29 Conn. 204 | Conn. | 1860
We have no intention to disturb the current of our decisions in regard to the granting of new trials for verdicts against evidence. Nor do we mean to say that the highway on which this deplorable accident occurred, was not “ so raised above the surface of the adjoining ground as to endanger the safety of travelers,” nor that it was adequately protected by a fence or railing on its sides, as the law requires. Rev. Stat., tit. 24, § 7. Indeed, a majority of us are of opinion that the town had been culpably negligent in regard to such protection. But upon a very careful examination of the evidence before us, we are satisfied that, however negligent the defendants may have been, the unfortunate woman who lost her life, essentially contributed to the production of that result by her own culpable imprudence and indiscretion; so that upon the well established principles of law, promulgated and recognized by this court in many cases, the plaintiff was not entitled to the verdict which he obtained. /
An inlet from Connecticut river, called the cove, runs up into the main land in the town of Glastenbury. About twenty-seven rods from its mouth, a highway had been laid through this cove to the Wethersfield ferry, and a causeway constructed thereon for the accommodation . of the public travel. The causeway was about twenty-five rods long, and nineteen feet wide, was raised about two feet above the ordinary surface of the water, and there was a bridge about nine rods from the easterly end of it. The water in the cove, along the sides of the causeway, was ordinarily about one foot deep, but in times of freshet it frequently rose so high as to submerge the causeway, and render its passage perilous and sometimes impossible.
The general course or bearing of the causeway from the east end to a point about two rods west of the bridge, was about S. 87° W; it then curved toward the north and struck the elevated ground, on the west side of the cove, at a point about
We deem this conversation of some importance, because it shows that, while these ladies were encouraged to go on, by the information that others had passed before them, and by the fact that they had a gentle horse, they were not betrayed into their perilous undertaking, either by the apparent safety of the road, or by their own inattention to its condition, until it was too late to avoid it altogether; and that when they •were entirely beyond the reach of* danger, and could, with but little inconvenience, have avoided it, they deliberately determined to encounter and risk whatever of it might beset their way.
As they approached the causeway, the cove and the condition of the water in it could not have escaped their notice. They saw, and observed, that the causeway was entirely submerged, that a swift and strong current of turbid water
And surely, when upon the bridge, in full view of the scene before them, and aware, as they must have been, .of the accumulated and increasing dangers in their path, and especially with the knowledge which they then possessed of the impossibility of seeing the road, because of the turbid condition and ruffled surface of the water, and the rapidity of its current, they determined to proceed, and drove into the stream, their conduct was far below the standard of ordinary prudence. They voluntarily assumed the risk and all the consequences of their indiscretion.
The bridge was twenty-four, feet long, and fourteen feet wide between the railings. On this bridge they were safe; and if they could not, unaided, have turned around and retraced their steps, they could, and should have remained where they
In view of all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence detailed upon this motion, we feel constrained to say, that the attempt of these ladies to pass over this causeway, and especially over the western part of it, was an act of rashness, which, upon the well settled principles of law applicable in cases of this character, bars all claims in their behalf for damages from the town. We think no person of ordinary discretion in their circumstances, and exercising ordinary prudence and discretion, would have made such attempt.
We are not unmindful of the fact urged upon our, attention by the plaintiff’s counsel, that these travelers were females. And in that fact, and in the timidity, inexperience, and want of skill which it implies, we can find an explanation of their-injudicious and fatal attempt to turn around in the water, but no reason or excuse for the recklessness of their conduct in driving into it. It may be that in the midst of the appalling dangers which surrounded them, judicious conduct was not to be expected, and ought not to be required, but their error was in rushing into dangers which they had but too much reason to expect, and ought to have anticipated and avoided. The inquiry whether, in the particular case, the party conducted with ordinary care or prudence, always involves the consideration of the difficulties and obstacles to be overcome, the party’s knowledge of their existence, and his means and power to overcome them. And if men of ordinary prudence and discretion would regard the ability of the party inade
In order to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, he was bound to show, affirmatively, not only the culpable negligence of the town, but also that the decedent herself conducted with ordinaiy prudence and discretion. Beers v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 19 Conn., 566. Park v. O'Brien, 23 id., 339. Neal v. Gillett, id., 437. Daley v. Norwich and Worcester R. R. Co., 26 id., 591. In the language of Mr. Justice Gridley, in Spencer v. Utica and Schenectady R. R. Co., 5 Barb., 337, “ this is a stern unbending rule which has been settled by a long series of adjudged cases;” and this rule we must consider as the settled law of the state.
The application of this settled rule of law we suppose the jury, from inadvertence, or some other cause, must have failed to make, and finding the negligence of the town, must have decided to charge it with all the consequences of the accident, regardless of the co-operating carelessness of the decedent; which, in our judgment, was distinctly shown by the evidence, and completely established the defense.
We think a new trial should be granted.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
New trial granted.