312, 62 Pac. 1034. In this case the court says: “The predecessor in in
Rehearing
PETITION FOR REHEARING.
A petition for a rehearing has been filed in this ease and upon an examination of its contents, we are of the opinion that it shows no good reason for granting same, and a rehearing ought to be denied and it is so ordered.