64 A.2d 788 | Pa. | 1949
The plaintiff school district sued in assumpsit to recover from the defendant company unpaid school taxes on certain real estate for each of six consecutive fiscal years on the ground of the defendant's alleged personal liability for such taxes.
The statement of claim embraced six separate causes of action, one for each respective year's unpaid taxes, the several causes being separately set out under appropriate headings. The defendant answered to the merits and under new matter averred, with respect to the first two causes of action, that (1) the taxes included *559 therein were the same as had been returned by the tax collector of the school district to the county commissioners for non-payment on a date prior to the institution of the suit, and (2) the claims based thereon were barred by the Statute of Limitations (Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm. L. 76, Sec. 1, 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 31) . To the remaining four causes of action, the defendant answered that the property upon which such taxes were assessed and levied had been sold by the county treasurer on tax liens on October 14, 1942 (prior to the levy and assessment of any of the taxes covered by the remaining four causes of action), and that the property had been purchased at such sale by the county commissioners. The defendant further alleged that it had made certain payments on account of the delinquent taxes in suit.
The plaintiff, in its reply to the new matter, did not dispute the sale of the property to the county commissioners, as alleged by the defendant, and, further, admitted the payments on account of the taxes in suit as averred by the defendant. As the material facts were either expressly admitted or undisputed, the plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. After argument, the learned court below enteredsix separate judgments, viz., two for the plaintiff and four for the defendant. From those judgments, the plaintiff and the defendant have each taken but one appeal which gives rise to an attendant procedural difficulty.
It was, of course, entirely proper for the plaintiff to combine in one suit a number of similar causes of action triable in the same county: see Rule 1020(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (354 Pa. xxxix). Such had previously been the practice under existing law: see Commonwealth v. Turner SupplyCompany,
The defendant company has not pressed upon us the contention it made below that the plaintiff's first two causes of action were barred by the Statute of Limitations. We shall not, therefore, make further reference *561
to that matter, especially as the learned court below properly rejected the contention. In such connection, see Erny's Estate,
In support of its second contention with respect to the plaintiff's first two causes of action, the defendant argues that the plaintiff school district may not recover a judgment for taxes in an action in assumpsit brought after the real estate against which the taxes were levied had been returned to the county commissioners for nonpayment of the particular taxes. Our decision in Blythe Township School District v.Mary-D Coal Mining Company, Inc.,
The only difference (immaterial, as will appear) between the instant case and the Blythe Township case is that here the suit was brought under Sec. 21(b) of the Act of May 25, 1945, P. L. 1050 (
The remaining four causes of action stand in an entirely different position. None of the taxes embraced thereby was assessed or levied while the defendant company *563
was the record title owner of the property involved. As the plaintiff admits, the defendant ceased to be the owner on October 14, 1942, when the property was sold to the county commissioners by the county treasurer at a tax sale; and the taxes covered by the causes of action now under consideration were levied for subsequent years: see Reading Trust Company v.Campbell,
Personal liability for taxes on real estate in Pennsylvania is an incident of record ownership of land at the time of the assessment and levy of the taxes covered by the liability:Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances, etc., Trustee, v. Bergson,
The Act of May 29, 1931, P. L. 280, as amended,
Sec. 17 of the Act of 1931, supra, further provides that, after redemption by the former owner or upon a sale by the county commissioners, the "property shall be charged by the assessor in the name of the last purchaser or redeemer, andsuch lands shall again be liable for taxes as other lands." (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, under Sec. 21(b) of the Act of 1945, supra, whereon the instant suit is based, the action in assumpsit therein authorized for the recovery of taxes is a suit against the party "owing such taxes". Obviously, there can be no such person until there has been a due assessment followed by a formal tax levy; and, as we have seen, there is neither an assessment nor levy of taxes on property held by the county commissioners. Until those required steps of the process of taxation are taken, no tax liability is imposed and, hence, no personal liability therefor can be asserted.
In Benzinger Township School District v. Elk County, 50 Pa. D. C. 449, in an opinion which both this Court and the Superior Court have specifically approved as well-reasoned (see ZerbeTownship School District v. *565 Thomas,
The judgments subject to the several appeals are affirmed at the costs of the respective appellants.