393 Pa. 385 | Pa. | 1958
Opinion by
This appeal questions the dismissal by the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County of plaintiffs’ complaint in equity seeking an injunction to restrain the Amalgamated Clothing Workers’ Union of America (herein called Union), and George Nejmeh, its staff representative (herein called Nejmeh), from the unlawful picketing of plaintiffs’ plant located in Palmer-ton, Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff, Fountain Hill Underwear (herein called Fountain Hill), is a partnership engaged in the manufacture and sale of clothing with its principal place of business in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The employees of the'Bethlehem plant are represented by the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (herein called ILGWU). On September 1, 1956, Fountain Hill and the ILGWU executed a collective bargaining agreement, presently in effect, which provides that the terms and conditions of the agreement would apply to any plants that Fountain Hill might open in the future. Fountain Hill subsequently organized the Palmerton Mills, Inc. (also a plaintiff herein) — a wholly owned subsidiary — to extend its operations to a factory building located in Palmerton, Pennsylvania. This building had been leased previously by the Palmer Shirt Co., a corporation without any relationship to plaintiffs, whose employees were represented for collective bargaining purposes by the Union.
On December 17, 1957, after plaintiffs had hired approximately fifty persons, the Union picketed the plant entrance. The complaint avers that approximately two hundred pickets completely obstructed the sole entrance to the plant preventing those employed from entering the building and that numerous acts of violence were committed. Two days after these incidents — on December 19, 1957 — plaintiffs filed this complaint in equity requesting the court to enjoin the Union and Nejmeh preliminarily, until hearing, and permanently thereafter, from (1) mass picketing; (2) acts of violence; (3) preventing entrance to the plant by employees; (4) doing any act calculated to bring about a breach of the contract between plaintiffs and the ILGWU.
The court issued a rule to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted; after a hearing on January 3, 1958, this rule was discharged. The preliminary hearing was limited — in the language of the court — to the question of determining “whether or not there is such violation and interference down there in the operation of the plant, and whether or not it should be restrained.”
The court bases dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint upon the grounds that: (1) plaintiffs failed to allege and prove certain prerequisites to the granting of an injunction under the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, supra ;
' The basic error of the court below stemmed from its mistaken belief that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to every labor dispute. Section 206(d) provides specifically that the Act shall not apply to certain labor disputes.
The second reason assigned, namely, the failure of plaintiffs to produce sufficient evidence to justify in
Moreover, the filing of a complaint in trespass for damages does not oust equity of its jurisdiction, or prove that plaintiffs have a complete and adequate remedy at law. In Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, 380 Pa. 3, 109 A. 2d 815, we specifically recognized that equity relief which both prevents continued injury and allows damages for the harm already caused by the same unlawful act is not incompatible in a labor, or any other, controversy.
The court below finally asserts that the filing of a petition with the National Labor Relations Board by the plaintiffs ousted equity of its jurisdiction and demonstrates that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy
However, even if we assume that the National Labor Relations Board does have jurisdiction over the controversy in question, this does not per se deny state action in all cases. In Wilkes Sportswear, Inc. v. International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 380 Pa. 164, 167-168, 110 A. 2d 418, we stated: “Both parties to this controversy agree that plaintiff’s business involved interstate operations . . . But in view of the
For the above reasons, the order is reversed and the record remanded to permit plaintiffs to submit evidence in support of their allegations and to prove that the Union is still engaged in the alleged unlawful conduct.
The record, however, indicates that the court was concerned only with the question of determining the degree of violence: “. . . If the Court should make such an Order here and restrain mass
In this respect the court clearly erred. The Act of June 12, 1879, P.L. 177, §1 (12 PS §1102) provides: “In all eases in equity, in which a special or preliminary injunction has been refused by any court of common pleas, an appeal . . . shall be allowed, but the pendency of such appeal shall not suspend proceedings in the original suit; . . .” In addition thereto, the Anti-Injunction Act does not provide that an appeal shall act as a supersedeas: Act of June 2, 1937, P.L. 1198, §15, 43 PS §206o.
The Act of June 2, 1937, P.L. 1198, §9, 43 PS §206i: “No court of this Commonwealth shall issue any restraining order or a temporary or permanent injunction in any ease involving or
“(c) That, as to each item of relief granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by granting of relief, (d) That no item of relief granted is relief which is prohibited under section six of this act. (e) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and (f) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable to furnish adequate protection.” The Act of June 2, 1937, PX. 1198, §11, 43 PS 206k: “No . . . injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant . . . who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute, either by negotiation, or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration . . .”
“. . . Provided, however, That this act shaU not apply in any case — (a) Involving a labor dispute, as defined herein, which is in disregard, breach, or violation of, or which tends to procure the disregard, breach, or violation of, a valid subsisting labor agreement arrived at between an employer and the representatives designated or selected by the employes for the purpose of collective bargaining . . .”
*391 “(b) Where a majority of the employes have not joined a labor organization, or where two or more labor organizations are competing for membership of the employes, and any labor organization or any of its officers, agents, representatives, employes, or members engages in a course of conduct intended or calculated to coerce an employer to compel or require his employes to prefer or become members of or otherwise join any labor organization.
“(c) Where any person, association, employe, labor organization, or any employe, agent, representative, or officer of a labor organization engages in a course of conduct intended or calculated to coerce an employer to commit a violation of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act of 1937 or the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
“(d) Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined, an employe, or employes acting in concert, or a labor organization, or the members, officers, agents, or representatives of a labor organization or anyone acting for such organization, seize, hold, damage, or destroy the plant, equipment, machinery, or other property of the employer with the intention of compelling the employer to accede to any demands, conditions, or terms of employment, or for collective bargaining.” Act of June 2, 1937, P.L. 1198, §4, Act of June 9, 1939, P. L. 302, §1, 43 PS §206d.
See note 1, supra.
“The defendants’ first contention is clearly without merit— mass picketing is illegal; coercion, intimidation and threats are illegal; and where these exist it can not he successfully contended that the picketing was peaceful: [Citing eases].” Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., supra, at 363.
“The principles governing the issuing of injunctions against picketing in labor disputes, so far as here pertinent, are well established : ... (2) Where the object of the picketing is unlawful it is properly enjoinable: [citing eases] ... (3) The object of picketing is unlawful and therefore enjoinable if its purpose is to coerce the employer to compel or require his employes to join the union: [citing cases] ... (4) The object of picketing is unlawful and therefore enjoinable if its purpose is to coerce the employer to bargain with a non-representative union and sign a contract with it which would interfere with his employes’ right to choose their own bargaining representative: [citing cases] ... (5) Picketing may be enjoined if one of its objects is unlawful even though not the sole object: [citing cases] . . .” Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, supra, at 549-551.
“Ordinarily a Court of Equity has no jurisdiction to award damages for tortious or iUegal acts, but this is subject to the well recognized principle that once equitable jurisdiction has attached, Equity has jurisdiction to do complete justice between the parties and, inter alia, award damages for tort (or for breach of contract), as well as grant other equitable relief: [citing cases].” Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, supra, at 11.
See: Elisco v. Rockwell Manufacturing Company, 387 Pa. 274, 128 A. 2d 32.
“The question of federal jurisdiction in labor disputes arises only when the employer is engaged in interstate commerce or when his business substantially affects interstate commerce: [citing cases]. The record in this case, as compiled in the court below, does not clearly disclose the extent or even the existence of interstate commerce engaged in or affected by the operation of Vulcan Iron Works. In order to oust this Court of jurisdiction . . . appellants had the burden of establishing facts which would show the interstate character of the business involved.” Haefele v. Davis, 373 Pa. 34, 41-42, 95 A. 2d 195.
Although, in our view, the present record adequately supported the issuance of a preliminary injunction to restrain mass picketing and violence at the time of the first hearing, due to the lapse of time, we believe that now it is in the best interests of all