49 Md. 586 | Md. | 1878
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A motion is made to dismiss the appeal in this case, upon the ground that after the judgment by default the damages were assessed by an inquisition The case of the Wilmington and Susquehanna R. R. vs. Condon, 8 G. & J., 448, is relied upon as conclusive of the question. The inquisition in that case and the present is a totally different proceeding. There the inquisition was for the con
The motion to dismiss is overruled.
The declaration in this case is filed on behalf of the administratrix of James Sisco, on behalf of his widow, and on behalf of the guardian of his minor child, alleging, in the first count, damages to them respectively occasioned hy the defendant’s so obstructing and closing up an alley way as to deprive them of the proper use and enjoyment of a house and lot built thereon.
The second count seems to charge damages sustained only hy the widow.
Upon this declaration judgment by default was obtained.
When a jury was thereafter impannelled to inquire and assess the damages, they were sworn “ to try and assess the damages in the action now depending between Julia Ann E. Sisco, administratrix of. James Sisco, deceased, the plaintiff, and Patrick Forrester, the defendant, and a true inquisition give according to the evidence.”
An exception is taken to this form of swearing the jury, and presents the only question for our examination. There is no exception to any of the proof offered, nor any motion in arrest of judgment
The declaration, to say the least, is certainly a very singular one, but the effect of the judgment by default was to determine that injury had been done by the defendant to the enjoyment of the property by the deceased in his
The jury was, therefore, sworn to assess damages for an injury alleged in the declaration'and covered by the judgment by default. The City Court was right in giving a sensible effect to the judgment by default, and preventing the jury from assessing damages at the same time for three parties, each having distinct causes of action.
The appellant cannot have been injured by the course adopted by the Court. As no exception has been taken to any of the proof, we are fully warranted in concluding that the proof was confined to the damages and injury to John Sisco in his life-time, and that the jury in their inquisition assessed them alone.
Seeing no error presented by the exception of the appellant, the judgment of the City Court will he affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.