*1 gross counts of sexual assault submitted to gross his conviction of sexual assault jury
should be vacated. McAlevey’s testimony
heard that Powers incidents,
had confessed two the written single
confession of Powers recounts a inci- gross
dent of sexual assault. Dr. Ricci’s
testimony scarring about rectal addressed
the fact of the occurrence but not the num-
ber of the occurrences. On this evidence jury rationally could find the written
statement of Powers to more reliable confession,
than evidence of the oral
accordingly, guilty could find Powers gross
but one count of sexual assault. See Smith, v. (“any
State
issues as to witness or the
weight testimony lie within exclusive
province jury.”)
Judgments affirmed. (orally), Ellsworth, Michael L. Ross Mar- Harris, Paine, Harris, Lynch Bangor, tha Hunt,
James C. Elizabeth A. Williams Robinson, Kriger, McCallum & Greene, Portland, Vafiades, Lewis V. Va- fiades, Kominsky, Bangor, Brountas & defendant.
Joy W. FOSTER WATHEN, Chief Justice. FOSTER,
Charles K. Jr. plaintiff Joy appeal On Foster’s we con- Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. parties’ premar- sider the proceedings. to their divorce ital Argued March order, Superior Court In its divorce A.R.J.) (Hancock Browne, applied County, $50,- and awarded rights. her marital addresses We conclude that only in disposition the marital estate the event of defendant Charles by the improperly applied and was Superior Court. We vacate in 1977 married were children. Both and have two minor married, defen previously had been first mar by his dant had adult children before the riage. About a month *2 plaintiff signed (Me.1983). an Applying recited her desire to release dower and all other principle, this we the hold that rights “which, by marriage, the reason of provides only for certain inter trans- vivos she may acquire property in the property fers of inheritance rights. and of” agreement provided defendant. The paragraphs of the numbered deal with payment plaintiff $50,000 for of in the plaintiff’s rights defendant, as widow of event of defendant’s death. dower, and use terms such as distributive share, and descent. Most importantly, the precise language the the of paragraph establishing plaintiff’s entitle- $50,000 agreement providing pay- for the $50,000 ment the expressly for ment specifically payment conditions that payment only survives defen- plaintiff surviving on Foster “as his lawful dant, paid [plaintiff] sum be widow,” “[s]uch [to] defendant that the agree- as soon after the death of as plaintiffs [defendant] in entirety read releases practicable, in but no event later property in his in the event of di- year than after his death.” one The broad Specifically, vorce. relies on the he intro- language introductory the clauses to the ductory paragraphs read- expand does not actual ing as follows: provisions agreement. See WHEREAS, Foster desires to make a Berzinis, Estate and sufficient (antenuptial agreement did not refer to [plaintiff] in release in of and full satis- suggestive death but used terms of di- which, faction of all after the so- vorce, apply not to wife’s inheritance so did marriage, their might lemnization of she Gibson, rights); Parkhurst v. A.2d 454 or marriage could have reason of the (N.H.1990) (rejecting attempt to construe in property now has or general in the “Whereas” hereinafter or in his estate pre- to extend of a clause where the to divorce WHEREAS, [plaintiff] desires to ac- agreement did not include the words “di- cept all rights in vorce,” “alimony” “property settle- or acquire by which she would otherwise ment”). reason of the in the or Foster_ estate of challenges the additionally Plaintiff Su- Further, payment por- he contends that the perior of child Court’s awards tion of the contains fees; attorney’s we no abuse of the find that addresses both defendant’s death and in these court’s discretion either of awards. other circumstances: cross-appeal on Defendant’s contention dismissing in payment Court erred
[Plaintiff] provided paragraph [$50,000] alleging in re- his cruel abusive counterclaim merit. of all is also and full satisfaction treatment without which, by reason of the she in the to the Su- Judgment vacated. Remanded Foster, consideration thereof she perior proceedings consistent hereby relinquish all waive and opinion. with this which, Foster, as widow acquire.... would otherwise COLLINS, JJ., ROBERTS and principle It is well established give interpreted is to be effect contract
to the intention reflected ROBERTS, Justice, concurring. instrument, construed in re written matter, to vacate spect subject join I in the court’s decision to the motive and separately to making write purpose of vacating object accomplished. express an additional reason Baybutt See Corp. v. Union Ins. Constr. Commercial complaint, Joy Foster asks Joy] inter Mitchell in release of [then
alia for an
award of
which,
That re-
full satisfaction of
af-
quest
any express
was denied without
rea-
ter
the solemnization
their mar-
soning,
presumably
riage,
but
might
the basis of
or could
by any
have
premarital agreement.
Nowhere in
op-
*3
erative
or in
which Foster has or
the recitals
hereafter ac-
agreement
quire
or in his
alimony.
refer to
I am unwill-
ing
WHEREAS,
to extend the
reference to
ac-
Mitchell desires to
quired by marriage in
which
estate” of Charles
Joy
Foster to include
she would otherwise
by reason
alimony.
result,
Foster’s claim for
in the property
As a
or es-
even if the
tate
said Foster....
divorce court were
correct
finding
applicable to the di-
(Emphasis added).
Paragraph
1 of the
situation,
vorce
nothing
in that
agreement, Joy
gives up
Mitchell
her dow-
reasonably
can
be construed as a waiver of
agrees
er
to Foster’s real estate and
any
claim for
any
to execute
deeds or other instruments
to allow Foster to transfer his real estate
CLIFFORD, Justice, with whom
any
free from
Paragraph
claim of hers.
3
GLASSMAN, Justice, joins, dissenting.
Joy
Mitchell releases all
by
“which
I respectfully
I agree
dissent.
with the
court
Superior
Court did not abuse
Foster,”
as well as her
as a wid-
its discretion in its
award
child
very
ow. Such
at the
cre-
least
and the amount of attorney fees it ordered
ambiguity
ates an
as to whether the
paid by
Charles
agree
Foster.
I also
$50,000payment
intended the
Joy
Foster
with the court that
cross-ap-
defendant’s
to be in lieu of
claim she
have to
peal is
view,
without merit.
In my
how-
alimony
or Foster’s
in the event
ever, we should not
premarital
review the
of a divorce. See Brackett v. Middlesex
novo,
done,
de
as the court has
(Me.1985);
Ins.
486 A.2d
but rather
Superior
should defer to the
Valve,
Portland
Sys.
Inc. v. Rockwood
Court’s
construction of the
Corp.,
(Me.1983)(con-
460 A.2d
affirm
ambiguous
reasonably susceptible
tract
Giving effect to the
intent of the
interpretations).
of different
is the cardinal rule of construction of con-
decision,
Implicit
Superior
(the
tracts.
If the
unambiguous
contract is
receipt
shown
of extrinsic evidence
question of whether it
ambiguous being
is
validity
agreement,
on the
and intent of the
law),
question
the trial court’s inter-
premarital
is a determination that
pretation on the basis of the four corners
ambiguous.
is
That evidence
question
the contract is a
of law review-
Joy
showed that
Foster had been divorced
appeal.
able
de novo
Pelletier v. Jor-
duration,
marriages
twice after
of short
Assocs.,
1385,1386 (Me.1987).
dan
523 A.2d
through
and that Charles Foster had been
If,
hand,
on the other
ambig-
contract is
involving
alimony
substantial
uous and extrinsic evidence relevant to the
property.
division of
There was direct tes-
interpretation
is before
timony
agreement,
from the drafter of the
court,
interpretation
question
is a
attorney,
agree-
Charles
of fact reviewable under a deferential clear ment
drafted to
allow Charles
error standard. Titcomb v. Saco Mobile
convey
property freely
without his
Sales,
(Me.1988);
Home
signature,
provide
wife’s
and to
Wilson,
see Estate
possibility
Superior
of a divorce. The
(Me.1988). Such is the case here.
evidence, upheld the
Court considered that
agreement’s preamble provides:
agreement appli-
and found the
WHEREAS,
Foster desires to evoke a
Because the
cable to
divorce.
ambiguous
and sufficient
for ment is
Glover,
construing
considered
Burns
George
extrinsic evidence
Elizabeth
Brunswick,
Feldman,
we should review
that decision
clear Glover &
for defen-
Titcomb,
error.
COLLINS, Justice. appeals Leah M. Maxson from a (Sagadahoc County, McKinley, Court order *4 A.R.J.) reversing a District Court order (Cumberland, MacDonald, A.R.J.) granting (Cloutier) Leah M. MAXSON f/k/a to enforce a divorce motion Maxson that Court judg- erred it the divorce when held that E. Maurice CLOUTIER. permitted rooms only Maxson Supreme Judicial Court Maine. in resi- the marital home while was not rent the entire dence and that could Submitted Briefs June sharing income home without the rental ex-husband, Maurice with her Cloutier. Finding requirement in the divorce de- no while cree Maxson remain residence that home, we va- renting rooms cate order and remand affirming District judgment Court. di- Maxson and Cloutier were in District Court.
vorced in- between judgment pro- corporated into the divorce sold vided the marital home was to be that sale, pending “[Maxson] right from the have the to live in the house parties’ until the date of date of the estate_” sale real of said provided that Maxson was ment further maintaining grounds responsible for damage responsible done was home. She was interior of the “good faith to accommodate make effort ” showings of the house.... gives
At Maxson issue is a rent and retain the right to rent rooms summer of proceeds.” During the rented moved Florida Maxson learned of entire home. When Cloutier in- of the rental demanded half lease he by filing a mo- responded Maxson come. enforce, maintaining she enti- tion to a non- Mittel, Asen, After the rental income. tled to all Kenneth Altshuler the District Hunter, Portland, hearing, testimonial Eggert