83 Mich. 415 | Mich. | 1890
This was a proceeding brought 'by the petitioner for the condemnation of lands for its use-All questions of the constitutionality of the act under which the petitioner was organized were raised and disposed of in the case of Fort-street Union Depot Co. v. Morton, ante, 265.
Three other objections are raised by the respondents to-the validity of the proceedings, viz.:
1. No negotiations were had with the respondents for the purchase of the property prior to the commencement of the proceedings.
2. The petitioner was permitted to offer in evidence the-price it had paid for neighboring property for its own use.
. 3. The awards of the jury were against the weight of evidence.
1. Mr. O. B. Lothi’op, on behalf of the petitioner, conducted the negotiations with the respondents. It is evident that both the respondents before the conclusion of the negotiations, and before the final offer was made to-them by Mr. Lothrop, fully understood that he ivas acting on behalf of the petitioner. One Mr. J. Huff Jones represented Mrs. Thompson, who was not a resident of Detroit. Mr. Lothrop testified that Mr. Jones had charge of the lots; that they were for sale, and that he first fixed the price at $150 a foot; that Jones
So far as the negotiations which were conducted prior to the time that respondents knew the purpose for which the land was wanted, they were not within the statute. These negotiations provided for by the statute contemplate knowledge on the part of the land-owners of the purpose for which the lands were wanted. If the negotiations stopped there, we should be compelled to hold the proceedings void. But, as already stated, before .the negotiations, closed, the respondents had such knowledge. A Iona fide offer of an amount which the petitioner considered a fair price, and the refusal to accept it, are sufficient negotiations, within the statute. It is of no consequence that petitioner’s agent had no expectation that the offer would be accepted.
2. The second objection is ruled by Toledo, A. A. &
“In all such cases the Constitution, as well as the principles of the common law, makes them [the jury] judges of law and fact. * * * Their conclusions are not based entirely on testimony. They are expected to use their own judgment and knowledge from a view of the premises, and their experience as freeholders, quite as much as the testimony of witnesses to matters of opinion.”
It was there also held that the functions of the judge In such cases were advisory merely, and that such controversies as this cannot be disposed of on merely technical notions. These proceedings may be instituted in probate courts, the judges of which are frequently not lawyers, and are unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. If they were to be set aside on account of errors in the admission or rejection of testimony, the difficulty of -obtaining a finding by the jury which could stand the test would be apparent. Appellate courts should not interfere, unless the errors complained of are such as may fairly be said to have had a controlling influence in securing the result. The proof here complained of cannot be said to have exercised any such influence.
A careful examination of the testimony upon the question of values does not convince us that a case is made calling for the interference of this Court. While, under the statute, this Court may, upon appeal, set aside an award of the jury, and order a new appraisal, this should only be done where it is clear that the award is against the evidence. In this case, the damages awarded were within the values placed upon the property by several witnesses.
We find no error in the proceedings, and they must therefore be affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, with costs.
Defendant Jones was awarded §10,000, and defendant Thompson $21,000.