35 Tenn. 508 | Tenn. | 1856
delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the dissolution of the firm of Frierson and Fowler, engaged in business in New Orleans, they were indebted to John Toole in the sum of $10,409. Some months after the dissolution, Frierson and James T. Robinson, as the agent of Toole, come to a settle* ment, and Frierson executed notes at six, twelve, eighteen and twenty-four months time, in the name of the firm, for the amount in equal payments, when the following receipt was given at the foot of the stated account:
“New Orleans, Nov. 1, 1851.
“ Received of Frierson & Fowler, their notes as above described, for ten thousand four hundred and nine dollars and thirty-two cents, bearing 8 per cent, interest from date, in full for account up to date.
John Toole,
Per Jas. T. Robinson.”
It is proved that Robinson was agent of Toole, and refused to release Fowler by accepting the notes of Frierson without other personal security, and it was certainly his understanding, and perhaps that of
It is clear that the parties intended to look no more to the account, but only to the notes.
It is not controverted, that after the dissolution of a partnership one of the partners has no power to
In view then, of the facts of this case, and the principles of law applicable to them, Fowler cannot be made liable on the account, because that has been extinguished by the notes, with the understanding of both parties that it should have that effect, and not upon the notes, unless a mistake of the law as to the effect of receiving them in discharge of the account, will save the right of the creditor. The parties thought they were not discharging Fowler, but they did, and this mistake of the law cannot affect his rights in a transaction to which he was not a party. It is a general principle, too well settled to be more than suggested, that no one can avail himself of a mistake of the law. Here, then, was no mistake or uncertainty as to the facts, but simply a misunderstanding of the law by which the case would be governed. If, then, the legal consequence of what was done, was the discharge of Fowler from responsibility, the ignorance of the law on the other side, by which that effect would result, cannot change the rights of the parties, or deprive the defendant of any advantages to which he was, by operation of law, entitled.
This view of the case renders it unnecessary to examine the various questions made in argument on other points, as this must be decisive of the case according to the facts before us in the bill of exceptions.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted.