FORT SMITH SCHOOL DISTRICT; Grеenwood School District; Alma School District; and Van Buren School District, Appellants v. DEER/MT. JUDEA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
No. CV-14-576
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Nov. 20, 2014
2014 Ark. 486
Furthermore, there was substantial evidence to support the jury‘s verdict. SCI presented evidence that it performed dirt work and was not paid. At the close of SCI‘s case, the circuit court granted BCC‘s motion for directed verdict but denied Travelers’ motion for directed verdict. The settled rule is that if a defendant goes forward with “proof after a motion for a directed verdict was denied, any error in denying the motion [is] waived.” Higgins v. Hines, 289 Ark. 281, 283, 711 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1986). Travelers, rather than standing on the circuit court‘s denial of its directed-verdict motion, introduced evidence, thus waiving its directed-verdict motion made at the conclusion of SCI‘s case. Furthermore, if “after the denial of a request for a directed verdict . . . a defendant introduces evidence which, together with that introduced by the plaintiff, is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict, he wаives his claim of error by the court in refusing to direct a verdict . . . at the close of the plaintiff‘s case.” Shamlin v. Shuffield, 302 Ark. 164, 167, 787 S.W.2d 687, 689 (1990).
Travelers presented testimony from BCC‘s project manager, Jon Virden, that BCC credited back to the owner $33,145.60 for dirt work that SCI alleged it had performed. After hearing evidence that SCI performed dirt work, that SCI was not paid, аnd that BCC credited back to the owner the amounts to be paid for dirt work that SCI alleged it had performed, the jury awarded $25,468.20. Thus, the jury had before it evidence that BCC had an allowance for the dirt work but failed to take this allowance and pay SCI. From the evidence before it, the jury could reasonably have concludеd that the only reason BCC was not paid for SCI‘s dirt work is because BCC specifically credited back the amount to be paid for the dirt work. The majority, by not acknowledging all of this evidence, fails to conduct a proper analysis of whether substantial evidence supported the jury‘s verdict against Travelers. In doing so, it deniеs SCI‘s proven claim against Travelers and the bond for the work that it performed. This evidence is clearly sufficient to support the jury‘s verdict. Thus, I must respectfully dissent.
BAKER, J., joins in this dissent.
John C. Fendley, Jr. P.A., by: Clay Fendley; and Lewellen & Associates, by: Roy C. “Bill” Lewellen, for appellees.
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice.
Appellants Fort Smith School District; Greenwood School District; Alma School District; аnd Van Buren School District (collectively “Fort Smith“), appeal from the circuit court‘s order denying their motion to intervene as a matter of right in the litigation of appellee Deer/Mt. Judea School District (“Deer/Mt. Judea“).1 The sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying intervention as a mattеr of right. This court has previously recognized a right to appeal from the denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right under
The instant litigation stems from Deer/Mt. Judea‘s suit alleging inequities in the State‘s school-funding practices.
Following the circuit court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss Deer/Mt. Judea‘s adequacy claims by defendant Governor Mike Beebe and the circuit court‘s grant of summary judgment to Deer/Mt. Judea on its special-legislation claim, Deer/Mt. Judea appealed the circuit court‘s rulings to this court. In Deer/Mt. Judea School District v. Kimbrell, 2013 Ark. 393, 430 S.W.3d 29, this court revеrsed the circuit court‘s dismissal of some of Deer/Mt. Judea‘s claims and remanded. This court drew a distinction between Deer/Mt. Judea‘s claims, stating that
[s]ome of the acts or omissions complained of occurred after we had released the mandate in Lake View [School District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 370 Ark. 139, 257 S.W.3d 879 (2007)]. The circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing these claims. However, those acts or omissions that were brought or could have been brought in the previous school-funding cases are barred by res judicata, and the circuit court did not err in dismissing them.
2013 Ark. 393, at 19, 430 S.W.3d at 44. We then held that the “circuit court erred in dismissing [Deer/Mt. Judea]‘s claims . . . relating to the adequacy reports and evaluations, COLAs, transportation funding, and facilitiеs funding based on res judicata.” Id. at 23, 430 S.W.3d at 46.2
[a]ll of the prerequisites for intervention as of right are present here. Deer/Mt. Judea schools are small, remote schools located in mountainous and sparsely populated Newton County, Arkansas, who contend State actions related to their funding will inevitably result in their closure if not corrected. By contrast, Intervenors are larger schools at the other end of the spectrum located in the more populated areas of Crawford and Sebastian Counties, Arkansas, whose funding Deer/Mt. Judea points to as being in excess of what is needed at the expense of small, remote schools like Deer/Mt. Judea.
Fort Smith noted this court‘s decision in Deer/Mt. Judea affirming the dismissal of some of Deer/Mt. Judea‘s claims because they could have been brought in prior school-funding cases that Fort Smith claimed Deer/Mt. Judea was not a party to. It claimed that, without intervention, it could suffer the same fate and that its interests in any adjustments made to the school-funding system could be foreclosed as a result of the litigation. Attached as an exhibit to the motion was Fort Smith‘s complaint in intervеntion. Deer/Mt. Judea responded to Fort Smith‘s motion, requesting that the motion be denied. Deer/Mt. Judea asserted that the motion was untimely and that Fort Smith‘s interests were adequately represented by the existing parties.
A hearing on Fort Smith‘s motion was held on June 3, 2014. At the hearing, the circuit court heard arguments from Fort Smith and Deer/Mt. Judea, while counsel for the State Defendants informed the circuit court that they did not have a position on Fort Smith‘s motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court ruled that it was going to deny the motion because it was an individual lawsuit affecting only Deer/Mt. Judea. It subsequently entered an order denying the motion, in which it made the following findings:
1. Thе Districts’ motion is untimely. Plaintiff filed its original Complaint on 3 December 2010. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint on 18 January 2011. If Plaintiff did not adequately represent the Districts’ interests, the Districts should have intervened at that time. The Districts failed to justify their three year delay in seeking to intervene.
2. Even if the Districts’ motion was timely, the Districts do not have an interest in this case that needs to be protected. “The ‘Purpose’ section of Act 57 makes it clear that the amount of funding given to schools shall be based on need and not funds available.” Deer/Mt. Judea Sch. Dist. v. Kimbrell, 2013 Ark. 393 [430 S.W.3d 29]. This case is about the needs of the Plaintiff. The Court rejects the Districts’ argument that satisfying the needs of Plaintiff will somehow impair the State‘s ability to meet the Districts’ needs as well.
3. Even if the Districts’ motion was timely and the Districts have an interest in this case, the Districts are adequately represented by the existing parties. To the extent the Districts agree with Plaintiff, Plaintiff adequately represents their interests. To the extent the Districts agree with Defendants, Defendants adequately rеpresent their interests. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir.2004) (“The burden is greater if the named party is a government entity that represents the interests common to the public“).
Fort Smith now appeals.
As its sole point on appeal, Fort Smith argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to intervene. It contends that it is entitled to intervene as a matter of right because its interеsts are not adequately represented by either Deer/Mt. Judea or the State Defendants. Fort Smith asserts that its intervention is essential because the circuit court should hear and have the benefit of matters impacting districts of all sizes, not just those affecting smaller districts like Deer/Mt. Judea. It urges that its motion to intervene was timely because it was filed just after this court‘s prior decision in the matter and prior to Deer/Mt. Judea‘s filing of an amended complaint; therefore, Fort Smith claims, no prejudice to the current parties would result.
Deer/Mt. Judea responds that Fort Smith offers no explanation for its three-year delay in seeking to intervene in thе case. Moreover, it contends, Fort Smith has no interest to be protected because Deer/Mt. Judea‘s suit is an individual one, limited to the needs of Deer/Mt. Judea. It is not a class action, Deer/Mt. Judea avers, and for this reason, its case will have no res judicata effect on Fort Smith. Nonetheless, Deer/Mt. Judea assеrts that any interest claimed by Fort Smith is adequately protected by the existing parties.
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant‘s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
With respect to the progression of the proceedings, the circuit court observed
Along those same lines, prejudice to Deer/Mt. Judea and the State Defendants is certainly a concern. The focus of the litigation is already well-established and pertains to a single district. It is an individual lawsuit and not a class action, as was the case in the seminal Lake View litigation. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 351 Ark. 31, 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002) (noting class certification), mandate recalled by Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 355 Ark. 617, 142 S.W.3d 643 (2004) (per curiam). Fort Smith alleges that it has concerns that have not been asserted and will not be addressed by Deer/Mt. Judea‘s litigation. Even if that allegation were true, we would be hard-pressed to see how a more-than-three-year delay in the addition of nеw claims to a lawsuit involving funding legislation and its effect on a single school district would not be prejudicial to the parties already present.
Finally, Fort Smith‘s justification for its delay simply does not withstand scrutiny. Fort Smith claims that it timely filed its motion after our decision in Deer/Mt. Judea, 2013 Ark. 393, 430 S.W.3d 29, because that decision “made clear that, upon [Fort Smith‘s] failure to do so, [it] risked being bound by a decision in a case to which [it was] not a party.” That position, however, simply holds no water. The claims made by Deer/Mt. Judea that we held were barred by res judicata were barred because the claims could have been litigated in the Lake View cases. See Deer/Mt. Judea, 2013 Ark. 393, 430 S.W.3d 29. Those claims could have beеn litigated by Deer/Mt. Judea in those cases because, as already set forth, the Lake View case was a class-action suit, “which included all school districts in the state.” 351 Ark. at 43, 91 S.W.3d at 478. In contrast, the instant matter was brought by Deer/Mt. Judea by and for itself and is not a class-action. To that end, Fort Smith would not be subject to the doctrine of res judicata as it relates to the disposition of Deer/Mt. Judea‘s complaint.4 See, e.g., UHS of Arkansas, Inc. v. City of Sherwood, 296 Ark. 97, 103, 752 S.W.2d 36, 39 (1988) (“One who does not intervene, whether or not by right, is not at risk of being bound by the litigation and is not subject to res judicata.“).
The objective of our rules of procedure is the orderly and efficient resolution of disputes. See Employers Nat‘l Ins., 313 Ark. 645, 855 S.W.2d 936. See also
Affirmed.