[¶ 1] Pamela F. Francis appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superi- or Court (Washington County, Hunter, J.) in favor of Colleen Dana-Cummings, the Passamaquoddy Tribe (the Tribe), the Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Housing Authority (PHA), and five of the PHA’s commissioners (collectively, the Tribal Defendants). Francis contends that the Superior Court erred in ruling that: (1) the Tribal Court, sitting without a jury, has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (2007) to hear her claims against the PHA and the individually-named defendants;
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶ 2] The issues before us arise out of three separate lawsuits, two of which were consolidated, that Pamela F. Francis filed in the Superior Court against the PHA; the PHA’s former Executive Director, Colleen Dana-Cummings; and five individually-named PHA commissioners. All individual parties are members of the Pas-samaquoddy Tribe.
[¶ 3] On or about February 24, 1998, while Francis was residing in Old Orchard Beach, representatives of the PHA forcibly entered and took possession of a residence, Unit 25, that Francis had formerly occupied on the Passamaquoddy Reservation at Pleasant Point. Francis asserts that the residence was her private property, acquired as the successor to her father’s interest as the lease-purchaser, and that she suffered the loss of household items and other damages as a result of the entry into her residence.
[¶ 4] Francis first filed a four-count complaint in 2002 against the PHA in the Passamaquoddy Tribal Court, based on the same facts as in the case before the Superior Court, alleging violations of the Tribe’s Fair Housing Code, damages due to trespass, unlawful entry, and illegal possession of personal property. The PHA filed a counterclaim, seeking to quiet title to the property and alleging that Francis never had legal rights to the residence at issue and that her occupation of the unit
[¶ 5] We have previously considered several appeals in Francis’s state court claims against the Tribal Defendants. The lengthy history of the cases is reviewed in our opinion in Francis v. Dana-Cummings (Francis IV),
[¶ 6] In Francis IV, we remanded the case to the Superior Court with instructions to allow the Tribe to intervene as a defendant. Id. ¶ 24,
[¶ 7] On remand, the Tribe filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The individual defendants filed nearly identical motions for summary judgment, as did the Tribe and the PHA in Francis’s separate case against the PHA.
[¶ 8] After our remand in Francis IV, but before the Superior Court acted on the Tribal Defendants’ motions, the Tribal Court (Pleasant Point Division, Irving, J.) tried Francis’s claim against the PHA. The Tribal Court entered a judgment for Francis, finding that Francis’s father’s agreement with the PHA to lease-purchase Unit 25 was valid and that Francis was the successor-in-interest to the residence under the agreement following her father’s death. The Tribal Court concluded that the PHA violated the Tribe’s Fair Housing Code and, thus, Francis’s rights as a tenant/homebuyer. The court awarded Francis $10,461.75 in compensatory and emotional distress damages and ordered the PHA to deliver the deed to Unit 25 to Francis upon her payment of the $8048.60 balance due on the home. The Tribal Court held that punitive damages were not available because the PHA is a governmental entity immune from such damages. The PHA is appealing the judgment to the Appellate Division of the Tribal Court, as is Francis who asserts that the Tribal Court erred in denying her request for attorney fees.
[¶ 9] Shortly after the Tribal Court issued its judgment, the Superior Court granted summary judgments in favor of the Tribal Defendants. The court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that, as a matter of law, the issues, “sounding as [they do] in basic issues of housing on the Tribal reservation,” involve “an internal tribal matter.” Accordingly, the court concluded that state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Francis’s claims pursuant to section 6206(1).
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶ 10] We review a summary judgment de novo, considering the evi
[¶ 11] We also review the interpretation of a statute de novo and accord the words of the statute their plain, ordinary meaning. Maddocks v. Whitcomb,
[¶ 12] The central issue on appeal is whether, as a matter of law, Francis’s claims involve internal tribal matters, thus barring a state court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over them. The statute central to this appeal, section 6206(1) of the Maine Implementing Act, provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, within their respective Indian territories, shall have, exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges, powers and immunities ... of a municipality of and subject to the laws of the State, provided, however, that internal tribal matters, including membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal government, tribal elections and the use or disposition of settlement fund income shall not be subject to regulation by the State.
30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (emphasis added). Thus, despite the otherwise broad grant of jurisdiction to state courts with respect to the Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot Nation, see, e.g., 30 M.R.S. §§ 6204, 6206(2) (2007), a state court has no subject matter jurisdiction over internal tribal matters. See State of Maine v. Johnson,
[¶ 13] Section 6206(1) does not define “internal tribal matters” over which state courts have no subject matter jurisdiction, instead stating that internal tribal matters include, in a non-exhaustive list: “membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal government, tribal elections and the use or disposition of settlement fund income.” 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1). Although Francis’s claims involve her right to possession or ownership of a residence on tribal land, they do not involve her right to reside within the Tribe’s territory, which has been undisputed.
[¶ 14] Because Francis’s claims do not fit squarely within any of the examples of “internal tribal matters” listed in section 6206(1), we look to case law to address this issue. We have previously analyzed whether an issue involves an “internal tribal matter” in two opinions, Stilphen and Great Northern Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation,
[¶ 15] In Stilphen, we considered whether the Tribe’s provision of beano games to the public, in violation of state law, was an “internal tribal matter” within the meaning of section 6206(1).
[¶ 16] In Great Northern Paper, we did not discuss the ejusdem generis approach taken in Stilphen. Instead, we adopted the non-exclusive, non-dispositive factors described in Akins v. Penobscot Nation,
[¶ 17] Applying these factors, we concluded in Great Northern Paper that:
[A] Tribe’s own methods of convening and engaging in government will in most instances be matters “internal” to the Tribe. The methods by which the Tribes govern themselves are not matters of interest to the citizenry of the state at large. Tribal government will ordinarily be focused on Indian territory, tribal resources, and members of the Tribe. Moreover, treating the processes of tribal government as free from state interference is entirely consistent with the intent of the settlement acts.
[¶ 18] In Francis TV, we instructed the trial court to make factual findings to determine: (1) whether the dispute is between tribal members; and (2) who has ownership or possessory rights to the property in dispute and, if unclear, whether that question is resolved by the application and interpretation of tribal law.
[¶ 19] With the guidance of this history, particularly referencing the factors to consider in determining if a disputed issue relates to an internal tribal matter listed in Great Northern Paper, Fellencer and Akins, we look to the facts of this case.
[¶ 20] Here, the record establishes, without dispute, that:
1. All of the individual parties are members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe.
2. The property involved in the dispute is a low-income housing unit located on the Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Reservation on land owned by the Tribe.
3. The dispute involved occupancy and rights to use property on the reservation.
4. All questioned actions occurred on the reservation and involved only members of the Tribe and agencies controlled by the Tribes.5
5. A forum to redress any violation of rights and provide remedies exists in the Tribal Court.
6. This dispute can be resolved without participation by or communication with parties or agencies outside of the reservation community.
7. Resolution of this dispute requires the interpretation and application of tribal law, regulations, rules, and policies.
[¶21] Judged against the criteria discussed in Great Northern Paper, Fellencer, and Akins, and as the Superior Court determined, these factors demonstrate that the dispute here is an internal tribal matter over which the Tribe and the Tribal Court have exclusive jurisdiction, not “sub
[¶ 22] Francis argues that she must have access to State court remedies because the PHA was the only defendant in her Tribal Court litigation and because a jury trial, attorney fees, punitive damages, and the capacity to seek relief pursuant to the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA) were not available to her in Tribal Court. If such were the case, any claim involving an internal tribal matter could be shifted to State court by the simple device of pleading an entitlement to a remedy not available in Tribal Court.
[¶ 23] The important policies of the law to support tribal self-government over internal tribal matters limits claims involving such matters where, as here, some remedy and a forum to assert entitlement to the remedy is available within the Tribe. See Fellencer,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Title 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (2007), part of the Maine Implementing Act, 30 M.R.S. §§ 6201-6214 (2007), provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penob-scot Nation, within their respective Indian territories, shall have, exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges, powers and immunities ... of a municipality of and subject to the laws of the State, provided, however, that internal tribal matters, including membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal government, tribal elections and the use or disposition of settlement fund income shall not be subject to regulation by the State.
. As we suggested in Francis v. Dana-Cummings (Francis IV),
. The Stilphen Court noted that, at the time the Implementing and Settlement acts were under consideration, Maine’s Attorney General “understood the 'internal tribal affairs’ exception to have been drafted ‘in recognition of [the Indians'] unique cultural or historical interest.’ ” Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen,
. In Great Northern Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation,
Prior to the settlement, the State passed laws governing the internal affairs of the Passama-quoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, and claimed the power to change these laws or even terminate these tribes .... While the settlement represents a compromise in which state authority is extended over Indian territory to the extent provided in the Maine Implementing Act ... the settlement provides that henceforth the Tribes will be free from state interference in the exercise of their internal affairs.
. We have previously held that the PHA is a "quasi-municipal corporation, separate and independent from the Tribe.” See Francis IV,
. In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest that all seven factors we list must always be present for a matter to be an internal tribal matter. Such must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The seven factors listed here demonstrate the strength of the view that this matter is an internal tribal matter.