Thе appellant, Edward Forman, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, commenced this action in the district court for Platte County, Nebraska, to recover damages to his 1963 Rambler automobile and for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff’s wife, Barbara Forman, who at the time of the collision was operating said automobile in a northerly direction on Twenty-ninth Avenue in Columbus, Nebraska.
Defendant Earl Anderson was oрerating his 1962 Ford automobile in a westerly direction on Twenty-seventh Street at the time of the collision between the two cars at the intersection of Twenty-seventh Street and Twenty-ninth Avenue in the City of Columbus, Nebraska, on December 24, 1965.
. Defendant Anderson filed a cross-petition charging the plaintiff’s wife with negligence of a degree which would defeat her recovery and charging further that the negligence of Barbarа Forman was imputed to her husband, the plaintiff herein.
Both parties waived trial by jury and the cause was tried to the court. After hearing the evidence, the court *717 on November 24, 1967, found the defendant was negligent in the operation of his automobile and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiff’s wife. The court also found that plaintiff’s wife was also negligent, that her negligence contributed to the accident, and that such negligence was more than slight when compared with the defendant’s negligence.
The court on December 7, 1967, entered judgment for the defendant on plaintiff’s petition and for the plaintiff on defendant’s cross-petition. The court dismissed both the petition and cross-petition.
On February 7, 1968, the court overruled plaintiff’s motion for new trial. Plaintiff appeals to this court.
As a basis for reversal of the judgment of the district court, plaintiff asserts that said court erred in the following respects: (1) In finding that an innocent non-negligent plaintiff’s cause of action for loss of consortium, expenses, and damаges is barred by the contributory negligence of his spouse; (2) in declaring a certificate of title to a motor vehicle is conclusive as to ownership; and (3) in failing to determine the plaintiff’s interest in the 1963 Rambler.
The evidence among other things discloses that the plaintiff, Edward Forman, purchased the 1963 Rambler car in question in July of 1963; that at the time of its purchase Barbara Forman was not present; that only the plaintiff was present; and that the record title was placed in the names of Edward and/or Barbara Forman. In fact, it was agreed by the parties at the trial that the record title was in Edward and/or Barbara Forman. Thе inference that the title was ordered placed in the names of Edward and/or Barbara Forman, at the request of plaintiff, Edward Forman, is therefore reasonable and is supported by the evidence.
There was evidence from both the plaintiff and his wife, Barbara Forman, that the funds used to purchase said Rambler automobile were funds inherited by plaintiff from his father and that none of said funds came *718 from Barbarа. However, there was also evidence that the parties had a joint bank account and that the funds used were withdrawn by check from said joint account. All expenses such as automobile insurance, fuel, and repairs were also paid from said account.
All of the foregoing evidence was apparently offered by plaintiff for the purpose of showing that in spite of the fact that title was in both plaintiff' and his wife, that in truth and in fact, the ownership of the automobile was in plaintiff only, and therefore not having been in the car either as driver or passenger at the time of the collision he would be entitled to recover resulting damages.
The parties agreed at the trial that the automobile was being used in a family purpose.
This court has adhered to a strict interpretation of statutes pertaining to the оwnership of motor vehicles.
In Turpin v. Standard Reliance Ins. Co.,
“A certificate of title to a motor vehicle is generally conclusive evidence in this state of the ownership of the vehicle.”
It seems the plaintiff is endeavoring to come within the exception created by the word “generally.” The act of the plaintiff in placing the title in the names of both himself and his wife was done freely and voluntаrily by the plaintiff. There was no showing of a mistake of fact, or of any coercion or fraud. There is no valid reason for eliminating or removing Barbara Forman’s name from the title nor is there any showing that it was еver the intention of the plaintiff that he was to be the sole owner of the car. The entire transaction was the usual everyday situation whereby a husband or wife or both make a purchase of a home, household furniture, or *719 other personal property for the common use of the family.
Section 60-105, R. R. S. 1943, provides among other things: “No person * * * acquiring a motor vehicle * * * shall acquire any right, title, claim, or interest in or to such motor vehicle * * * until he shall have had issued to him a cеrtificate of title to such motor vehicle. * * * No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle * * * unless evidenced by a cеrtificate of title * * * duly issued, in accordance with the provisions of this act.”
In view of the foregoing we conclude that there is no merit to plaintiff’s second and third assignments of error.
Plaintiff in his first assignment of error states that the court erred in finding that an innocent nonnegligent plaintiff’s cause of action for loss of consortium, expenses, and damages is barred by the contributory negligence of his spouse.
In support of his сontention, the plaintiff cites a number of cases. An examination of these cases discloses that factual situations vastly different from the facts in the instant case are involved and it would serve no useful purpose to review them in this opinion.
This court in Doleman v. Burandt,
“We
adopt this rule only in the above situation where the action is brought by the co-owners as plaintiff against a third party. It would not necessarily apply in all cases, especially where the co-owners are parties defendant and one owner operating the car. In such a case the question of imputable negligence would still require proof of the relationship of principal and agent, joint enterprise, or some community of interest. Snyder v. Russell,
In Matheny v. Central Motor Lines, Inc.,
“As such co-owner of the automobile in which she was riding, the plaintiff had equal rights to direct and control its movement, * * * and was in law chargeable with the responsibility for the negligent operation of the automobile.”
In Paine v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,
In Neiman v. Watkins,
*721
“ ‘Under the entireties theory of property held by husband and wife, the husband clearly should be precluded from any recоvery for his own act of negligence.’ Id. at 456,
In Clark v. Hampton, 83 N. H. 524,
In Lasnetske v. Parres,
Based upon the evidence, the facts, and the foregoing *722 authorities, we conclude that the findings and judgment of the district court are correct and are therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.