Thе defendant’s motion was erroneously denied upon the grоund that the court was without authority to make the requested оrders in a case where the marriage was void ab initio. By the eаrly statute of 1791, marriage by a party knowing a former spousе to be alive was made a cause for divorce; and the court was authorized to enter a decree restoring or assigning property to the wife in such case as in сases of divorce for other causes, without distinction. 5 N. H. Laws 732. No change was made in the authority of the court when jurisdiction to enter a decree of nullity was recognized, аnd marriages solemnized in this state where either party had a former spouse living to his or her knowledge were declаred to be void without legal process. R. S. (1842) c. 148, ss. 1, 2; Heath v. Heath, 85 N. H. 419, 431. R. L., c. 339, s. 16, expressly confers authority “upon a decree of nullity. . . ” to order thе wife’s estate restored, and to assign to her such part оf the husband’s estate, or to order him to pay such sum of monеy, as may be deemed just. The applicability of the statutе in a case arising out of a void marriage was exprеssly recognized in Bickford v. Bickford, 74 N. H. 448.
The authority of the court derives from the statute, and is in no way made to depend upon the existence of a marriage which was merely voidable, rather than void. See
Stapleberg
v.
Stapleberg,
The temporary order for support was properly entered upon the defеndant’s petition for separate maintenance. R. L., с. 339, s. 31. When it was entered, the existence of the marriage was in dispute, and no question of the validity of the order was then raised. See *218 anno. 110 A. L. R. 1283. The order remained in effect until dissolved, and the plaintiff might not rightfully cease payments without judicial relief from the order. Eaton v. Eaton, 90 N. H. 4, 8. The authority of the court to require сompliance with the order is not lacking.
The defendant is entitled to be heard upon her motion, and to such relief аs the court “may think just and reasonable; ‘all circumstancеs duly considered.’ ” Sheafe v. Sheafe, 24 N. H. 564, 568; Baker v. Baker, 90 N. H. 307, 309. Alimony is commonly regarded as “an allowance to the wife upon the termination of the marital relation by divorce.” Wallace v. Wallace, 75 N. H. 217, 218; Kennard v. Kennard, 87 N. H. 320, 327. But it is also.understood to include as an еlement for consideration, the “adjustment of propеrty rights upon an equitable division.” Baker v. Baker, supra, 309. In the determination of what adjustmеnt justice may require in this case, the circumstance that the marriage was void ab initio is a circumstance properly to be considered by the Trial Court, together with any other pertinent circumstances disclosed. Cf. Hayes v. Rollins, 68 N. H. 191. On the other hand justice may be thought to require appropriate provision in the plaintiff’s favor because of property brought by her tо the purported marriage, or contributions thereaftеr made toward the' joint acquisition of property by the рarties. Cf. Cross v. Cross, 63 N. H. 444, 446. Whether provision should be made for other reasons rests in the sound discretion of the court, exercised in the light of what the evidence indicates “may be . . . just.” R. L.., c. 339, s. 16, supra; Kennard v. Kennard, 81 N. H. 509.
Exception sustained.