In this аction the plaintiffs sought an injunction restraining and prohibiting the defendants (members of a colored race), from leasing, renting or occupying certain lots of land described in the complaint. Judgment went in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiffs appeal.
The record shows that the tract of land involved in this proceeding embracеs 199 separate lots. The court found that 62 of the owners of the lots described in the рlaintiffs’ complaint did not sign the agreement; that 18 of the signers did not own the lots set opposite their names in the complaint and alleged to be the owners thereof; that as to 5 of the lots, which apparently were owned by tenants in common, the agreement was not signed by all of the owners of the respective lots. The agreement contains no provision for forfeiture or penalty, and if otherwise valid, could only be enforced by a prohibitory injunction. No time is specified in the agreement for its duration, as appears by the following paragraph contained therein: “That we and each of us, the undersigned, the owners of the said several parcels of land, will not permit the said property, or any part thereof, to be leased tо, or rented to, nor shall the same ever be used or occupied by any person of either the Negro, African or Asiatic race, or any person not of the White or Caucasian race, whether by the owner, tenant or *484 any other person, except, however, that these covenants and conditions shall not prevent thе employment on the said property of Negro, African or Asiatic servants.”
The map introduced in evidence showing the lots and blocks described in the complaint reveals that the _ lots ^ owned by the signers to the agreement are widely separatеd, do not constitute a solid mass, and are interspersed by a number of lots owned by pеrsons not signing the agreement.
The court found from the testimony introduced, and also in the сonstruction of the agreement, that it was not intended to have any force or effect until it had been signed by all of the property owners, which brings the ease directly within the ruling had in
Oberwise
v.
Poulos et al.,
Another ground exists upon which the judgment of the trial court must be sustained, to wit: The agreement is void as being against the provisions of sections 711 and 715 of the Code of Civil Procedure prohibiting an unlimited restraint of alienation. While a restraint of occupancy for a limited time has been held valid, in a number of cases an unlimited restraint of aliеnation, as appears to be the intent of the agreement involved in this actiоn, has been held invalid. We may say the question is definitely settled
*485
in this state in the case of
Title Guarantee & Trust Co.
v.
Garrott,
The condition of the agreement which we have quoted is so worded that there can be no segregation оf the reasons or inducements for the signing thereof by the respective lot owners. Under these circumstances the whole condition upon which the agreement purрorts to be based must be held invalid. Other reasons might be assigned, but the foregoing are sufficient to show that the judgment of the trial court must be, and the same is, hereby affirmed.
Thompson, J., and Pullen, P. J., concurred.