94 Mass. 26 | Mass. | 1866
Of the competency of the libellant to testify in his own behalf we entertain no doubt. The libel is brought under Gen. Sts. c. 107, § 4, which provide that on proof of “ fraud or other cause of nullity, the marriage shall be declared void by a sentence of divorce.” This, therefore, is in a strict and proper sense a “ divorce suit,” in which, by the express provision of Gen. Sts. c. 131, § 14, a party is made a competent witness for himself or the other party to the suit.
But we think it equally clear that the court would not be warranted in declaring the alleged marriage void on the facts stated by the libellant in his testimony on the hearing of the case. The difficulty is not that adequate cause for a decree of nullity is not set forth in the libel, but that the evidence entirely fails to support the essential allegations on which a sentence annulling the marriage for the cause set forth must be based- Whenever fraud is
These familiar and well settled principles are to be observed and adhered to with scrupulous care and fidelity in their application to the contract of marriage — a contract which, from its peculiar nature and on grounds of public policy, the law regards as especially sacred and inviolable, and which cannot be avoided or set aside on the ground of fraud except on the most plenary and satisfactory proof of deceit and imposition touching matters which constitute the essentialia of the marriage relation. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen, 605, 608. It seems to us that, on applying the principles above stated to the facts proved on the hearing, it is clear beyond question that if the libellant was deceived and imposed upon at all by the statements of the woman with whom he subsequently intermarried, he nevertheless entered into the contract of marriage under circumstances which repel the inference of such legal fraud and deceit as are necessary ta be proved in order to warrant a court of law in setting aside and annulling the contract.