49 Ind. App. 565 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1911
Action by James R. Parsell against the Port Wayne Iron and Steel Company, for damages for personal injuries. There was a trial by jury on an amended complaint in four paragraphs, and a judgment for appellee in the sum of $2,600, from which this appeal is taken.
Errors relied on question the action of the court in overruling appellant’s motion to require appellee to make each paragraph of the amended complaint more specific, overruling the demurrer to each of said paragraphs, sustaining appellee’s demurrer to the third and fifth paragraphs of appellant’s answer, overruling appellant’s motion for judg
The amended first paragraph of complaint alleges, in substance, that defendant is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of iron and steel in Allen county, Indiana; that as a part of its plant it maintained a battery of three upright steam-boilers, each twenty-five feet high and six feet in diameter, and located in a line, 'about twenty-five feet apart; that these boilers had an outer and inner concentric shell, the inner one being about three feet in diameter in which water was placed for the generation of steam, and heated by means of hot air conducted from furnaces into the space between the inner and outer shells aforesaid; that at the bottom of each boiler there was a manhole, provided with a removable lid, through which the inner boiler could be entered from a pit underneath; that near the bottom of the boiler was a blow-out pipe, which communicated with the inner shell and extended outwardly, horizontally to near the outer edge of the pit, where it was bent down and into the earth at the bottom of the pit, and there connected with a horizontal pipe, which was buried in the earth and connected said boilers; that said underground pipe connected with another horizontal discharge pipe, which extended eastwardly beneath the surface, a distance of 100 feet; that near the angle of the blow-out pipe, where it turned down into the pit, there was a rotating valve about two and one-half feet long, operated by a wrench, which valve when closed prevented the discharge of the contents of the boiler through said pipe into said under-ground pipes, but when open afforded a passage for water amd steam from said boilers through said pipes into a ditch; that defendant was accustomed to clean out the boilers by opening the valve of the blow-out pipe of the boiler to be cleaned and by pressure of the escaping steam and hot water; that when this was done, if any other boiler was empty, and the valve to its
The second paragraph of amended complaint contains the same general averments as the fii’st, except the allegation that the construction of said boiler and pipes attached thereto was defective and unsafe in this: That the outer discharge pipe was too small to discharge the contents of the boiler so freely as to prevent a part from entering into the other empty boiler when the valves were not closed, and that each boiler should have had a separate discharge pipe without any connection with the pipes of the other boilers, thereby preventing any part from entering the other blow
The fourth paragraph of amended complaint is substantially the same as the first, except that it is therein alleged that at the time plaintiff was injured the construction of the boilers and their appliances made it dangerous and unsafe for any one to enter an empty boiler for the purpose of cleaning it, unless such person was thoroughly familiar with the construction of said boiler and its appliances, or unless such person had been duly notified of the manner of the construction of the boiler and appliances, and of the fact that said valve should be kept closed while such person was in the boiler, and having been so informed assumed the risk of closing and keeping closed said valve while within such empty boiler; that plaintiff could not have ascertained the facts necessary to his protection by examining said appliances which were open to his view; that defendant failed to notify plaintiff of the dangers incident to his new service in cleaning out said boiler; that if he had been so notified he could and would have closed the valve and taken steps to keep it closed while working in said boiler.
It has been held that a plaintiff is not required to plead specifically facts which are peculiarly within the knowledge of defendant, and this rule is applicable in this case. Kni&h
We do not think the objections can be sustained, for in each paragraph it is clearly alleged that the injuries were caused by the negligence charged, and the facts alleged are so related as to show that the injuries were the proximate result of the particular negligence charged in the several paragraphs of complaint, and likewise that the negligence relied on is that of appellant, or its responsible agent acting in its stead. Appellee’s want of knowledge of the danger and appellant’s knowledge thereof and failure to notify appellee are definitely shown in each paragraph. The demurrers were properly overruled.. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gray, supra; Robertson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1896), 146 Ind. 486; Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Przezdziankowski (1908), 170 Ind. 1, 8, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 972, 127 Am. St. 352; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Heck (1898), 151 Ind. 292; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wagner (1899), 153 Ind. 420; City of Fort Wayne v. Patterson (1900), 25 Ind. App. 547; Taylor v. Evansville, etc., R. Co. (1889), 121 Ind. 124, 6 L. R. A. 584,16 Am. St. 372; City of Fort Wayne v. Christie (1901), 156 Ind. 172; Standard, Oil Co. v. Fordeck (1904), 34 Ind. App. 181; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Walker (1908), 41 Ind. App. 588; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. McFall (1905), 165 Ind. 574; Oölitic Stone Co. v. Ridge (1910), 174 Ind. 558.
This is the second appeal in this ease. The original complaint was held insufficient by the Supreme Court (see Fort Wayne Iron, etc., Co. v. Parsell [1907], 168 Ind. 223). The substance of that complaint, which was in one paragraph, is set out in the opinion, from which it appears that the parties, the dates, the allegations as to the injury, the transaction and the alleged transfer of plaintiff from one employment to another are identical with those shown by the amended complaint, but it is contended that the actionable negligence charged is so different as to make a new cause of action; also that the opinion settles the theory of the original complaint, and is the law'of the case.
It thus appears that the Supreme Court found in the original complaint allegations which suggested an attempt to state a cause of action (1) under the employers’ liability act, (2) for defective or insufficient means of preventing steam from entering the boiler, (3) for failing to notify appellee of the danger, and (4) for defects in the construction or maintenance of the apparatus connected with said boiler. In other words, there was some statement, though imperfect, of the same causes of action found in the several paragraphs of the amended complaint.
In the case of Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks, supra, the court showed that both in the original and the amended complaint the cause of action was for the death of Mrs. Hendricks, caused by the wrongful act of the defendant company, and not the particular manner or means of her death, and in the ease of Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Fearnaught, supra, this court said: “The facts set out in the original and in the amended complaint in the case at bar manifestly describe the same occurrence, and show that the negligence of appellant caused appellee’s injury, and the court did not err in overruling the demurrers. ’ ’
Appellant’s learned counsel present a formidable array of authorities from other states, which, to some extent, support the contention that a different cause of action from that of the original is stated in the amended complaint, but these authorities cannot control if the courts of our own State have decided the question. In the case of Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Fearnaught, supra, on page 336 this court states that the rule in Indiana is different from that of many other states, and our examination of the numerous authorities cited confirms this conclusion.
In the ease of Blake v. Minkner (1894), 136 Ind. 418, cited by appellant, our Supreme Court, in discussing this question on page 426, quotes approvingly the following from Baylies, Code Pl. 323: “To determine whether an amendment of the complaint will set up a new cause .of action, * * “ it is a fair test to inquire whether a recovery on the original complaint would be a bar to any recovery under the amended pleading. If it would, the amendment may be allowed; if it would not, the amendment should not be ordered.”
In the cases of Fleming v. City of Anderson (1907), 39 Ind. App. 343, and Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Stein (1894), 140 Ind. 61, our Appellate and Supreme Courts quote approvingly from the case of Blake v. Minkner, supra, as follows: “ 4 "Where the amendment does not change the cause of action nor deprive the defendant of any defense which he had to the original suit, the plaintiff’s right shall be preserved’. [Buswell, Limitations (1889 ed.) §364.]”
In the case of Thrall v. Gosnell (1902), 28 Ind. App. 174, 177, this court said: "One test by which to determine if a new cause of action is alleged is to inquire if the same evi
Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Stein, supra, is a case which presents the question in a way somewhat similar to the case at bar. There had been a former appeal in that case and the original complaint was held sufficient, but before the second trial an additional paragraph of complaint was filed, which contained the main allegations of the original complaint and additional allegations as to defects of an engine, and the court said: “We do not think this fourth paragraph of complaint stated a new cause of action. The restatement of the original cause of action, whether in the form of an amendment to the complaint or by means of an additional paragraph, does not constitute the bringing of a new action.”
In Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Bergschicher (1904), 162 Ind. 108, we have another case where the question arose in a manner similar to that of the case at bar. In that ease a paragraph of complaint had been filed under the employers’ liability act, charging an engineer with an affirmative act of negligence in applying the steam and causing the locomotive to back. The paragraph of complaint on which the judgment was rendered was filed after the period of the statute of limitations had run, and charged negligent acts of omission on the part of the engineer in the manner of adjusting the machinery of the locomotive, whereby the steam escaped into steam chests, and caused the locomotive to back. The court held that the cause of action was the same and that the statute of limitations had not run.
In the ease of Baker v. State, ex rel. (1887), 109 Ind. 47, 61, our Supreme Court quotes approvingly a definition of the term “cause of action”, given in the case of Veeder v. Baker (1880), 83 N. Y. 156, 160, as follows: “It may be said to be composed of the right of the plaintiff and the obligation, duty or wrong of the defendant; and these combined, it is sufficiently accurate to say, constitute the cause of action. ’ ’
Bearing this definition in mind, in looking to the averments of the original complaint we find that it attempted to assert the right of appellee to recover from appellant for the negligent violation of a duty owed by it to him. "We also find that in the original complaint there was mention of the various phases of the transaction, and different acts of negligence, which in the amended complaint are stated separately in different paragraphs; but at all times refer to the
There is a difference between a defective cause of action and a defective statement of a cause of action. In the case at bar, the original complaint states defectively a good cause of action.
As illustrative of the Indiana eases relied on by appellant, we note the following: In the case of Blake v. Minkner, supra, the original complaint was for partition, and the amended complaint was in ejectment, clearly a different cause of action. A judgment on one complaint would not have been a bar to a judgment on the other complaint.
We have already referred to the case of Fleming v. City of Anderson, supra, and space forbids special mention of other cases cited by appellant. These cases are not in conflict with the prevailing rule established in Indiana, and are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar by the facts shown in each case. Appellant’s counsel also cite numerous' cases where the proof does not support the theory and allegations of the complaint. These eases are only remotely related to the question of the alleged new cause of action, and cannot control here, as the question we are called on to decide is determined by decisions directly in point.
The amended complaint does not state a new or different cause of action, but simply restates in separate paragraphs the cause of action attempted to be stated in the original complaint. The action, therefore, is not barred by the statute of limitations, and the court did not err in its rulings on the demurrers to the third and fifth paragraphs of answer, aforesaid.
It is contended that the answers to the interrogatories show that the negligence that caused appellee’s injuries was that of a fellow servant, and that there was no negligence on the part of appellant or of Harry Green, the alleged vice-principal.
These answers nullify any answers tending to show that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, and find that Green stood in the relation of vice-principal to appellant, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of appellee’s injury. The motion for judgment on the interrogatories was properly overruled. Walker v. Ap
We have yet to consider the motion for a new trial, which states that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, is contrary to law, and presents questions of the misconduct of jurors, the ruling on the admission and exclusion of certain testimony and the giving and refusing to give certain instructions.
It has frequently been held that the misconduct of a jury must be gross, and clearly appear to have injured the complaining party, to justify the granting of a new trial. And furthermore, that where the trial court hears evidence, either orally or by affidavit, touching such misconduct, its conclusions on conflicting statements will not be disturbed by this court on the weight of the evidence. Stamets v. Mitchenor (1906), 165 Ind. 672.
It has been held by our Supreme and Appellate Courts that to determine whether an individual is a fellow servant or a vice-principal the controlling inquiry must be, whether the act or omission resulting in the injury involved a duty oAving by the master to the injured servant, and that the question CEfhnot be determined by ascertaining the difference in rank or by the power to hire, discharge or control employes. Robertson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1896), 146 Ind. 486. However, in the case of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gray, supra, our Supreme Court held that the facts of looking after machinery, directing the work, hiring, bossing and discharging employes, transferring them from one employment to another, and having general charge of other men, might be considered, and Avhere the jury found that a certain employe was a vice-principal, the court Avould not, upon such evidence, disturb the finding. Keller v. Gaskill (1898), 20 Ind. App. 502, 512.
14. It has also been held that if at the time the offending servant performs an act by which another servant was injured he was in the performance of a duty which the master owed to his servant, he was not a fellow servant, for the master cannot rid himself of the duty he owes to his servant by delegating his authority to another, and if he attempts so to do, the person to whom he delegates the power to act is a vice-principal and not a fellow servant. Justice v. Pennsylvania Co. (1892), 130 Ind. 321; Pennsylvania Co. v. Whitcomb (1887), 111 Ind. 212; Ross v. Union Cement, etc., Co. (1900), 25 Ind. App. 463; Perigo v. Indianapolis Brewing Co. (1899), 21 Ind. App. 338.
This transfer of appellee from one employment to another, the 'want of knowledge on his part, the knowledge on the part of appellant and said Green of the peculiar construction and danger incident to tfie new employment, and their failure to notify appellee thereof, or to close the stopcock and shut off communication from the other boilers, run through each paragraph of the complaint.
In the face of these facts, the claim that the negligence was that of some fellow servant other than Green cannot operate to relieve appellant of liability, for, at most, it would amount only to concurrent negligence operating with that of appellant and its vice-principal, and liability would still remain against appellant. Haskill & Barker Car Co. v. Przezdziankowski (1908), 170 Ind. 1, 8, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 972, 127 Am. St. 352; South Bend Mfg. Co. v. Liphart (1895), 12 Ind. App. 185; Knouff v. City of Logansport (1901), 26 Ind. App. 202, 84 Am. St. 292.
The alleged errors in giving and refusing instructions,
We find no available, error in the .record.
Judgment affirmed.