Dеfendant-appellant, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“the bureau”), appeals the Cuyahogа County Common Pleas Court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment and the court’s subsequent finding that plaintiff-appellee Vincent Forster’s cause of action was timely filed.
On October 8, 1988, appellee was working for defendаnt Reliance Electric Company at a downtown Cleveland construction site, the British Petroleum Building. While he wаs in the course and scope of his employment, a piece of concrete fell from the fifth flоor, striking appellee on the head and causing him to fall down. Appellee attempted to breаk his fall by putting his hands in front of him. Appellee felt his wrists snap back.
Appellee filed a claim with the bureau for injuriеs to his neck. Appellee stated in his deposition that although his hands felt somewhat sprained, he thought it would gо away. The treating physicians, Dr. Mares and Dr. Stephee, did not examine appellee’s hands.
Appеllee stated that in June 1989 his hands began tingling. For this reason, appellee was referred to Dr. Shah of Parma Hospital for nerve testing. On August 22, 1989, the test results were interpreted by Dr. Mars, a neurologist, as showing bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. On September 19, 1990, Dr. Mars’s medical report of appellee stated he believed the condition had a causal relationship to appellee’s injury on October 8, 1988.
Appellee filed written notification of the additional claim with the bureau on November 5, 1990. A hearing was held and appellee’s claim was disallowed for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome “as not a ‘Flow’ injury from 10/8/88 injury and not alleged within 2 yeаrs of the date of injury.” The decision was subsequently affirmed by the regional board of review.
Appellee аppealed to the trial court. The bureau filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that appelleе’s cause of action was time-barred pursuant to R.C. 4123.84. In response, appellee filed a motion in оpposition, arguing that the *746 cause of action was timely since it was filed within two years of discovering the еxistence of the residual injury.
On May 19, 1994, the trial court overruled appellant’s motion for summary judgment. After a final pretrial hearing, the trial court amended its entry denying appellant’s motion, found the cause of actiоn to be timely filed, and remanded the cause to the bureau for further proceedings. Appellant timely filеd this appeal and assigns one assignment of error:
“The trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for summary judgment and determining that appellee’s motion for the additional allowance of carрal tunnel syndrome was filed within the limitation found in R.C. 4123.84(A)(1).”
Initially we note that an appeal to the court of commоn pleas involving a claimant’s right to participate in the State Insurance Fund, pursuant to 4123.512, is subject to a
de novo
review for a determination of both the facts and law. See
Afrates v. Lorain
(1992),
Civ.R. 56 provides that a summary judgment may be granted only after the trial court determines that (1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come but to one conclusion and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgmеnt is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co.
(1982),
Further, an entry of summary judgment against the moving party is appropriate where all relevant evidence is before the court, no genuine issue as to any matеrial fact exists, and the nonmoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Lester v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(1989),
In the case
sub judice,
appellant misconstrues thе following statement regarding R.C. 4123.84 made in
Clementi v. Wean United, Inc.
(1988),
Further, a party’s failure to move to strike or otherwise object to documentary evidence submitted by another party in support of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment waives any error in considering that evidence under Civ.R. 56(C).
Stegawski v. Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc.
(1987),
Since appellant did not object at trial lеvel to the evidence entered in support of appellee’s motion in opposition, all dоcuments attached to both parties’ motions were properly considered by the trial court. After a review of the evidence submitted, we find that appellee first became aware of the residual injury, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, on August 22,1989. Since appellee filed his claim on November 5, 1990, appеllee’s claim for an additional allowance was timely filed under a proper application of R.C. 4123.84. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment and subsequently entering a finding that appellee timely filed his claim.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for further proceedings.
Judgment affirmed.