88 U.S. 475 | SCOTUS | 1875
FOX
v.
GARDNER, ASSIGNEE.
Supreme Court of United States.
*477 Mr. R.T. Merrick (with whom was Mr. B.G. Caulfield), for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. W.F. Vilas, contra.
*478 Mr. Justice HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.
The thirty-fifth section of the Bankrupt Act provides that a transaction like the one under consideration here "shall be void, and the assignee may recover the property or the value of it from the person so receiving it or so to be benefited."
The language of the statute authorizing the assignee "to recover the property, or the value of it, from the person so receiving it or so to be benefited," does not create a qualification or limitation of power. There is no implication that the party paying is not also liable. The words are those of caution merely, and give the assignee no power that he would not possess if they had been omitted from the statute. In the present case the property or value attempted to be transferred belonged originally to the bankrupt. On the adjudication of bankruptcy the possession and ownership of the same were transferred to the assignee.[*] The attempted transfer by the bankrupt was fraudulent and void. It follows logically that the debtor yet holds it for the assignee, and that the assignee may sue him for its recovery.[]
Upon principle there would seem to be scarcely room for doubt upon the point before us. The pretended payment or transfer or substitution by the debtor of the bankrupt was in fraud of the act and illegal. It was a transaction expressly forbidden by the statute. The jury found that the insolvency of Young was known to Fox & Howard, and to *479 the creditors by whom the drafts were taken at the time they were taken; that they were given by the bankrupt with intent to create forbidden preferences, and that they were accepted by Fox & Howard in fraud of the act. This is a transaction expressly condemned by the statute.
It amounts simply to this: the debtor of the bankrupt seeks to protect himself against an admitted debt by pleading a payment or substitution which was in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, and, therefore, void. The proposition carries its refutation on its face. Fox & Howard were indebted to the bankrupt and can only discharge themselves by a payment or satisfaction which the law will sanction. A payment or transfer condemned by the express terms of the Bankrupt Act cannot protect them.
It is to be observed, also, that when the bankruptcy proceedings were begun Fox & Howard had never, in fact, paid to Burrows and his associates the amount of the drafts accepted by them. They had simply promised to pay them, if there should prove upon settlement of their accounts with the bankrupt to be so much money due to him. This presents them in a still less favorable condition. They owe money to the bankrupt. They are sued for it by his assignee in bankruptcy. As a defence they allege that they have made an agreement with Burrows and others, with the assent of the bankrupt, to pay the amount of the debt to them. They allege an agreement merely. This agreement has already been shown to be illegal. The assignee, representing the creditors as well as the bankrupt, is authorized to set up such illegality. The bankrupt perhaps could take no action to avoid this agreement, but his assignee has undoubted authority to do so. When the assignee sets up this illegality and sustains it by proof of the facts referred to, the whole foundation of the defence falls.
It is well settled that a debtor may pay a just debt to his creditor at any time before proceedings in bankruptcy are taken. It is also true that a valid agreement to substitute another person as creditor may be made, and may be pleaded as a discharge of the debt in the nature of payment. It is *480 not, however, payment in fact, and is binding only when the contract is fair and honest and binding upon the first creditor.
The right of an insolvent person before proceedings are commenced against him to pay a just debt, honestly to sell property for which a just equivalent is received, to borrow money and give a valid security therefor, are all recognized by the Bankrupt Act, and all depend upon the same principle. In each case the transaction must be honest, free from all intent to defraud or delay creditors, or to give a preference, or to impair the estate.[*]
If there is fraud, trickery, or intent to delay or to prefer one creditor over others, the transaction cannot stand.
It is urged that Fox & Howard are liable upon the drafts to the creditors of Young, in whose favor the acceptances were given. Should this be so it would but add another to that large class of cases in which persons endeavoring to defraud others are caught in their own devices. The law looks with no particular favor on this class of sufferers.
In the present case, however, there seems to be no such difficulty. The acceptances were a part of an illegal contract, and no action will lie upon them in favor of those making claim to them. They are guilty parties to the transaction and can maintain no action to enforce it.[] The law leaves these parties where it finds them, giving aid to neither. The drafts cannot pass into the hands of bonâ fide holders, as by the terms of the acceptances they are to remain in the possession of Fox & Howard until they can be paid by authority of law. When Fox & Howard pay to the assignee the debt due from them to Young they will pay it to the party entitled to receive it and will have discharged their liability.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] Section 14 of the Bankrupt Act.
[] See Bolander v. Gentry, 36 California, 105; Hanson v. Herrick, 100 Massachusetts, 323.
[*] See Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wallace, 332; Tiffany v. Boatman's Institution, Ib. 376.
[] Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wendell, 24; S.C., 4 Hill, 424; Randall v. Howard, 2 Black, 585; Kennett v. Chambers, 14 Howard, 38.