25 P.2d 497 | Cal. Ct. App. | 1933
In this action the plaintiffs sought an injunction restraining and prohibiting the defendants (members of a colored race), from leasing, renting or occupying certain lots of land described in the complaint. Judgment went in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiffs appeal.
The record shows that the tract of land involved in this proceeding embraces 199 separate lots. The court found that 62 of the owners of the lots described in the plaintiffs' complaint did not sign the agreement; that 18 of the signers did not own the lots set opposite their names in the complaint and alleged to be the owners thereof; that as to 5 of the lots, which apparently were owned by tenants in common, the agreement was not signed by all of the owners of the respective lots. The agreement contains no provision for forfeiture or penalty, and if otherwise valid, could only be enforced by a prohibitory injunction. No time is specified in the agreement for its duration, as appears by the following paragraph contained therein: "That we and each of us, the undersigned, the owners of the said several parcels of land, will not permit the said property, or any part thereof, to be leased to, or rented to, nor shall the same ever be used or occupied by any person of either the Negro, African or Asiatic race, or any person not of the White or Caucasian race, whether by the owner, tenant or *484 any other person, except, however, that these covenants and conditions shall not prevent the employment on the said property of Negro, African or Asiatic servants."
The map introduced in evidence showing the lots and blocks described in the complaint reveals that the lots owned by the signers to the agreement are widely separated, do not constitute a solid mass, and are interspersed by a number of lots owned by persons not signing the agreement.
[1] The court found from the testimony introduced, and also in the construction of the agreement, that it was not intended to have any force or effect until it had been signed by all of the property owners, which brings the case directly within the ruling had in Oberwise v. Poulos et al.,
[2] Another ground exists upon which the judgment of the trial court must be sustained, to wit: The agreement is void as being against the provisions of sections
[3] The condition of the agreement which we have quoted is so worded that there can be no segregation of the reasons or inducements for the signing thereof by the respective lot owners. Under these circumstances the whole condition upon which the agreement purports to be based must be held invalid. Other reasons might be assigned, but the foregoing are sufficient to show that the judgment of the trial court must be, and the same is, hereby affirmed.
Thompson, J., and Pullen, P.J., concurred.