86 Mo. App. 103 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1900
Plaintiff was a stockholder in the defendant, a corporation organized under the statute relating to building and loan associations. In October, 1892, plaintiff borrowed of the defendant $400, and by the terms of the contract plaintiff agreed to pay monthly $2 on his stock, $2 interest and $2 premium or bonus. As a security for the money so loaned, interest, stock dues and premium, the plaintiff made a deed of trus.t on certain real estate and in addition transferred his stock to the defendant as collateral security. Plaintiff paid these several monthly installments of interest, premium and stock dues, until April, 1899, when he declined to pay any further and sought to redeem his land from these
On the issues the court found for the plaintiff — that said monthly premium aggregating $156 was an illegal charge and usury and credited the principal note therewith, leaving a balance due the defendant of $69.21, on the payment of which it was decreed that the notes, deeds of trust, etc., be cancelled. Defendant appealed.
I. We discover no reason for disturbing this judgment. As has been repeatedly decided, -these buildings and loan associations may collect from the borrowing stockholder in addition to interest, a monthly premium or bonus, provided, however, that such premium shall be fixed by a competitive bidding at a directors’ meeting held for that purpose. If not so fixed, then it is regarded as interest merely on the loan, and if together with the interest proper, the rate shall then exceed the limit allowed by law, then such premium should be treated as usury and the amount so paid go as a credit on the principal note. Brown v. Archer, 62 Mo. App. 277; Moore v. Building and Loan Ass’n, 74 Mo. App. 468; Price v. Empire Loan Ass’n, 75 Mo. App. 551; Barnes v. Mo. Guar. S. & B. Ass’n, 88 Mo. App. 466, and Clark v. Mo. Guard. S. & B. Ass’n, not yet reported.
In this case the trial court found that the so-called pre
In answer to tbe suggestion in defendant’s brief that tbe plaintiff was not entitled to an accounting because “tbe debt was not due,” it is sufficient to say, that tbe debt was due; tbe contract was to pay “ten years after date, or sooner at our option;” and plaintiff exercised this option to pay at an earlier date.
The declarations of Johnson, secretary and agent of tbe defendant, were competent evidence. These statements were made in tbe course of tbe business intrusted to bis management and were made in respect to matters within tbe scope of bis authority.
Other minor objections have been examined and all found without merit. Tbe judgment is manifestly for tbe right party and will be affirmed.