delivered the opinion of the court.
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether our decision in
Surratt, Adm'r
v.
Thompson,
Plaintiff, Eunice S. Fountain, sought damages against Spencer Fountain, her husband, and others, for personal injuries sustained on August 11, 1970, when an automobile driven by her husband, in which she was a passenger, collided with a car operated by another.
*348 The trial court held that the Surratt decision would be accorded prospective effect only from the time it was rendered, and entered summary judgment for the defendant, Spencer Fountain. We granted plaintiff a writ of error to the judgment.
Plaintiff contends that the rule of Surratt, supra, should be given retrospective effect to August 11, 1970, the date of her accident.
The traditional rule is that a decision abolishing an old common law rule is normally given retroactive effect.
Saffell
v.
Orr,
We have held in cases involving the criminal area that certain new constitutional rights are accorded only prospective effect. In doing so we followed the criteria pronounced in
Linkletter
v.
Walker,
The Supreme Court of the United States has “ ‘recognized the doctrine of nonretroactivity outside the criminal area many times in both constitutional and nonconstitutional cases.’ ”
Lemon
v.
Kurtzman,
“[Sjtatutory or even judge-made rules of law are hard facts on which people must rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct. This fact of legal life underpins our modern decisions recognizing a doctrine of nonretroactivity.”411 U.S. at 199 .
.The_precise question presented in the case at bar has not been before us. But a majority of courts of other jurisdictions that have abolished
*349
intra-family immunity have held that their decisions shall have prospective effect only from the date they were rendered because of justifiable reliance on the doctrine by defendants or their insurers.
Darrow
v.
Hanover Township,
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, before deciding in
Darrow, supra,
whether
Immer
v.
Risko,
2
56
N.J. 482, 495,
In holding that
lmmer
should have prospective effect only from the date of the decision, the court reasoned in
Harrow
that there had been justifiable reliance on earlier decisions upholding inter-spousal immunity. Thus it was entirely conceivable that persons would rely on the existing state of the law in determining what financial protection they needed; and that insurance companies providing protection for their insureds also justifiably relied on the existing law in evaluating the risk entailed, the premiums to be charged, and in deciding whether to investigate an accident involving their insureds while the witnesses were available and the facts were fresh on their minds. The court further reasoned that aside from protecting those who justifiably relied on inter-spousal immunity, prospective application of
lmmer
would foster stability in the law, “since it would avoid the necessity of opening claims which have gone stale because of a failure to prop
*350
erly investigate. Prospectivity permits the courts to introduce important changes in the law with minimal disruption; it will not affect past conduct or relationships.”
We agree with the reasoning of the New Jersey court and the majority of the other courts that the rule abrogating inter-spousal immunity shall be given prospective effect only from the date of the decision announcing the new rule. Hence we disagree with the contention that the rule in Surratt should be given retrospective effect to the date of plaintiff’s accident, which occurred nearly a year before our holding in Surratt.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.
Notes
. Cited and followed by us in Surratt, and
Smith
v.
Kauffman,