83 N.C. App. 101 | N.C. Ct. App. | 1986
Lead Opinion
There is no dispute with respect to the facts found by the Commission. The only question involved in this appeal is whether the Commission properly found and concluded that plaintiff is ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits because her accidental injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. We affirm.
In order for an injured employee to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits for accidental injury, the claimant must prove that the injury arose out of the employment and that it occurred in the course of the employment. G.S. 97-2(6); Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 251, 293 S.E. 2d 196, 198 (1982). Both elements —i.e., “arising out of’ employment and “in the course of’ employment — must be satisfied or compensation will be denied the injured employee. Hoyle, supra. Although interrelated, each of these elements has a distinct meaning: “[tjhe term ‘arising out of refers to the origin or cause of the accident, and the term ‘in the course of refers to the time, place and circumstances of the accident.” Id.
An injury arises out of the employment when it is a natural and probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of the risks thereof, so that there is some causal relation between the injury and the performance of some service of the employment. Id. at 252, 293 S.E. 2d at 198, quoting Perry v. Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 273-74, 136 S.E. 2d 643, 645 (1964). It has been held that the test of whether an accidental injury “arises out of’ the employment is whether a contributing proximate cause of the injury was a risk inherent or incidental to
An injury occurs “in the course of’ the employment “when the injury occurs during the period of employment at a place where an employee’s duties are calculated to take him; and under circumstances in which the employee is engaged in an activity which he is authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer’s business.” Powers v. Lady’s Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 730, 295 S.E. 2d 473, 475 (1982).
Applying these well established principles to the facts of the present case, it is apparent that plaintiffs unfortunate accident neither arose out of her employment nor occurred in the course thereof. Although she had been instructed by her employer to dispose of the plants, her decision to take them to her home and hang them on her porch during working hours was motivated by purely personal considerations, i.e., the availability of someone to assist her. But for this reason, she would not have made the trip, and therefore she cannot be said to have been engaged in an errand undertaken in furtherance of her employer’s business. See Ridout v. Rose’s Stores, Inc., 205 N.C. 423, 171 S.E. 642 (1933). Moreover, plaintiffs act in standing on a chair on her front porch in order to adjust the device upon which she intended to hang the plants was clearly an act undertaken for her own benefit and not “for the benefit of [her] employer ‘to any appreciable extent,’ ” a fact determinative of compensability. Hoffman v. Truck Lines, Inc., 306 N.C. 502, 506, 293 S.E. 2d 807, 810 (1982). The incidental benefit accruing to J. K. Holding Company — the disposition of the plants so that it could vacate its office — was not so appreciable as to render plaintiffs aesthetic positioning of the plants at her home sufficiently work related as to justify compensation. Finally, plaintiffs employment with J. K. Holding Company did not enhance in any manner the risk that she might fall from a chair at her home, nor was such a risk incidental or inherent to her employment.
We are cognizant that the Workers’ Compensation Act is to be construed liberally, to the end that “benefits . . . should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction.” Roper v.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In my opinion the majority takes too narrow a view of plaintiffs employment, the activity that brought about her injury, and G.S. 97-2(6). The task that plaintiffs boss assigned her, clearing out the office and getting rid of the plants that adorned it, was certainly for the employer’s benefit and how the task was carried out was left to her discretion with the knowledge and expectation that she would take some of the plants home and hang them up, since they were hanging plants. She was at the halfway mark in performing the task when she was injured. For the task did not end when she and the plants left the office, or even when they arrived at her home; it included removing the plants from the office, taking them somewhere, disposing of them as she saw fit, and returning to the office if the work day was not over and other work remained to be done, as was the case. If the accident had occurred in taking the plants from the office to the car, or in lifting them out of the car, or on the way to her home, or on the way back to the office, the injury would have been compensable though all of these acts were merely incidental to the task assigned of getting rid of the plants. Yet the majority holds that plaintiffs injury is not covered by the Act though the accident occurred while she was actually getting rid of the plants, the ultimate task she was told to do. The employer received the same benefit from plaintiff hanging the plants on her porch — the disposition of the plants — as it would have received if she had put