On March 5, 1997, Plaintiffs Charles and Randy Forseth (the “Forseths”) filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Wisconsin state law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin against Defendants Village of Sussex (“Village”), the Village’s former President, John H. Tews (“Tews”), and the Village’s Administrator, M. Chris Swartz (“Swartz”). The Forseths claimed that Defendants wrongfully interfered with their development of a tract of land. The court dismissed the action without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), holding that the Forseths’ federal claims were “not ripe for adjudication.” We Affirm in Part and Reverse in Part and Remand with Instructions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Forseths’ Land Development and Events Leading to the Dispute
In July 1992, the Forseths, doing business as A&R Land Company, purchased thirty acres of land in the Village of Sussex, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, with the intention of developing the land as a residential subdivision. In August 1992, pursuant to Wisconsin law, the Forseths submitted a preliminary plat
Before the Forseths submitted the final plat for Village Board approval, Tews, whose homestead abutted four lots of the proposed development, was elected President of the Village Board. Plaintiffs made several allegations in their complaint and brief submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss about the conduct of Village Board President Tews and Village Administrator Swartz, including, that even before he was elected President, Tews made various efforts to obstruct and/оr delay the Forseths’ subdivision development because Tews’ homestead was in his family for decades and overlooked the’ Forseths’ property. Plaintiffs further contended that Tews “became angered and frustrated at the prospect of streets and houses disrupting the natural area and obstructing his views”; thus, Tews “calculated a plan of harassment ... designed to exact retaliation and vengeance” and with the assistance of Swartz, engaged “in a series of actions [designed] to prevent and obstruct” the Forseths’ proposed develoрment and “ultimately exact a coveted piece of land Tews was previously unable or unwilling to fairly acquire — even from his own family.” For example, in February 1993, the For-seths point out in their complaint that Tews claimed that Native American campgrounds of archeological or historical significance were located within the Forseths’ subdivision. However, the State Historical Society of Wisconsin could not substantiate this claim.
Plaintiffs also allege in their complaint that in October 1993, Village Board President Tews persuaded the Army Corps of Engineеrs to perform a wetlands survey of the Forseths’ property. The Corps agreed and determined that the size of the wetlands had increased about 100 feet westward since its 1982 survey, thereby reducing the area available for development. Because the increased wetlands had not been taken into account in the Forseths’ plat designs, the Village Board denied their final plat.
The Forseths set out to revise their plat once more. But before they submitted another revised plat, in their complaint and brief opposing the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs allege that President Tews, with the assistance of Administrator Swartz, conceived of a plan that would require the Forseths “to convey a buffer strip to Mr. Tews on both sides where his homestead bordered” the planned development, in exchange for Village Board approval of their subdivision. The Forseths further claimed in their complaint that they reluctantly agreed to President Tews’ condition “because they were personally frustrated and financially strained by the delays and expenses incurred in connection with the pri- or two proposed plats.” The Village Board went along with the conveyance and approved the revised final plat on the express condition that the buffer strip would be conveyed to Tews.
B. The District Court’s Opinion
In early March 1996, the Forseths filed a Notice of Circumstances of Claim and an Itemized Claim and served them upon Defendants pursuant to state law governing actions against a governmental subdivision and its officers. See Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1). Because Defendants failed to respond after 120 days, the Forseths’claim was deemed disallowed under Wisconsin law. See id On March 5, 1997, the Forseths filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with the filing of a substantive due process claim, an equal protection claim and two takings claims under the 5th and 14th Amendments. They also asserted various state law claims, including state constitutional violations, nuisance, negligence, and conversion.
Defendants, citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, moved to dismiss the For-seths’ complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because all four of the Forseths’ federal claims failed to satisfy the ripeness requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Williamson County Reg. Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank,
Because Defendants had already filed their answer, the district court construed Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
II. ISSUES
On appeal, we are presented with the following issues: (1) Are the Forseths’ federal claims subject to the ripeness requirements of Williamson-, and (2) if they are, do their federal claims satisfy those requirements?
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
B. The Applicability of Williamson
In Williamson County Reg. Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank,
1. Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Process Claim
The Forseths’ substantive due process claim arises from Defendants’ act of conditioning approvаl of the final plat on the Forseths’ agreement to convey a buffer strip to Village Board President John Tews personally. Although we have recognized the potential for a plaintiff to maintain a substantive due process claim
In Gamble v. Eau Claire County, we distinguished substantive due process claims from takings claims and questioned whether, under certain circumstances, the former required Williamson ripeness:
The plaintiffs claim that she was denied substantive due process is different, however, from her claim thаt she was denied just compensation.... It is not obvious that this alternative approach [substantive due process] to obtaining relief in a case in which the government has taken one’s property should require exhaustion of state remedies. By this approach, the plaintiff is not seeking an award of compensation .... but that she is entitled to get her land back or its pecuniary equivalent.
Gamble,
Here, the Forseths, in essence, base their due process claim on the fact that a two acre portion of their land was taken solely for private use, as a buffer strip for Village Board President Tews. Similarly, Gamble stated that substantive due process
has its greatest appeal when the state acts outside its eminent domain powers, for example by taking property for a private rather than for a- public use. Suppose a state passed a law which said that the governor could take away a person’s home and give it to his brother-in-law. It could be argued that such a law, even if meticulously enforced in accordance with the requirements of due process in the sense of fair procedure, would, if the law were as arbitrary and unrеasonable as it seemed, deprive the homeowner of property without due process of law.
Gamble,
Whatever door that was left open by Gamble’s observation that “[t]he requirement that the contemplated use [оf taken land] be public has been severely attenuated” such that “[w]e can find no case in the last half century where a taking was squarely held to be for a private use,” Gamble,
Further, our facts here are unmistakably similar to Covington Court. In Cov-ington Court, as a condition of moving their development plans forward by the local board of trustees, the developer conveyed portions of the lots to a private party and even landscaped land, grаnted easements and erected a fence for the private party.
So too here do the Forseths allege that the defendants have taken their land for the sole purpose of satisfying the private aesthetic preferences of the Village Board President. Despite the troubling facts and allegations of the instant case, particularly the significant private pecuniary gain achieved by President Tews and the quеstionable use of his governmental position and authority, we are forced to conclude that Plaintiffs’ are bound by Covington Court and Williamson. Because the For-seths’ “labeled” substantive due process claim falls within the framework for takings claims, see Covington Court,
2. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim
The Forseths’ equal protection claim arises from both Defendants’ alleged act of conditioning approval оf the Forseths’ final plat on their agreement to convey a buffer strip to John Tews and from Defendants’ other alleged conduct that obstructed and delayed the Forseths’ subdivision development. The Forseths’ equal protection claim, however, stands on firmer ground than their substantive due process claim. Because this Circuit’s rulings relating to equal protection claims in the land-use context have yet to make clear the applicability of Williamson’s ripeness requirements, we take this opportunity to articulate the applicable standards.
This Circuit has read Williamson broаdly, rejecting attempts to label “takings” claims as “equal protection” claims and thus requiring “ripeness.” See Unity Ventures v. County of Lake,
A survey of this Circuit’s previous holdings that maintained equal protection claims in the land use context, reveal that the Esmail standard was satisfied when the equal protection claim was based on: (1) the malicious conduct of a governmental agent, in other words, conduct that evidences a “spiteful effort to ‘get’ him for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective,” Esmail,
Here, the Forseths have indeed alleged that the Defendants, through the actions of the Board President and Village Administrator, acted “maliciously” in conditioning the plat approval on the conveyance of the buffer strip as well in failing to prevent the storm water run-off on their property. Because we are obligated to accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and accept all reasonable inferences drawn from them, see Potter,
We are also of the opinion that the facts of this case present sufficient grounds to allow the Forseths to maintain their equal protection claim on the, basis of the questionable conduct of Village Board President Tews while in office. Unlike any of this Circuit’s previous holdings on the issue of equal protection in the land-use context, Plaintiffs alleged that a member of the governing body denied them equal protection under the law when he demanded and received significant personal pecuniary gain by the abuse of his governmental authority. The Forseths allege that Tews, in his official capacity conceived of and engineered the review of Plaintiffs’ plat in order to receive a buffer strip to his property at a significant discount. As a governmental actor, Tews’ conduct, as alleged by Plaintiffs, raises significant questions about whether he abused his official authority for personal gain at the expense of the Forseths’ right to equal protection under the law. Thus, we hold that these facts as alleged by Plaintiffs would be sufficient to demonstrate that the actions of Defendants were taken for improper purposes “wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective,” see Esmail,
3. The Forseths’ Takings Claims
The Forseths also made two takings claims under the 5th and 14th Amendments. First, they argue that the conveyance to Tews was an “unconstitutional condition” because they were required to give up land without just compensation in exchange for a govérnment benefit {i.e., approval of the final plat) having little to do with the required conveyance. See Dolan v. City of Tigard,
The Forseths’ second takings claim is based on the Village’s design and/or construction of the current drainage system that causes storm water to run-оff from surrounding subdivisions onto their land, which they claim constitutes a temporary taking by periodic invasion. This too is a garden variety takings claim clearly subject to the ripeness requirements of Williamson,
C. The Satisfaction of Williamson’s Requirements
Having concluded that Williamson is applicable to the Forseths’ federal substantive due process and takings claims, we must examine whether these claims satisfy the ripeness standard.
Because the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement often overlap with, but are distinct from those underlying the finality requirement, see Williamson,
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that the Forseths’ federal substantive due process and takings claims were not ripe, and that the district court was correct to dismiss those claims. However, for purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, Plaintiffs successfully рleaded and maintained a bona fide equal protection claim, which was not subject to Williamson ripeness. Further, we remand to the district court to resolve whether, with only the equal protection federal claim remaining, the court maintains supplemental jurisdiction over the Forseths’ state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Van Harken v. City of Chicago,
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND Remanded with Instructions.
Notes
. The Forseths’ preliminary plat proposed a residential subdivision called "Meadow Canyon Estates.”
. Plaintiffs contend in their complaint that the buffer land strip condition was expressly included in the accompanying ordinance granting re-zoning and the conditional use permit for the Forseths’ property, both of which were signed by Tews and Swartz in their official capacities. They further contend that they "were required by the Village to enter into a Subdivider’s Agreement which incorporated by reference all of the obli-
. The Forseths contend that Tews initially offered $1,500, but ultimately agreed to pay $6,000 for the 1.85 acre buffer land strip.
. State law claims against a Wisconsin governmental subdivision or its officers must be brought within six months of the disallowance of a claim. See Wis. Stat. § 893.80(l)(g). Here, however, because Defendants did not serve a formal notice of disallowance on the Forseths, their claims were deemed disallowed, see Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1), rendering the six month deadline inapplicable. See Blackbourn v. School Dist. of Onalaska,
.A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (emphasis added). "After the pleadings are closed ... any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
. As discussed above, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6). However, because Defendants previously filed their answer, the district court correctly construed Defendants' motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend,
. In a later opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished Williamson’s prudential ripeness requirements from ripeness requirements drawn from Article III limitations on judicial power. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
. Even if Plaintiffs made such a showing, there is authority that when a taking is made for wholly private use, the takings clause and not substantive due process provides the analytical framework. Thus, Williamson’s ripeness requirements would still apply. See, e.g., Covington Court, Ltd. v. Village of Oak Brook,
. Covington Court owned 22 of 23 residential lots comprising Whitehall Park. See Covington Court, 11 F.3d at 178. When Covington planned a subdivision on this property, the owner of the remaining lot, William Bailes, informed Covington that in light of his connections with the local officials, the Oak Brook Board of Trustees would halt Coving-ton’s project until his concerns were met. Id. Bailes had so much influence over the local board members that even the board president informed Covington Court that "its plans would not move forward until Bailes was satisfied." Id. Consequently, Covington Court did not pursue a vote from the Board, but instеad negotiated with Bailes and met his concerns. Id. The Board subsequently approved Covington’s subdivision proposal. Id.
. In Covington Court, we affirmed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiff had failed to pursue “the remedies available to it through the state courts.” Covington Court, 11 F.3d at 178.
. Of course, after discovery, should Plaintiffs’ claims be revealed to be frivolous and without any factual basis, Defendants may then been titled to a summary judgment in their favor.
. Because a physical invasion is a "final decision,” this takings claim is subject only to Williamson’s exhaustion requirement. See Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. Public Service Comm’n,
. Federal courts, relying on Williamson, have dismissed the vast majority of takings claims brought in federal court, see generally John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the Ripeness Mess? A Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 Urb. Law. 195 (1999), while the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Williamson. See, e.g., Suitum,
. In light of our above holding that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy Williamson's ripeness requirements because of their failure to exhaust their state remedies, we need not address the issue of whether the Forseths’ satisfied the "final decision” prong of Williamson.
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we would be inclined to conclude that the Forseths did in fact satisfy Williamson s final decision requirement by demonstrating "a final decision on a ‘development plan submitted, considered, and rejected by the governmental entity,' ” see Covington Court,
Although we do not know why the Forseths did not pursue several other opportunities to receive a decision under Wisconsin law, such as seeking a variance from the Plan Commission or an approval of a plat that included the increased wetlands areas without the buffer strip conveyance to Tews, we presume that it was because the Forseths did not believe they could receive а favorable decision in light of their treatment by President Tews and Village Administrator Swartz. Consistent with Williamson’s ruling that a plaintiff need not pursue state procedures that are unavailable or inadequate, see Williamson,
. As previously stated, the Forseths have filed state law claims both in this case and in a parallel state action filed after the district court dismissed their case in September 1998.