FORT ZUMWALT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Missouri, et al., Respondents.
No. 76861.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
April 25, 1995.
from reducing the state financed proportion of the cost of any existing activity or service required of . . . political subdivisions. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the general assembly or any state agency of . . . political subdivisions, unless a state appropriation is made to pay the . . . political subdivision for any increased costs.
In Rolla 31 School District v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc 1992), we affirmed а trial court‘s injunction prohibiting the state from requiring a school district to provide new special education services “until the legislature provides a specific appropriation” to fund the state portion of the program. We reserved for another day the question whether a violation of
In this case, school districts and taxpayers present that issue, claiming that the state has reduced its proportion of funding of special education services below its 1980-81 level. The trial court sustained the state‘s motion for summary judgment. The school districts and taxpayers appeal. Our jurisdiction is founded on
Richard J. Pautler, Thomas E. Tueth, Celynda L. Brasher, St. Louis, for appellants.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Robert L. Presson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondents.
I.
Appellants Fort Zumwalt School District, Francis Howell School District, St. Charles School District, and Wentzville Sсhool District are school districts in Missouri. Appellants Robert Fisher, Jayne Voss, Carl Hack, Barbara Hack, Teri Fricke, Keith Schulte, Richard Place and Diane Hansen are residents and taxpayers of these school districts. Respondents are the State of Missouri, the Governor, the Missouri State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the Commissioner of Administration, and the State Treasurer.
In 1986, the legislature increased the respective amounts to $11,646.00 per class, $10,500.00 per EMR class, $6,794.00 per remedial reading class, $8,000.00 for full-time professionals other than teachers, and $4,000.00 for each full-time teacher aide.
The total amount of state aid for special education increased from $60,569,207 in 1980-81 to $144,946,670 in 1992-93. Appellants admit that each of the four school districts in this case received a higher dollar amount of special education aid in 1989-90, 1990-91, and 1991-92 thаn they received in 1980-81. However, the school districts allege the state has unconstitutionally reduced the proportion that its reimbursement of costs bears to costs of the school districts in providing special education services.
The school districts’ and taxpayers’ petition sought a declaration that “the state is obligated to maintain the same proportion of categorical aid to Missouri school districts for providing special education services to school-aged rеsidents as it did in 1980-81,” and also a declaration that the state violated the provisions of
The parties each filed motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs’ motion sought partial summary judgment, asking the court to hold that
The state defendants’ summary judgment motion asserted that compliance with
The trial court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment sustaining the state defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded, among other things, that the state had “not reduced the level of state financing for special education” and rejected any claim that
II.
A.
The state defendants’ contention that the school district defendants have no standing to enforce
Notwithstanding other provisions of this constitution or other law, any taxpayer of the state, county, or other political subdivision shall have standing to bring suit in a circuit court of proper venue and additionally, when the state is involved, in the Missouri supreme court,2 to enforce thе provisions of sections 16 through 22, inclusive, of this article and, if the suit is sustained, shall receive from the applicable unit of government his costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in maintaining such suit.
[Emphasis added.]
The Hancock Amendment makes no pretense of protecting one level of government from another. By its clear language,
The school district plaintiffs do not, because they cannot, claim status as taxpayers. We hold, therefore, as did the trial court, that the school district plaintiffs in this case are without standing to bring an action to enforce
The taxpayer plaintiffs do have standing, however; the remaining portions of this opinion discuss the taxpayers’ claims exclusively.
B.
Read as a whole, the Hancock Amendment,
As this case comes to this Court on summary judgment, only two issues concern us: First, whether
1.
The taxpayers claim that
Commonly understood, the word “proportion” means “the relation of one part to another or to the whole with respect to magnitude, quantity, or degree: relative size: ratio.” Webster‘s Third International Dictionary, 1819 (1976). Once “proportion” is understood as meaning a ratio, the state‘s insistence that its compliance with
By prohibiting the state from reducing the state financed proportion of the cost of mandated special education activities in the school districts,
We hold, therefore, that
2.
a.
To support their factual averment that the state has violated
Plaintiffs are mistaken that establishment of the
The state‘s liability is limited to the state‘s mandated activity and the state financed proportion of the cost of that activity in effect in 1980-81. Providing these factors for 1980-81 and each subsequent year will require sophisticated budgetary evidence and economic expertise.
b.
The taxpayers’ summary judgment motion also seeks a declaration that
Assuming that taxpayers could present sufficient evidence to establish the 1980-81 and subsequent year proportions, they are not entitled to a money judgment on behalf of the school districts against the state in any event. This is because, as the state defendants argue, sovereign immunity protects the state from a money judgment for a violation of
In Jones v. State Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. banc 1977), this Court abolished sovereign tort immunity. With specific exceptions, the abolition оf the common law doctrine of sovereign tort immunity was reversed by legislative action.
Here,
Other equally effective but less onerous remedies than permitting a money judgment against the state are available to enforce a taxpayer‘s interests under
One purpose of the Hancock Amendment, of which
III.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
COVINGTON, C.J., and HOLSTEIN, BENTON, THOMAS, and LIMBAUGH, JJ., concur.
PRICE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
PRICE, Judge, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion for three reasons. First, the opinion ignores the language of
I.
The fiction engaged in by the majority is obvious. A mere reading of its holding shows that it has ignored the actual language of
We hold, therefore, that
Section 21 re-quires the state to maintain the same proportion of the costs of financing special education in school districts as it existed in fiscal year 1980-1981.
(Emphasis supplied.) The language of
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed portion of the cost of any existing activity or services required of counties and other political subdivisions....
By replacing a prohibition against reduction of the state‘s proportion of spending with a requirement to maintain a proportion of funding, the majority materiаlly changes the content of the Hancock Amendment.
The actual language of
The difference could not be more dramatically shown than here. State spending for sрecial education was $60,569,270 in 1981. By 1992-1993, state spending on special education had more than doubled to $140,946,607. Admittedly, local school districts allowed their expenses for special education to increase at an even faster pace, but there is no allegation in the pleadings or proof offered, whatsoever, that the school districts’ increase in spending was required by or had anything to do with the state.
II.
The majority also ignores the requirements of Rule 55.05. M.R.C.P. The rule provides that a petition “contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief“. This requirement was extensively discussed in ITT Commercial Finance v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993).
The operative allegations of plaintiffs’ first amended petition are that:
23. In 1980-81, the year the Hancock Amendment became effective, the state financed 42.8% of the costs of special education in the Fort Zumwalt School District through categorical aid. In 1990-91, the state financed only 38.9% of the costs of special education in the Fort Zumwalt School District thrоugh categorical aid. In 1991-92, the state financed only 33.7% of said costs in that district through categorical aid. As a result, in 1990-91 and 1991-92, the Fort Zumwalt School District was forced to offset this deficiency in categorical aid for special education by the use of local tax monies and/or unrestricted state aid.
24. In 1980-81, the state financed 41.4% of the costs of special education in the Francis Howell School District through categorical aid. In 1989-90, the state financed only 40.8% of the costs of special educаtion in the Francis Howell School District through categorical aid. In 1990-91, the state financed only 35.9% of said costs in that district through categorical aid. In 1991-92, the state financed only 32.4% of said costs in that district through categorical aid. As a result, in 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92, the Francis Howell School District was forced to offset this deficiency in categorical aid for special education by the use of local tax monies and/or unrestricted state aid.
25. In 1980-81, the state financed 41% of the costs of special education in the St. Chаrles School District through categorical aid. In 1989-90, the state financed only 37.4% of the costs of special education in the St. Charles School District through
categorical aid. In 1990-91, the state financed only 36.2% of said costs in that district through categorical aid. In 1991-92, the state financed only 28% of said costs in that district through categorical aid. As a result, in 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92, the St. Charles School District was forced to offset this deficiency in categorical aid for special education by the use of local tax monies аnd/or unrestricted state aid. 26. In 1980-81, the state financed 45.1% of the costs of special education in the Wentzville School District through categorical aid. In 1989-90, the state financed only 36.5% of the costs of special education in the Wentzville School District through categorical aid. In 1990-91, the state financed only 36.8% of said costs in that district through categorical aid. In 1991-92, the state financed only 24.6% of said costs in that district through categorical aid. As a result, in 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92, the Wentzville School District was forced to offset this deficiency in categorical aid for special education by the use of local tax monies and/or unrestricted state aid.
27. The state violated Article X, Sections 16 and 21 of the Missouri Constitution in 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92, by reducing the state financed proportion of the costs of special education services funded through categorical aid from the proportion provided to plaintiff school districts in 1980-81. Such reduction amounts to an unconstitutional shifting of the tax burden away from the state and onto local school districts and taxpayers.
As to these allegations, the majority correctly notes that:
Plaintiffs are mistaken that establishment of the
Section 21 proportions requires no more than comparing 1980-81 and subsequent year costs with the state‘s contribution to special education in those years.
Although generally discussing the need for “sophisticated budgetary evidence and economic expertise” that might separate out “mandated” expenditures from “discretionary” expenditures, and even giving an example of “greater-than-required salary increases“, the majority never outlines what facts are requirеd to state a cause of action. The school districts have made no allegations of what increases in expenditures were “mandated” by the state, what increases were beyond the state‘s or the school districts’ control, or what increases were “discretionary” by the school districts. Neither have they made any attempt to plead that the change in the ratio of spending resulted from an affirmative act of the state to reduce its proportion of the expense of special education programs. As anyone can see by reading the pleadings here, plaintiffs have merely alleged a 1980-1981 state/school district expenditure ratio and corresponding ratios for the 1989-1990, 1990-1991, and 1991-1992 school years, numbers the majority apparently believes are inadequate to state a claim.
Nevertheless, the majority condones this failure in pleading that would have required dismissal against any other party. ITT Commercial Finance, 854 S.W.2d at 379. Aside from being inconsistent with our application of Rule 55.05 to all others, thе problem now posed for plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts is clear. Despite the fact that plaintiffs have survived a motion for summary judgment, no one knows what facts or elements are essential for the school districts to prevail. Nor do they even know what facts the school districts will attempt to prove.
III.
Finally, the majority opinion will result in either a horrendous loss of governmental services to the people of Missouri or a never-ending spiral of increased government spending. The majority opinion will require the state legislature to annually evaluate local spending in all programs where the state and a local governmental entity share funding responsibilities. If the state is unable to match local increases, the program can no longer be required. The consequence in many instances would be the forfeiture of massive amounts of federal matching funds upon which so many of our state services depend, such as schools, highways, and
Instead, the reality of the majority‘s opinion will be that year after year the legislature will be forced to continually adjust its spending, ever upward, to match school district by school district and county by county spending, benefiting our richer counties at the expense of our poorer ones. In short, despite its rhetoric, the majority has transformed the Hancock Amendment from a shield to protect the people of Missouri from the increasing growth of govеrnment and taxation into a sword mandating continued increases in spending.
I cannot believe this was the intention of those who drafted the Hancock Amendment or the voters who passed it.