Charles FRANCES v. GAYLORD CONTAINER CORPORATION
00-130
Supreme Court of Arkansas
June 8, 2000
July 13, 2000
20 S.W.3d 280
527
Bridges, Young, Matthews & Drake PLC, by: Michael J. Dennis, for appellee.
W.H. “DUB” ARNOLD, Chiеf Justice. Appellant, Charles Frances, brings the instant appeal challenging a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission denying his claim for medical expenses and temporary total-disability benefits. In a published decision dated January 19, 2000, the Arkansas Court of Appeаls reversed the Commission‘s decision. See Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 69 Ark. App. 26, 9 S.W.3d 550 (2000). Pursuant to
The parties agree that on September 23, 1996, Frances was injured while working for appellee, Gaylord Container Corporation. At the time of thе accident, Frances had worked for appellee for approximately thirty-four years. According to Frances‘s testimony, on the day of the accident he was clearing away paper, broken during processing, from a paper machine when a scanner struck him on his left side, causing him to twist to the floor in an awkward motion to avoid being seriously injured. Following the accident, Frances continued to work until mid-November, when he missed two days of work.
Eventually, Frances sought medical treatment on December 2, 1996, from Dr. Clyde Paulk, who referred him to Dr. Robert D. Dickins, Jr. Following an MRI scan, Dr. Dickins diagnosed Frances with a possible herniation. Frances then began conservative treatment, including physical therapy, and continued to work full-time, until his back condition failed to improve. Ultimately, on September 3, 1997, he underwent surgery and remained off work until Jаnuary 7, 1998.
Frances‘s co-worker, Brian Hamblin, an eight-and-a-half-year employee who worked as third-man on the paper machine for four years, corroborated the September 23, 1996, incident. Specifically, Hamblin testified that Frances‘s shirt was torn and that his arm was cut following the incident. Hamblin also recalled that Frances reported the incident to supervisors and completed an accident report with the foreman. Two to three days after the accident, Hamblin observed that Frances “laid up on the counters” because of back рain and that he began walking with a limp.
Randy Womack, a four-year employee who worked as the fourth-hand on the paper machine in September of 1996, testified similarly. Womack reported that Frances told him that the “scanner had caught him.” Womack also observed that Frаnces‘s “arm was bleeding and his shirt was torn” after the accident. Moreover, he related that three days after the accident, Frances told him that his back was hurting and he was feeling numbness in his leg.
Bobby Young, Frances‘s auto mechanic, testified that in November of 1996, Frances came in Young‘s shop “walking
After Frances filed his claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the Administrative Law Judge determined that the claim was compensable and ordered Gaylord to pay appellant related medical expenses and temporary total-disability benefits from September 3, 1997, through January 7, 1998. Gaylord apрealed the ALJ‘s decision to the Workers’ Compensation Commission, which reversed the ALJ and found that Frances had failed to prove that his back condition was the result of any work-related accident.
Notably, the Commission also found that Dr. Dickins‘s opinion failed to satisfy the requiremеnts of
As you are aware, the determination of onset of symptoms related to an injury is determined based on the history a patient gives the physician. The description of the injury Mr. Francis sustained is included in my consultation report dated December 6, 1996. The statement that I can make about this is that the mechanism of injury that he describes could producе a lumbar disc injury. The history given that he initially sustained back pain and then four weeks later had recurrent back and leg pain could be consistent with an injury to the disc initially, subsequently followed by the development of a herniation of that disc.
(Emphasis added.)
Following the Commission‘s decision reversing the ALJ‘s award, Frances appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case, reasoning that the Commission had no substantial basis to deny compensability. Although the appellate court agreed that credibility determinations were left to the Commission, it submitted that the Commission was not free to arbitrarily disregard any witness‘s testimony. See Frances, 69 Ark. App. at 30, 9 S.W.3d at 553. From the appellate court‘s decision reversing the Commission, comes the instant appeal. Notably, when we grant a petition to review a case decided by the Court
I. Substantial evidence
Appellant‘s first point on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Commission‘s decision denying him benefits. On appeal, this court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission‘s decision and affirm when that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Ester v. National Home Ctrs., Inc., 335 Ark. 356, 361, 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998) (citing Golden v. Westark Community College, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W.2d 154 (1998); Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997)).
Substantial evidence exists if reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion. Id. Moreover, we will not reverse the Commission‘s decision unless fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusion when considering the same facts. Id. Where the Commission denies benefits because the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission‘s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. McMillan v. U.S. Motors, 59 Ark. App. 85, 953 S.W.2d 907 (1997).
Although аppellee Gaylord acknowledges that the September 23, 1996, accident occurred, it contends that Frances‘s injuries are not attributable to the accident. In support of its position, appellee cites instances when Frances reported other causes as the source of his condition, including statements to medical providers and insurance carriers that his injury was not work-related. For example, Gaylord points to Frances‘s initial statement to his treating physician that his injuries were not work-related. Next, Frances told Dr. Dickins that he had a subsequent work-related accident in November of 1996, which caused his pain. Frances also denied work-relatedness when he applied for group health benefits. Furthermore, Frances suggested to his co-worker Brian Hamblin that his back problem was caused by old age rathеr than a work-related accident.
Likewise, Gaylord suggests that Frances‘s work history disproves a causal link between the September accident and his subse
In response, Frances suggests that he elected to pay his own way because he was told that if he filed a claim, it would probably be denied and his insurance might stop paying. Apparеntly confused as to the consequences of signing the workers’ compensation claim forms and seeing appellee‘s doctors, Frances opted to continue treatment with his own physicians. In any event, Gaylord argues that these facts provide substantial evidence to support the Commission‘s decision to deny benefits. We agree. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commission‘s decision, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the denial of benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission and reverse the Court of Appeals.
II. Section 11-9-102(16)(B)
The second issue before us on appeal concerns the interpretation of the clause “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” as set forth in
In Atwood, the Court of Appeals quoted favorably from a Nebraska Supreme Court decision which explained that:
... expert medical testimоny based on “could,” “may,” or “possibly” lacks the definiteness required to meet the claimant‘s burden to prove causation. Our well-known preference for the use of phrases “reasonable degree of medical certainty” or “reasonable degree of probability” is an indication to courts and parties of the necessity that medical expert opinion must be stated in terms that the trier of fact is not required to guess at the cause of the injury.
Atwood, 61 Ark. App. at 196-97, 966 S.W.2d at 913 (quoting Paulsen v. State, 249 Neb. 112, 121, 541 N.W.2d 636, 643 (1996)). Following this direct quote from the Paulsen case, the Atwood court reasoned that although the court expressed a preference for certain phrases:
“... an expert opinion is to be judged in view of the entirety of the expert‘s opinion and is not validated or invalidated solely on the basis of the presence or lack of the magic words ‘reasonable medical certainty.’ ”
Atwood, 61 Ark. App. at 197, 966 S.W.2d at 913 (quoting Paulsen v. State, 249 Neb. 112, 121, 541 N.W.2d 636, 643 (1996)).
In its petition for review, Gaylord submitted that thе appellate court‘s decision in Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 69 Ark. App. 26, 9 S.W.3d 550 (2000), was in conflict with Atwood. We agree. In quoting with favor from Paulsen, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Atwood that medical opinions based upon “could,” “may,” or “possibly” lack the definiteness required to meet the claimant‘s burden to prove causation. However, in conflict with that expressed position, the Atwood court determined that a physiсian‘s opinion was sufficient when he opined that although eye exams, before and immediately after the claimant‘s injury, would be needed to clearly associate the injury to work-related events, acid “can cause” the claimant‘s injury. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. at 197, 966 S.W.2d at 912-13. (Emphasis added.)
We expressly agree with the Nebraska Supreme Court‘s decision in Paulsen that expert opinions based upon “could,” “may,” or “possibly” lack the definiteness required to meet the claimant‘s burden to prove causation pursuant to
We also note that although Atwood seemingly rejects an expert‘s use of the word “could” when stating an opinion within a reasonable medical certainty, it validates an expert‘s use of the word “can.” Given this inherent contradiction, it is understandable why Frances chose not to rely on the Atwood decision in support of his argument. Consequently, because Frances never cited or relied upon Atwood, we apply our limited overruling of Atwood retroactively. See Wiles v. Wiles, 289 Ark. 340, 342, 711 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (1986); see also Looney v. Bolt, 330 Ark. 530, 536-37, 955 S.W.2d 509, 512 (1997). In conclusion, we hold that Dr. Dickins‘s opinion that appellant‘s work-related accident was the kind of event that could cause his resulting back condition was insufficient to satisfy
CORBIN and SMITH, JJ., concur in part, dissent in part.
DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting in part. I concur with the result reached by the majority, but I write separately to express my concern that this opinion not be so broadly construed as to precludе future workers’ compensation claims simply because of the way a doctor phrases his medical opinion. As the majority correctly points out,
In the present mаtter, I believe that the majority fails to emphasize a crucial factor common in both this case and Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998), that impacts the reliability of the doctors’ opinions. That factor is the lapse of time following the claimants’ accidents before either of
Concurring in part; dissenting in part.
SMITH, J., joins.