395 S.E.2d 254 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1990
The defendants were jointly indicted for unlawful possession of cocaine. We granted their separate applications for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of their motions to suppress the contraband.
While assisting the FBI in attempting to locate a federal fugitive, the Sheriff of Truetlen County observed a truck pass by him in which appellant Fowler was a passenger. The sheriff knew Fowler and also knew that he was an acquaintance of the fugitive in question. The sheriff testified that there was nothing suspicious about the conduct of the truck’s occupants but that he decided to pursue and detain the
We must agree with the appellants’ contention that the discovery of the cocaine in the truck was the fruit of an unlawful detention. “A person is seized . . . when by means of physical force or show of authority his freedom of movement is restrained. [Cits.] The subjective intention of the officer to detain the defendant had he attempted to leave is irrelevant except insofar as that intention may have been conveyed to the defendant[.] [Cit.]” Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 11-12 (282 SE2d 61) (1981). The appellants’ freedom of movement clearly was restrained when their pathway was blocked by the police vehicle. At that point, a limited investigative inquiry was authorized only if the intrusion was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. See generally Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. 233 (2) (303 SE2d 773) (1983). “[W]here no circumstances at all appear which might give rise to an articulable suspicion (less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice) that the law has been violated, the act of following and detaining a vehicle and its occupants must be judged as an impermissible intrusion on the rights of the citizen. Where this occurs, the penalty exacted by the law is that evidence turned up as a result of such intrusion may not be introduced against the defendant on the trial of his case.” Brooks v. State, 129 Ga. App. 109, 111-112 (198 SE2d 892) (1973). Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that the appellants’ motions to suppress should have been granted.
Judgment reversed.