54 A.2d 710 | Conn. | 1947
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the action of the board of tax review of the defendant town in placing its property on the tax list, claiming that it was exempt, as belonging to a Connecticut corporation organized exclusively for educational purposes, under 1163 of the General Statutes. The trial court sustained the action of the board and the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
Previous to 1925, our statutes had for many years included a provision exempting from taxation "buildings or portions of buildings exclusively occupied as colleges, academies, churches or public schoolhouses," with an addition made in 1921 to include "the land on which they stand." General Statutes, *3
Rev. 1888, 3820; Rev. 1902, 2315; Rev. 1918, 1160; Public Acts, 1921, Chap. 109. We considered the scope of the exemption in Yale University v. New Haven (1899),
In 1925, a special commission appointed under authority of the General Assembly particularly to *4 study exemptions from taxation made a report, and as a result an act was passed which, in place of the general exemption of colleges, academies and schools quoted above and certain other institutions, contained a provision which, although somewhat altered in detail by chapter 319 of the Public Acts of 1927, is essentially the same as that now found in 1163 of the General Statutes. Subject to certain other sections of the statutes not relevant to the issue before us, subsection (7) exempted "the real property of, or held in trust for, a Connecticut corporation organized exclusively for scientific, educational, literary, historical or charitable purposes or for two or more such purposes and used exclusively for carrying out one or more of such purposes and the personal property of, or held in trust for, any such corporation, provided (a) any officer, member or employee thereof does not receive or at any future time shall not receive any pecuniary profit from the operations thereof, except reasonable compensation for services in effecting one or more of such purposes or as proper beneficiary of its strictly charitable purposes, and provided (b)" that a quadrennial statement of the claimed exemption shall be made to the taxing officials.
Since the adoption of the 1927 act we have decided four cases directly involving claims by institutions that their property was exempt as devoted to educational purposes. In Canterbury School v. New Milford,
In the cases decided by us under the statute as it stood before the 1927 amendments, the question was as to the institutions which the legislature intended to include in the general word "academy." As long *6
as the exemption was expressed in such a general word, it was our right and duty to inquire what institutions it was the intent of the General Assembly to include in that word; it was our conclusion that the General Assembly could not in reason have meant that every institution falling within the scope of the general terms of the statute should be entitled to an exemption, but that it must have intended the law to apply only to institutions having characteristics which would bring them within the purposes for which exemptions from taxation are ordinarily granted; and, accordingly, we construed the broad words of the statute to be inapplicable where those purposes were not being served. See National Fireproofing Co. v. Huntington,
In omitting the previous general provision as to colleges, academies and public schools and in bringing them within the broad scope of "scientific, educational, literary, historical or charitable institutions," the act indicates clearly an intent to do away with any such test. See Westport Bank Trust Co. v. Fable,
For us to import into the law a requirement that a school, to be exempt, must not only come within the terms of the statute but must also appreciably relieve the state of the burden of educating the children within it would be to add a limitation which the General Assembly not only has not made but which it refused to make. When the General Assembly has undertaken to state definitely the requirements necessary to secure an exemption, we cannot read into them other requirements having no sanction in the language it has used. Simmons v. Holcomb,
The defendant's contention that to construe the act as we have done would make it invalid as in effect *9
a use of public funds for private purposes is without merit. Education in itself serves a public purpose. Lyman v. Adorno,
It is unnecessary to consider at any length the facts involved in the case before us. Unattacked conclusions of the trial court are that the plaintiff was organized exclusively for educational purposes and that it met the express requirements of the statute under which it claimed exemption; but the court denied its claim on the ground that its property was not devoted to public use because it did not perform functions which otherwise would devolve upon the state or municipal government. This conclusion was based upon findings that the school was largely for boarding pupils, although it took a few day pupils; that its charges were relatively high; that it did not give much scholarship aid, and in bestowing that aid no preference was given to students from Connecticut; and that the larger number of pupils came from outside Connecticut and few came from the defendant town. As the plaintiff was found fully to comply with the requirements for exemption stated in the statute, it could not properly be denied relief on the ground taken by the trial court.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to sustain the plaintiff's appeal and order the board of tax review to strike the plaintiff's property from the tax fist.
In this opinion JENNINGS and INGLIS, Js., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority or the reasoning upon which it rests. It is my judgment that there are three essentials to the exemption of an educational institution under 1163(7): (1) It must be devoted to the public use. (2) It must be sequestered for educational uses. (3) Neither it nor any person can secure any profit from its operations. The first requisite involves "the conception of public education and public benefit which is at the root of the exemption claimed — the performance, though by private persons, of functions which otherwise devolve upon the State or municipal government"; Pomfret School v. Pomfret,
By its opinion in the instant case the majority accepts the language used in that connection as authority for its present conclusion. This language, however, was not essential to that decision, and recognition that the result in that case was correct does not require an exemption in the present case, for the factual situation is materially different. There, as that opinion pointed out, the plaintiff was "organized to care for educationally exceptional and underprivileged children," and, accordingly, by fulfilling *12 that function it served the public interest by relieving the public schools of this "great burden and responsibility." Here, not only does the plaintiff provide no such public service but it is primarily a boarding school exacting a charge of $500 per year for any day pupil. During 1945-6, while Litchfield furnished education for 769 of its local pupils, but two in all, and they as day pupils, were cared for by the plaintiff with its hundred thousand dollar plant. It gives but little scholarship aid, with no preference to students from Connecticut, and a majority of its pupils come from outside of this state. Manifestly the plaintiff is a private school which is totally devoid of that devotion to the public use which distinguishes the Edgewood School case.
The majority opinion suggests further reasons for holding that under the present wording of 1163, adopted by amendments enacted in 1925 and 1927, devotion to the public use is no longer essential to exemption. Chapter 109, 1, of Public Acts, 1921, the statute construed in the Pomfret School case, exempted realty "exclusively occupied as colleges, academies, churches, public schoolhouses or infirmaries." The corresponding provision of 1163(7) reads: "the real property of . . . a Connecticut corporation organized exclusively for scientific, educational, literary, historical or charitable purposes." A natural and obvious purpose of this change of wording was to simplify the language. Thus, the words "educational . . . purposes" in their context took the place of "colleges, academies . . . public schoolhouses"; and similarly "charitable purposes" took the place of "churches . . . or infirmaries" while "scientific [and] literary . . . purposes" supplanted "scientific and literary societies," *13
which had been dealt with in a subsequent provision of the 1921 act. The full import of the change referred to was, in my opinion, this simplification rather than the expression of an intent to eliminate the devotion to the public use requirement, as so resourcefully argued by the majority. The legislature knew when it adopted these amendments that this court had repeatedly and without exception held this requirement to be essential to exemption under the 1921 act. The presumption is justified that the legislature substituted the summarizing words "educational . . . purposes" for "colleges, academies, . . . public schoolhouses" with the expectation and intention that the new wording should connote the continuance of this requirement. This court expressly so held in Stamford Jewish Center, Inc. v. Stamford,
I am unable to follow the suggestion in the majority opinion that the use in the 1921 act of "the general word `academy'" gave rise to a "right and duty" in this court to determine whether a devotion to the public use was essential to exemption thereunder which the employment of the more inclusive words "educational . . . purposes" in the present statute *14 does not permit. The majority refers to the significance of the report to the legislature of the 1925 special commission to study exemptions from taxation. The content of that report, however, seems to me to make very clear that the legislature did not intend by the statute as amended to eliminate the first essential above referred to. This report, after reciting a recommended provision for exempting "educational . . . institutions," goes on to state (p. 31) that this clause includes all the classes of institutions covered by the clause, "exclusively occupied as colleges, academies . . . or infirmaries," in the 1921 law. The report states on page 28 that the commission's investigation had "disclosed several tax exempt institutions in this state, which pay dividends, and more where the form of organization makes private gain possible," contrary to the state's exemption policy. On the same page it also states that "The existing statute is amended in the following respects only." Then are enumerated seven items, one of which is the private gain provision, but no mention is made of eliminating the devotion to the public use requirement. In view of these statements, the inclusion in the amended act of the nonprofit limitation and the failure to incorporate the devotion to the public use requirement to my mind have no such significance as is suggested in the majority opinion.
The present wording of 1163 became operative in 1927. On July 27, 1934, this court rendered its decision in Connecticut Junior Republic Assn. v. Litchfield,
It is my conclusion that, where, as in the case before us, this court's decisions have established the exemption requirements under this statute and these have been accepted by the taxing authorities, the courts and the legislature for so many years, any such radical modification as the majority decision effects should come by legislative enactment and not by the pronouncement of a change in judicial interpretation of the statute by this court.
For the foregoing reasons I conclude that there was no error.
Dissenting Opinion
The majority opinion finds support in a literal interpretation of the statute, but so to construe it raises a doubt as to its constitutionality under article