269 Pa. 162 | Pa. | 1920
Opinion by
This is a case-stated, wherein the facts agreed upon are as follows: On May 15, 1897, a limited partnership association owned in fee simple the real estate here in controversy, situate in Armstrong County, this State;
The court below gave judgment for plaintiff; and, in pursuance of a right duly reserved, defendant entered the present appeal.
It is stated in 28 A. & E. Enc. L. (2d ed.) 1129: “Ordinarily the words ‘trustee’ or ‘in trust’......contained in a deed......are deemed sufficient to put a transferee on inquiry.” The preponderance of authority supports this rule: see Sturtevant v. Jaques, 96 Mass. 523, 526; Mercantile National Bank v. Parsons, 54 Minn. 56, 63; Railroad v. Durant, 95 U. S. 576. 579; and others cited in 28 A. & E. Enc. L., supra.
New York seems to have a contrary rule as to real estate (see Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Fallon, 91 N. Y. Supp. 497; Greenwood Lake, etc., R. R. Co. v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 134 N. Y. 435); but, even in that state, so far as personal property is concerned, the rule accords with that stated in 28 A. & E. Enc. L., supra: see Swan v. Produce Bank, 24 Hun 277.
In Flitcraft v. Com. Title Ins. & T. Co., 211 Pa. 114, the chancellor squarely decided the Pennsylvania rule to be that the word “trustee,” after the name of the grantee, in a deed, without more, was sufficient to put one accepting a deed of such grantee on inquiry as to the extent of his authority to convey; but the court in banc, when disposing of exceptions, whilst sustaining the chancellor’s decree, decided the case on another point; and, when the final decree was appealed to this court, we affirmed per curiam, on “the opinion of the court below dismissing exceptions to the findings of the trial judge.” Hence that case does not rule the question
We use the expression “sought to be brought before us,” because, as the case-stated is drawn, the point in question is not necessary of solution here. The case-stated does not give any facts, as to inquiries by the grantee from Wasson or by others dealing with the title, nor does it ask the court to decide anything as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of inquiries made; all the court is asked to decide is whether or not the deed from Wasson, trustee, “passes a good record title.”
Since the deed from Wasson was executed^ delivered and recorded more than a quarter of a century before the agreement of sale between plaintiff and defendant, in view of the recital contained in the former — that the grantor makes the conveyance pursuant to a request of his “cestui que trustent” — we must take it that the instrument “passes a good record title,” after this lapse of time.
There is nothing in the case-stated to show who has been in possession of the premises during the period therein dealt with. If the property was held in trust, by Wasson, for one then in possession, and that possession still continues, how far, under such circumstances, if the trustee wronged his cestuis que trust, the actual title of the latter would be affected by the former’s deed, is a point not now before us, and we leave it undecided. As previously suggested, confining our consideration to the facts contained in the case-stated (as we must, since “whatever is not distinctly and expressly agreed upon and set forth as admitted must be taken not to exist”: Berks County v. Pile, 18 Pa. 493; Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 71), all we determine is the question of record title there presented; and, as to that, for the reasons hereinbefore given, we think the record, on its face, indicates a good title in the plaintiff. To this extent we concur with the court below.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.