1. Thе Workers’ Compensation Act as first adopted and as it appeared in the Code of 1933, gave an option to both the employer and employee to reject its provisions, and former Code § 114-201 provided that the parties were presumed to have acсepted the provisions of the Act unless notice as therein specified was given to the contrary. The present Code §§ 114-110, 114-111 on the contrary create a conclusive presumption of coverage unless otherwise specifically provided in the Act. Further, the original provision that an employer not operating under the Act was liable to an action in tort but lost his common law defenses of contributory negligence, fellow servant doctrine and assumption of risk (former Code § 114-204; Ga. L. 1920, p. 177) was entirely eliminated. The penalties which may presently be assessed against an employer who fails to meet the requirements of the Act are the assessment of damáges and attorney fees (Code § 114-603) and criminal prosecutiоn as a misdemeanant (Code §§ 114-9905; 114-9907). See Ga. L. 1972, p. 929 et seq., where Georgia was removed from the minority of "elective” states, and 2A Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 67.10. Cf. Shaw v. Industrial Commission,
2. The so-called no-fault automobile insurance provided by the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (Ga. L. 1974, p. 113 et seq.; Code Ch. 56-34B) requires the owner of an automobile to carry both
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liability insurance in accordance with the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (Code § 68C-307) and protection for certain stated classes of insureds such as the owner and certain relatives, occupants of the vehicle, and pedestrians injured by it. Code § 56-3403 (b) is thus, as analyzed in
Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Davis,
3. We apply the above law to the facts of this case as follows: The defendant owner-operator of the insured vehicle was the employer of the plaintiff оccupant, regularly employed over three persons in his business, and the accident in whiсh the plaintiff was injured arose out of and in the course of her employment. The defendаnt employer has not complied with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act аnd has no workers’ compensation insurance. These latter facts do not alter the рlaintiffs predicament, for she is barred under the provisions of Code § 114-103 et seq. from any remedy except that provided by the workers’ compensation law. This necessarily means that she cannot bring an action in tort against her employer, although she may treat him as a self-insurеr and file a claim under the Act, and also seek penalty and attorney fees. But she may not bring a tort action, and she may not require payments under the liability provisions of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. The defendant was in fact insured for, and she did receive, *539 mediсal and hospital benefits up to the limit of $5,000 under Code § 56-3403b (b).
The trial judge properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.