74 Ga. 251 | Ga. | 1885
Has the complainant in this bill, who, Dy appointment of the court of equity, succeeds the original assignee named under k voluntary assignment made by the Bank of Borne, a right to maintain this suit, either under the terms of that assignment or by virtue of any provision of law, against the defendant, on account of a collusive arrangement charged to have been entered into between him and those to whom he sold the bank, and who afterwards re-organized it as its stockholders, directors and other officers, whereby the creditors and others dealing with the corporation were alleged to have been defrauded and injured? The question for our consideration is, not whether the creditors of this insolvent corporation can maintain a suit against this defendant for his participation in this alleged fraud, which it is insisted has resulted in loss and inj ury to them, but whether its voluntary assignee has authority to institute and carry on such a suit for their benefit.
“ A fraudulent transfer,” says Bump, pp. 444, 445, 446, “ is good ■ as against the grantor, his heirs, executors, administrators, agents, parties claiming under him, and his vendees and grantees. A fraudulent receipt to a person who owe3 money to the debtor is as binding as any other transfer.” The array of cases cited by him in the noles sustaining these positions is overwhelming. Again, the same careful and reliable compiler, on p. 484 of the same work, says, “ If the debtor subsequently makes an assignment, the creditors may still have the fraudulent transfer set aside, for he cannot transfer any right to his assignee which he himself does not possess.” This is likewise sustained by numerous cases cited in note 5.
. “ In general, a receiver, by virtue of his appointment, is clothed with only such rights of action as might have been maintained by the persons over whose estate he has been appointed and to whose rights for purposes of litigation he has succeeded.” High o.n Receivers, §§201,205, and cita
Several cases have been cited by the complainant .which are supposed to authorize this suit, especially’ Casey vs. Cavaroc, 96 U. S., 475, and Pillsbury vs. Kingon, 33 N. J. Eq., 287. Upon examination, however, it will be found that each case rests upon the peculiar provisions of statutes specially intended to confer the power upon assignees to maintain such for suits causes of action ; they are therefore not in conflict with the general rule, but have been taken out of its operation by virtue of the legislation designed to enlarge it so as to embrace the cases theretofore excluded from it. It is true that the reasoning of the court in the last case goes very far to abrogate the rule itself, and it may perhaps be fairly inferred that the result would have been the same had there been no legislative enactment expressly or impliedly authorizing it. The court, however, puts the case squarely upon the act of the New Jersey legislature. That act applies not only to suits by assignees, but to those by executors and administrators, and authorizes them to impeach transactions for fraud, wherever the creditors of the assignor or of the decedents could have done so.
In the strictly analogous case of fraud committed by the deceased in his lifetime, it has been held that while his creditors might set the transaction aside on that account, the executor or administrator could not do so in any case where the testator or intestate had no authority to bring an action. Our own decisions are full upon the question, and will dispense with the necessity of citing others from the English authorities and from nearly all the states of the Union. Crosby vs. DeGraffenreid, 19 Ga., 290; 20 Id., 452, 464, 465; 22 Id., 431. For a full and
Such being our view of1 the law applicable to this case, the verdict sought to be set aside could have been no other than it was. It is not binding upon the creditors of the bank or others having claims against it on account of the alleged fraudulent dealings between the defendant and those who became its owners and managers; and as to any rights they have against the defendant on this account, the voluntary assignee of the bank was not their trustee and had no authority to act for them in that behalf. This suit, as to them, is to all intents and purposes a suit between strangers; it is res inter alios acta. On this ground alone, and without any reference whatever to the other questions made upon the trial, which we have not considered, and as to which we express no opinion, we ratify the action of the superior court and order its judgment affirmed.