168 Wis. 259 | Wis. | 1918
It will be noted that the defendant Hannah Sieber did not sign the note which was indorsed by the plaintiff John Frailing and which he was compelled to pay. Sec. 1675 — 18, Stats, (negotiable instrument law), provides : “No person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly provided.” This is a statutory embodiment of pre-existing well settled law. Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 303; 2 Corp. Jur. p. 525; 7 Cyc. 549; 21 Ruling Case Law, p. 895. Speaking of the rule that no party can be charged as principal upon a negotiable instrument unless his name is thereon disclosed, Mr. Daniel, in his work on Negotiable Instruments (5th ed.), § 303, says:
“The reason of this rule is that each party who takes a negotiable instrument makes his contracts with the parties*262 who appear on its face to be bound for its payment; it is ‘a courier without luggage,’ whose countenance is its passport; and in suits upon negotiable instruments, no' evidence is admissible to charge any person as a principal party thereto, unless his name in some way is disclosed upon the instrument itself; although upon other written contracts, not negotiable, it is often competent to show that, although signed in the name of the agent only, they were executed in the business of the principal, and with the intent that he should be bound. And in such cases he is bound upon them accordingly. The rule excluding parol evidence to' charge an unnamed principal as a party to negotiable paper is derived from the nature of such paper, which being made for the purpose of being transferred from hand to hand, and of giving to every successive holder as strong a claim upon the original party as the payee himself has, must indicate on its face who is bound for its payment; for any additional liability not expressed in the paper would not be negotiable.”
This principle, now embodied in our statutes, evidently overlooked by the trial court in its disposition of the case, is fatal to the judgment against Hannah Sieber.
While the judgment must be reversed for the reason already stated, a reversal is necessary for the further reason that there are no facts disclosed by the record justifying a conclusion that in the execution of the various notes John Sieber acted as the agent of Hannah Sieber, if in fact that was the effect of the jury’s verdict. The defendant John Sieber, who at the time of the trial had separated from his wife and codefendant, Hannah Sieber, was a willing witness for the plaintiff, and testified that she was cognizant of the fact that he had borrowed the money on the several occasions mentioned and that he had given his notes therefor; that she not only consented thereto, but urged and directed him to dO' so. This is the only evidence from which it may be inferred that he was acting as her agent in borrowing the money. It falls far short of establishing the relation of principal and agent. It reveals nothing more than the natural conferences and conversations that might be expected to
By the Court. — -Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint as to the defendant Hannah Sieber.