*1 did nоt of a continuance which the denial This is a case. delayed the have even not plaintiffs. prejudice only a few case, was filed which young it was day year before days over the circumstanc way to view There is retain to unable That Lowe was dismissed. support reasonably here which would es to with- King’s motion attorney until an and the dismis denial of a continuance unreason- granted is had been draw 1089; Id. at Locas of Mr. Lowe’s case. sal at least want able, attorney would since cio, at 499. 694 F.2d accepting files before Lowe’s see to addition, attorneys would most case. III. CONCLUSION. begin scheduled a case to take hesitate court abused its discretion The district a continuance. without a month triаl within denying his dismissing Mr. Lowe’s suit and difficulties, Lowe these without Even Consequently, for a motion continuance. he found February when only had reverse, and Lowe’s action reinstate Mr. we prepara- lack of attorney’s out about apply. Rule 36 shall Circuit remand. a new hire tion, 20 both to March until ready to attorney attorney and have for the fault Finally, much of
try the case. on the sched- to trial proceeding
Lowe’s not had King, Mr. who with rests
uled date apparently had case and
prepared could not he quite a while that for
known date because scheduled trial on the
go to case. with another a conflict & CON- VICINITY FOX VALLEY WORKERS STRUCTION on of discretion abuses have found We FUND, Plaintiff-Appellee, PENSION Beeson, 931-32; facts. F.2d at similar Cir.1983). (7th Webber, 1070-71 721 F.2d at v. on their hearing cases favoring
The policy (Lamar), Laurine BROWN un- court’s outweighed the district merits Defendant-Appellant, clearing its concern derstandable Webber, here. as it does docket Brown, Defendant-Appellee, Dessie Greyhound case is unlike Stevens This Cir.1983), (7th Linеs, Inc., action of an affirmed a dismissal Claimants, Defendants. All Unknown plaintiffs’ prosecute based for failure There, the attorney. find an No. 88-2322. failure given several continuanc- had plaintiff been Appeals, Court United States exhorted repeatedly been had es and Circuit. Seventh attorney. find an 18, 1989. Argued Jan. unreason- that it was Having concluded Dec. En Banc Reargued between Mr. Lowe to choice put able to even his when going to trial dismissal 9, 1990. March Decided trial, ready for attorney was not previous motion denial of Lowe’s Judge Lozano’s of discre- abuse was also an
a continuance case is same reasons.
tion for Real Es- Washington Sherwin
unlike Cir.1982),
tate, Inc., F.2d 1081 three which was City, a case
cited request for a old at the time
years
continuance, plaintiffs did not in which se, pro and in case
object trying their *2 Baum, Neuman,
Bernard M.
M.
James
Ill.,
Sigman, Chicago,
Roy
Baum &
Hassel-
Ala.,
tine,
Hasseltine, Florence,
Harris &
age. The
Schramm,
reaching retirement
died before
A.
Mark
Esposito,
F.
Nicholas
may desig-
Heuel,
specifies
Plan
how
Chi-
Heuel,
&
Esposito
M.
Terence
beneficiary:
Valley. nate
Fox
Ill.,
plaintiff-appellee
cago,
Beneficiary
Participant’s
shall be
Funai,
Masuda,
&
Morel,
Eifert
L.
Gerald
designates in the
persons he so
person or
Janich,
Ill., Daniel N.
Mitchell, Chicago,
*3
in
received
the Admin-
last written notice
Ill.,
defendant-appellant Laurine
for
Lyons,
Participant’s
prior to the
istrative Office
Brown.
responsibility
the
death.
It shall be
Hasseltine,
Hasseltine, Harris &
Roy
writing
Participant
notify
to
in
Des-
Ala.,
defendant-appellee
Florence,
for
choice of
Administrative Office
his
Brown.
sie
Beneficiary.
Beneficiary
any change in
or
Participant may,
the consent
A
without
BAUER,
Judge,
Chief
Before
Beneficiary, or
designated
his
then
CUDAHY,
Jr.,
WOOD,
CUMMINGS,
Beneficiaries, change his Beneficiaries.
FLAUM,
COFFEY,
POSNER,
[Participant shall
In the event
MANION,
RIPPLE,
EASTERBROOK,
Beneficiary, or if such
fail to name a
KANNE,
Judges, and
Circuit
living
time
Beneficiary shall not be
at the
Judge.
ESCHBACH,
Circuit
Senior
death,
Participant’s
such benefits
of the
WOOD, Jr., Circuit
HARLINGTON
paid to:
shall be
Judge.
(a)
living;
legal spouse, if
his
filed
action
interpleader
This is an
(b)
then to his
spouse
living,
if no
Vicinity
Work-
Valley &
Construction
Fox
shares;
living
equal
children
(“Fund”) to determine
Pension Fund
ers
living,
(c)
spouse
if
or children be
pay-
a death benefit
recipient of
proper
shares,
equal
or
parents
his
then to
partici-
Fund
death of
of the
because
able
if
parents
such
the survivor of
(“James”). The defen-
Brown
pant James
(1)
living;
one
Laurine Brown
aсtion are
in the
dants
children,
parents be
(d)
spouse,
if no
spouse, and
former
(“Laurine”), James’s
living brothers
living, then to his
(“Dessie”),
mother.
James’s
Brown
Dessie
shares;
equal
sisters
Laurine’s motion
court denied
The district
children,
(e)
parents,
spouse,
if no
sum-
and entered
summary judgment
for
living,
to
then
and sisters be
brothers
in fa-
against Laurine
mary judgment
Partici-
of such deceased
the estate
Dessie, ordering
pay
the Fund to
vor
pant.
appeals
Laurine
to
benefit
Dessie.
death
Beneficiary
executed a
James
decision.
naming Laurine as
Designation Form
ac-
interpleader
brought this
The Fund
Lau-
September
beneficiary. On
1335. The district
under 28 U.S.C.
tion
§
They both
were divorced.
rine and James
to 29 U.S.C.
pursuant
jurisdiction
had
court
property settle-
court-approved
to
agreed
1132(e).
raises issues under
This case
§
following proviso:
that included
Security
Income
Employee Retirement
any interest or
each waive
parties
(ERISA),
1001-
29 U.S.C.
1974
§§
Act of
retirement, pension,
any
in and
claim
ap-
jurisdiction over this
We have
1461.
annuity plans re-
and/or
profit-sharing
pursuant
peal
oth-
employment
sulting
party.
er
BACKGROUND
I. FACTUAL
divorce,
continued
James
after their
Even
were married
and James
Laurine
1986 and
for much
live
Laurine
was covered
1982. James
April
change his
no effort
made
1987. James
Vicinity
Work-
Valley
Construction
Fox
&
divorce.
beneficiary after the
designated
(“Plan”),
provided
Plan
Pension
ers
17, 1987.
on June
James died
(“Death
Benefit
Lump
Sum Death
at-
when
dispute arose
Benefit”)
plan pаrticipant’s
payable to
paid to
Benefit
Death
have the
tempted to
if the
designated
refused,
Sears,
claiming
Co.,
her. The Fund
it
Roebuck
&
F.2d
(7th Cir.1988).
who should
was uncertain
receive the
Death Benefit. The Fund then filed this
noted,
As the district court
this is a
action,
interpleader
asserting
although
impression
case of first
under ERISA. We
designated beneficiary,
it
Laurine was
spouse
must determine whether a divorced
legal
as to the
effect of the
was uncertain
designated
who was
beneficiary prior
as a
marital
in to the divorce will still receive the Death
seemingly
waived her
which Laurine
despite
Benefit
provision
in the divorce
from the Fund. The
Fund
settlement waiving any rights to the bene
since,
Dessie as a
also named
defendant
fit.
preempts
pen
Because ERISA
state
Plan,
under the
Dessie would receive the
laws,
sion
1144(a),
benefit
if
benefit
the court determined that Lau- must find the answer to this issue within
*4
properly
rine
waived her claim.
ERISA itself or in the federal common law
summary judgment
Laurine moved for
interpreting ERISA. See Pilot
Ins.
Life
21, 1987,
James,
arguing
Dedeaux,
41,
on October
45,
Co. v.
481 U.S.
107 S.Ct.
1549,
unrepresented
1551-52,
who was
at their
(1987) (state
divorce
tenance. Equity Retirement Act of 98-397, (1984); Pub.L. No. 98 Stat. 1426 see II. DISCUSSION S.Rep. Cong., 18-19, 98th 2d Sess. No. Summary judgment Cong. should be reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Ad & granted only genuine when there are no 2564-65. Prior to the en min.News of material issues fact and when the amendments, mov actment of these some courts ing party judgment is entitled to tentatively as a mat exempted state domestic rela 50(c). ter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. There were tions orders from the ERISA anti-alien disputed facts in See, this case and the provisions. dis ation e.g., Operating En that, law, trict court found as a gineers’ matter of Local # Pension Trust Fund 428 paid the death benefit should be Dessie.1 v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 200 Cir. 1981) (order We review decision de novo. assigning EEOC v. alimony benefits for suggested description It was that there were unresolved which either of them had prevented summary judg- might against material facts that hereafter have or claim the other. ment. These unresolved facts concerned the It was stated that the consideration was the agreement promises consideration for the and the back- mutual standings and several and under- ground leading up signing. to its agreement On its face the regarding set forth in the interests, agreement parties states that good each con- and for other and valu- sidered it to be in their best try interests to settle able considerations. We see no need to kind, nature, every go between parties. them all behind the mutual of the
279 part of divorce agreement a ERISA); T v. &AT in conflict with confirming, ap- ratifying, expressly (ERISA provi- decree 124-25 F.2d at 592 Merry, it as an order of the proving, adopting support obli- traditional not alter do sions specifically part of the It was 314, court. Reicker, F.2d Cody gations); of the court “each judgment prevent Cir.1979) (ERISA does not (2d under the terms perform shall parties obligations). support for garnishment agreement.” said un- most removed amendments The 1984 preempted arguing that her waiver exception creating a limited by certainties misinterprets pur- for a state provisions the anti-alienation provisions and spendthrift pose behind the “qualified if it is a order relations domestic QDRO. The effect of a intended (“QDRO”). 29 order” relations domestic are de- provisions of ERISA spendthrift rela- 1056(d)(3)(A). A domеstic U.S.C. § employee’s ac- that the to “ensure re- meet certain technical must tions order actually benefits are available crued QDRO recognized as to be quirements un- purposes,” preventing retirement under ERISA. H.R.Rep. assignment or alienation. wise case 1056(d)(3)(B)-(E). parties All reprint- 2d Sess. Cong., 93d No. does property settlement agree Cong. & AdminNews ed U.S.Code QDRO. of a requirements meet *5 4670, focus 4639, provisions These 4734. the settlement argues that since Laurine benefits or alienation of assignment provi- anti-alienation QDRO, the not a is right of a not the waiver by participant, a She property settlement. nullify the sions designat- by made a payment of benefits no ef- can have that the settlement claims QDRO is exception beneficiary. The ed beneficiаry. of on the fect assign- alienation or on the centered also alien- assignment or prohibits ERISA legisla- in As noted ment of benefits. and, according to Lau- benefits, of ation creation, recognition, or history, “the tive a only for exception an rine, makes ERISA right payee’s alternate assignment of the marital if a claims that QDRO. Laurine from exempted be benefits” will qualify, does not settlement property QDRO re- if the provisions spendthrift pursuant to paid must ERISA benefits 575, 98th S.Rep. quirements met. No. beneficiary. of original designation 1984 U.S. reprinted in Cong., 2d Sess. A Cong. 2565. when she is states Laurine correct & Admin.News Code of bene- right payment QDRO creates a attempt alienate or any preempts at property settlement The mаrital or- fits. by a domestic relations assign benefits those any right to waives in this case issue QDRO. The a is not if that order der benefits. in this at issue property settlement marital assignment or case, however, an not was pro- specify the QDRO requirements The In the by James. benefits, of benefits but assign
alienation
necessary to
cedures
attempt to dis-
settlement,
made
James
not
followed
need
procedures
those
Instead,
dis-
Laurine
inter-
his interest.
an
pose
waiving
is
nonparticipant
a
when
benefits.
right she had
ben-
any
ERISA allows
pension
claimed
in
benefits.
est
Plan,
in the
in bene-
Laurine,
interests
nonparticipant
a
their
to waive
eficiaries
benefit,
1055(c)(l)(A)(i)
just as
any
See,
right
e.g., 29
her
waived
fits.
joint and
in
may
to benefits
interest
any
(spouse
waive
waived
James
time). The
any
property
at
This marital
of benefit
form
pension.
survivor
Laurine’s
that a
the di-
made clear
incorporated into
ERISA amendments
was
settlement
preserv-
method of
QDRO
proper
Court
was the
by the Circuit
decree entered
vorce
in
spouse
a former
September
ing the interests
Illinois on
County,
Kane
S.Rep.
575, 98th
decree,
See
pension benefits.
No.
found
That court
1986.
1984 U.S.
19, reprinted in
Cong.,
en-
2d Sess.
consideration, “was
for its
presented
As
Cong.
voluntarily between Code
freely and
& Admin.News
into
tered
noted,
had
Browns
if the
court
the district
“not unconscionable.”
parties”
was
in the
Laurine’s interest
to secure
the wished
made
specifically
that court
Therefore
benefits,
QDRO
they could hаve executed a
Brown,
Construction Workers v.
establishing
right.
a
F.Supp.
(N.D.Ill.1988),
such
Other methods
when it not
general
available to
ed that
were also
establish Laurine’s
rule is that a divorce
does not
beneficiary designation
interest. Laurine and James could have
affect a
in
pension
a life
policy.
left
mention of
insurance
Significantly,
out of
settlement,
Eighth Circuit
the marital
also cited the district
James
court
opinion in Fox
Valley
redesignated
could have
Laurine as
when it
his ben-
observed
Instead,
eficiary.
spouse’s beneficiary
jointly
the Browns
interest
“[t]he
divested, however,
can be
agreed
pursuant
to waive all
in
interest
each other’s
to a
pension plans.
judg
Such a waiver
in a
does not fall
divorce
Lymаn,
ment/’
scope
within the
spendthrift
ERISA’s
at 693. The
Lyman
provisions.
general
We hold that a
court found that
proper waiver
word
ing by
nonparticipant
specifical
of interest
a
divorce decree did
a
is
not
ly refer
preempted by
modify
to and
the beneficiary
ERISA’s anti-alienation
inter
est
provisions,
participant’s
which in
incorpo-
this case was
ex-wife. The
Eighth
rated
a state court
Circuit therefore
judgment.
into a
affirmed the dis
trict court’s award of
pri
benefits to the
Lyman
erroneously
Laurine
asserts that
mary beneficiary.3
Lyman opinion
is
Hill,
Lumber Co. v.
281
1976);
Cherry,
Keeton v.
(Iowa
793,
v. Cen-
798
rights. See O’Toole
those
nation
(Mo.Ct.App.1987); Bell
694,
697
728 S.W.2d
Pension
Laborers’
tral
Welfare
185,
Garcia,
(Mo.Ct.App.
191
639 S.W.2d
995, 997,
N.E.2d
299
Funds,
Ill.App.3d
12
Schleis,
561, 562,
N.M.
Haley v.
1982);
97
held
court
(1973).
392,
The district
394
(1982);
Culbertson
164,
165
642 P.2d
property
in the marital
that
the waiver
Co.,
906,
P.2d
Assurance
631
Continental
termination
specific
awas
settlement
(Utah 1981).
was
The district court
913-14
benefits.
contained
finding that the waiver
correct in
issue,
When ERISA is silent on an
specifi
settlement
in the marital
a federal court must fashion federal com
benefits,
pension
fund
cally
dealt
govern
mon law rules to
ERISA suits. Na
at issue in this
Death Benefit
including
Christie,
chwalter v.
(11th Cir.1986)(courts
805 F.2d
959 case.
develop
must
federal
other
by pointing to
counters
interpreting ERISA);
rules when
Amato v.
qualify
seems to
O’Toole
language
Bernard,
(9th Cir.1980)
618 F.2d
567
affect
ability
of a divorce
(Congress intended that courts would de
O’Toole, beneficiary.
In
rights of a
velop
ERISA).
federal common law for
In
only
specific
Illinois
did state
court
making
rules,
such
we must of course look
a benefi-
affect
benefits would
waiver of
guidance,
to the statute itself for
In re
or a
policy
itself
ciary’s rights “unless
Equip. Co.,
White Farm
788 F.2d
O’Toole, provides otherwise.”
statute
(6th Cir.1986),
proper
and it is also
As
N.E.2d at 394.
at
Ill.App.3d
creating
rules,
turn to state law when
such
out,
qualifica-
pointed
court
the district
Corp.,
Scott v. Gulf Oil
general
method
does not refer
tion
(9th Cir.1985),
long
as
as such state
in the
beneficiary found
designating a
policies underly
law is consistent with the
ing
re-
Instead,
court
O’Toole
was
policy.
issue,
the federal statute at
Nachwal
would
or statutes that
ferring
provisions
ter,
trator must
EASTERBROOK,
Judge,
Circuit
of a
and determine whether
BAUER,
Judge,
whom
Chief
relations orders exist that could
domestic
MANION,
Judge, join,
Circuit
affect
the distribution of benefits. This dissenting.
just
investigation.
such an
case arose from
might
Three
support giving
reasons
only requires plan
Our decision
administra-
James Brown’s death benefits to his moth-
practice
current
tors to continue their
court,
er Dessie: the order of the state
thoroughly investigating the marital status
contract between James and his former
participant.
of a
Laurine,
wife
and Laurine’s waiver.
Finally, Laurine asserts that James
The first
unsatisfactory
of these is
be
unrepresented
hearing
was
at their divorce
cause the
“qual
state court’s order is
anot
and that he did not read or understand the
order”,
ified domestic relations
provisions
settlement,
property
of the
in
1056(d)(3). Matrimonial law does not re
cluding
provision.
argu
the waiver
quire one
disposition
or another
unpersuasive.
sign
ment is also
James did
in an uncontested divorce. James and Lau-
agreement,
provision
and the waiver
rine were
agree
anything they
free to
straightfоrward.
simple
was
Laurine’s
wanted. There is
policy
no state
about the
lawyer inserted the
language,
own
waiver
allocation of death benefits that could be
and Laurine makes no claim that she did
disrupted. The
approval
state court’s
not read
understand the
settlement.
private
is like a consent
She does not claim that she was unaware
decree, which should
treated
like a con
of what effect the waiver could have on her
Cleveland,
tract.
Firefighters
See
own claims. Laurine makes this claim
501, 517-23,
3063, 3072-76,
U.S.
106 S.Ct.
though
even
both Laurine and James on
(1986).
BAUER, EASTERBROOK Chief determining the set- In whether MANION, Judges, join, Circuit and binding tlement constitutes dissenting. part of Ms. of these benefits on the waiver Brown, administering policy this federal of in presents important issue case This according must plan the to its documents resolving administration of ERISA. respected in to ensure that the order issue, have one task: to ascertain that purpose of is effectuated. How- ERISA Congress. implement the will of To- ever, majority, by its over-reliance sight objective. of loses that day’s decision principles, sight loses of that state law altered the Su- Consequently, unless and, consequently, frustrates policy federal Congress, majority’s preme Court Analogous prin- congressional intent. significant impedi- approach stands as helpful in ciples of state law often can be congressional goal of achieving the ment to interpreting and in fash- a federal statute em- and certain administration of efficient in ioning gaps federal common law to close plans. ployee benefit However, legislative scheme. this methodology employed must with ex- A. objective treme caution.3 The ultimate is notes, majority quite pointedly As the policy objectives not to fulfill of state law that sets ERISA is a statute feder- federal congressional to fulfill the command but pension plans subject al standards language in оf embodied and structure of that mandate is its terms. Part federal Here, federal statute. ERISA’s com- 1104(a)(1)(D).1 in That contained section plan mand that a be administered in accord- plan that a be adminis- requires section plan’s ance with the documents must be with the documents tered in accordance primary fashioning in a waiver our concern plan. of that and the instruments general The maxims of state insur- rule. strong fed- statutory command embodies upon majority relies ance law parties participant, all policy eral that not, course, formulated with this were — trustee, beneficiary to ascer- able in explicit command of ERISA mind. —be certain- rights requires, tain their and liabilities with in to effectuate the order certainty expectations in ty.2 plan policy at issue here fulfills federal administration, and ease in quite explicitly. provides mandate It States, 1104(a)(1)(D) See Central S.E. & S.W. Areas of the Labor Title states 1145. Section Truck, plan that a administrator v. Gerber Pension Fund (7th Cir.1989) (en banc). discharge respect to a shall his duties with participants plan solely in the interest of the and— and beneficiaries detail, Congress majority sets forth in 3.As great precise specifying circum- took care in (D) accordance with the documents and provi- in which ERISA’s anti-alienation stances governing instruments .... may be overridden a state marital sions 1104(a)(1)(D) (emphasis supplied). U.S.C. § ample care settlement decree. Such necessary prudence evidence of the and caution already congressional in- 2. We have noted “analogous” state law con- reliance on certainty obligations sistence on cepts. interpretation our § 515 *10 divorce, had, at the time she of Ms. Brown plan’s the according to made changes be maintains, legitimate expectation a that she require that The documents documents. only by receive benefits. Both she and change made would the beneficiary be the Therefore, beneficiary absent Mr. Brown were aware that the plan. to the notification participant, changed. the At the by designation the had not been notification such beneficiary.4 least, then, binding very on the there is a triable issue of not waiver is of fact as to the intent Ms. Brown with B. the that cannot be re- respect to “waiver” summary judgment. solved on that, accept proposition the if Even we the conformity the lack of with despite that, suggests if Mr. majority The Brown beneficiary a statutory scheme benefits, the wanted Ms. Brown to receive inter- to have waived an can be considered beneficiary a he should have new executed a difficult plan, there remains est in the However, it must form after the divorce. intent of Lau- respect to the with question Mr. knew there remembered Brown that addressed that has been rine Brown designation conformed already was a that district court or satisfactorily by either the entitled to plan to the on file. He was is purported The “waiver” majority. the that, had even if Laurine Brown conclude agree- property settlement in a contained divorce, the at the time of waived benefits part the parties as executed the ment change not to his decision marriage. That a document dissolution of redesignation. designation to a amounted rights be- designed adjust was all, informed, at the time After he had been mar- “growing out of parties tween the original designation, that a he made the previ- relationship now ital or other only by effected his com- change could be R.l parties.” existing ously between changing the benefi- ing to the office terms, then, the By its own at Ex. 5. ciary. “waiver”) with (or does deal agrеement judg- reverse the Accordingly, I would respect party’s choices each ground court on the ment of the district property after divorce. disposition of was not effective be- that the “waiver” read the Indeed, quite plausible to it is change of benefi- cause a nothing more establishing as document participant. made ciary was never part of Ms. Brown on the than a waiver However, approach of the even under the QDRO5 part as on a right her to insist issue of there remains a triable majority, Indeed, property. of marital the division summary judgment. precludes fact that supported by the interpretation is such alleges Brown. R.16. She of Ms. affidavit clear, both before Mr. Brown made that divorсe, expected he
and after payable to Con- her. would despite the division
sequently, Indeed, regulations, 1056(d)(1). ac- legislative policy § also ren- U.S.C. primary federal 4. provision, pur- corresponding companying tax that Ms. Brown's the fact ders irrelevant 401(a)(13)(A), "assignment” a ported contained in waiver is define § part divorce arrange- as of a state executed "[a]ny direct or indirect as "alienation” arguendo to assume irrevocable) Even if were action. (whether where- revocable are a the settlement manifesta- terms of participant or by party acquires a a benefi- they policy are contained of state because tion against the ciary enforcеable or interest judgment, we are still constrained in a state (em- 1.401(a)-13(c)(l)(ii) plan...26 C.F.R. congressional mandate. prefer federal clear supplied). phasis Similarly, Brown's we were to construe Ms. if contingent anticipatory gift to the as an waiver participant to alienate permits 5. ERISA Brown, beneficiary, the fact Dessie remains ordered pursuant a state court in a valid, anticipatory gift if at any all, would be such specific fulfills order that domestic relations rule law and such state under state domes- Such a state in ERISA. criteria set forth policies embodied the federal would contravene “qualified domes- called a tic relations order only frustrate the feder- It would not in ERISA. (QDRO). See 29 U.S.C. relations order” tic 1104(a)(1)(D) but also run al of section mandate 1056(d)(3). provision. 29 anti-alienation ERISA’s afoul of