8 Watts 282 | Pa. | 1839
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, brought originally before a justice of the peace, by the defendant in error, against the plaintiff in error, and thence by appeal into the court below. ' The plaintiff had been the tenant of a farm, including the locus in quo, belonging to the defendant below, under a lease from the latter for a term of two years, commencing on the 1st of April 1834. In the autumn of 1835, the plaintiff below sowed two of the fields on the farm with wheat, which was growing thereon in the spring of IS36, when his lease expired, and he removed from the farm, giving up the possession thereof to the defendant below. The trespass complained of is, that the defendant below, after the expiration of the lease, and before the wheat had ripened, either wilfully conducted his horses into the fields of wheat, or permitted them to break into the same, and there to consume and destroy the wheat of the plaintiff below, then growing, by eating and treading down the same.
That the plaintiff below was entitled to the wheat as his way-going crop, has not been denied; nor could his right thereto have been contested with any possible chance of success, after its having been settled and recognised repeatedly, by-the decisions of this, as well as of every other court in the state, for half a century and more, last past, that the tenant in such case is entitled to the way-going crop. It is the settled law of the state, founded upon a custom that has prevailed and been general, at least, if not universal, throughout the same. See Diffadorffer v. Jones, decided in 1782, and cited in 5 Binn. 289, and 2 Binn. 487; Stultz v. Dickey, 5 Binn. 285; Briggs v. Brown, 2 Serg. & Rawle 14. But it was contended
From the authorities, therefore, on this subject, as well as the reason and fitness of the thing, the plaintiff in error has no good ground to complain of the charge of the court below. In truth, it would seem to have been more favourable to him than he had any right to claim; for, from the language of the court, in their direction to the jury, on this point, the jury might readily have apprehended the court as instructing them, that the injury complained of by the plaintiff below, must have been wantonly, that is, as the jury might well have understood it, wilfully committed by the defendant, in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover. The words of the court are, “ Does the evidence satisfy you that Forsythe was a wrongdoer, and did wanton injury to the crop of the plaintiff, either by his trespassing upon it, and throwing down the fences, or otherwise? If it does, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.”
Judgment affirmed.