Case Information
*1 In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 14, 2015 S15G0321. FOSTER v. GEORGIA REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY.
B LACKWELL , Justice.
Dana Foster sued the Georgia Regional Transportation Authority under the provisions of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq., alleging that the Authority is liable in tort for injuries that she sustained while riding as a passenger on its bus. The Authority moved for judgment on the pleadings, noting that the period of limitation for a claim under the Tort Claims Act is two years, see OCGA § 50-21-27 (c), and Foster filed her lawsuit morе than two years after she sustained the injuries in question. Foster, however, had given ante litem notice of her claim to the Authority and the Department of Administrative Services as required by the Tort Claims Act, see OCGA § 50-21- 26 (a), and she argued that the period of limitation was tolled for so long as her *2 notice of claim was pending. In support of this argument, Foster pointed to OCGA § 50-21-27 (e), which provides that “[a]ll provisions relating to the tolling of limitations of actions, as provided elsewhere in this Code, shall apply to causes of action brought pursuant to [the Tort Claims Act],” and OCGA § 36- 33-5 (d), which provides that “[t]he running оf the statute of limitations shall be suspended during the time that the demand for payment is pending before such authorities without action on their part.” The trial court denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the Authority took an interlocutory appeal.
Concluding that the tolling provision of OCGA § 36-33-5 (d) has no
application to a claim asserted under the Tort Claims Act, the Court of Appeals
reversed. Ga. Regional Transp. Auth. v. Foster,
As we have explained before, when we read statutory text, “we must
presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant,”
Deal v. Coleman,
That provision speaks of tolling a period of limitation “during the time
that
the
demand for payment is pending before
such
authorities without action
on their part.” OCGA § 36-33-5 (d) (emphasis supplied). The statutory
references to “demаnd for payment” and “authorities” are particularized; the
statute clearly means to refer to some specific “demand for payment” and
particular “authorities.” And the context оf subsection (d) — in particular, the
other provisions of OCGA § 36-33-5 — reveals the specific “demand for
*5
payment” and “authorities” to which subsection (d) refers. See Smith v. Ellis,
(e) The description of the extent of the injury required in subsection (b) of this Code section shall include the specific amount of monetary damages being sought from the municipal corporation. The amount of monetary damages set forth in such claim shall constitute an offer of compromise. In the event such claim is not settled by the municipal сorporation and the claimant litigates such claim, the amount of monetary damage set forth in such claim shall not be binding on the claimant.
(f) A claim submitted under this Code section shall be served upon the mayor or the chairperson of the city council or city commission, as the case may be, by delivering the claim to such official personally or by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery.
a claim against a municipal corporation] is pending before [the governing authority of that municipal corporation] without action on [its] part.”
By its own terms, OCGA § 36-33-5 (d) permits the tolling of the period of limitation only for claims against municipal corporations. The Authority is not a municipal corporation, and for that reason, OCGA § 36-33-5 (d) does not apply to any claim against the Authority, whether under the Tort Claims Act or otherwise. The Court of Appeals correctly reversed the denial of the motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the judgment of the Court of Apрeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Notes
[1] Foster allegedly was injured on an Authority bus on August 16, 2011. She filed her lawsuit on September 18, 2013.
[2] Foster gave ante litem notice in February 2012, well within the two-year period of limitation, and it appеars that the State may never have responded to the notice. In any event, no one disputes that, if the pendency of the notice of claim tolled the period of limitation, the stаtute of limitation would not bar this lawsuit.
[3] Judge McMillian concurred in judgment only and did not join the opinion of the
Court of Appeals. See Foster,
[4] See 1 New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 123 (1993 ed.) (when used as a relative adverb or conjunction, dealing with quality or manner, the primary meaning of “as” is “[i]n the way or manner that; to the same extent that; in proportion as; according as” when used without an antеcedent like “so” in a subordinate clause, or “[i]n the same way as, as if, as it were; after the manner of; in the likeness of; like” when used in a phrase with part of the subordinate clause understoоd); American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, p. 106 (3d ed. 1992) (when used as a conjunction, “as” can mean “[i]n the same manner or way that”).
[5] In its entirety, OCGA § 36-33-5 provides as follows: (a) No person, firm, or corporation having a claim for money damages against any municipal corporation on account of injuries to person or property shall bring any action against the muniсipal corporation for such injuries, without first giving notice as provided in this Code section. (b) Within six months of the happening of the event upon which a claim against a municipal corporation is predicated, the person, firm, or corporation having the claim shall present the claim in writing to the governing authority of the municipal corporation for adjustment, stating the time, place, and extent of the injury, as nearly as practicable, and the negligence which caused the injury. No action shall be entertained by the courts against the municipal corporation until the cause of action therein has first been presented to the governing authority for adjustment. (c) Upon the presentation of such claim, the governing authority shall consider and act upon the claim within 30 days from the presentation; and the action of the governing authority, unless it results in the settlement thereof, shall in no sense be a bar to an action therefor in the cоurts. (d) The running of the statute of limitations shall be suspended during the time that the demand for payment is pending before such authorities
[6] Foster points to an opinion in which the Court of Appeals, citing OCGA § 36-33-5
(d), said thаt “giving ante litem notice under the statute involved in Howard [v. State of Ga.,