Lead Opinion
OPINION
{1} This case presents us with an opportunity to revisit the issue of who, other than the state and federal attorneys general, has standing to sue to enforce the land trust provisions of the Enabling Act, an issue last addressed in Asplund, v. Hannett,
Background
{2} Plaintiffs Forest Guardians, Southwest Environmental Center, and Western Game-bird Alliance are environmental conservation groups whose primary interests are to restore and promote biological diversity on public lands. In addition, Forest Guardians and Southwest Environmental Center have bid on State school trust lands and have expressed an intention to continue bidding on lands that the groups consider ecologically significant. Plaintiffs Bridget Jaeober, Rich Atkinson, Mary Lou Jones, and Jeffrey Scott are individual parents of New Mexico schoolchildren.
{3} Plaintiffs filed a complaint in which they sought (1) an injunction prohibiting the leasing of school trust lands without advertisement and public auction, (2) a declaration that “all State laws, rules, regulations and practices” relating to six leasing procedures are invalid under the New Mexico Enabling Act and Article XIII of the New Mexico Constitution, and (3) a declaration that the Land Office “has violated their trust obligation by failing to protect the corpus of the trust by allowing state trust lands to deteriorate.” Defendants New Mexico Commissioner of Public Lands and New Mexico State Land Office moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, failure to exhaust mandatory administrative remedies, and res judicata. The Commissioner was joined, in a separate brief, by the New Mexico Attorney General. In addition, the New Mexico Cattle Growers Association (NMCGA) intervened over the objections of Plaintiffs and filed their answer to the complaint and their own motion to dismiss. The New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau, the New Mexico Public Lands Council, and the New Mexico Wool Growers, Inc. lаter intervened without objection.
{4} In their response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs raised the doctrine of “great public importance” as an alternative source of standing and requested that the district court accept the case as a writ of mandamus. Defendants’ reply objected to Plaintiffs’ request on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not followed the proper procedural rules for mandamus and argued that Plaintiffs’ claims did not raise questions of “public juris” such that the doctrine should be applied. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court ruled that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Standard of Review
{5} The determination of whether a party has standing to sue is a question of law, which we review de novo. Douglas County v. Babbitt,
The Enabling Act
{6} By the Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557, ch. 310 (hereinafter the Enabling Act or the Act), Congress set forth the terms by which New Mexico would be admitted as a state. Under the Act, the federal government granted New Mexico certain lands within the State “for the support of common schools.” Enabling Act § 6. By the terms of the grant, these lands were to be held by the State in trust. Id. § 10, ¶ 1. The Act set forth the conditions by which trust lands could be sold or leased and established limitations on the uses to which income derived from these lands could be put. The Act made it clear that actions taken in contravention of any provision of thе Act would constitute a breach of the trust. Id. ¶ 2.
{7} In Asplund,
Trust Law
{8} The Enabling Act, the New Mexico State Constitution, and case law make it clear that the lands granted under the Act as well as the profits to be derived from these lands are to be held in trust for the benefit of named institutions. See Enabling Act, § 10, ¶ 1; N.M. Const, art. XIII, § 1; N.M. Const, art. XXI, § 9; Asplund,
{9} The primary differences between a charitable trust and other private trusts are that a charitable trust may be perpetual, the denominated recipients of the trust income may be indefinite, and the intended beneficiary is the community itself. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 364-65 (1959). The trusts created by the Enаbling Act are perpetual. See NMSA 1978, § 19 — 1— 17 (1917) (naming permanent and current funds financed by trust lands); State v. Llewellyn,
{10} Having identified the Enabling Act trust as a charitable trust, we turn to the law of charitable trusts to determine who has standing to sue to enforce the trust. Traditiоnally, three categories of persons have such standing: (1) the state attorney general or other public officer, (2) a trustee as against co-trustees, and (3) persons having a special interest in the enforcement of the trust. See Restatement, supra § 391.
{11} The Enabling Act expanded the group of persons entitled to enforce the trust by reserving, in the grantor United States, the right to enforce the trust by making it the duty of the United States Attorney General to prosecute “in the name of the United States and its courts such proceedings” as may be necessary. Enabling Act, § 10, ¶ 8. However, in establishing this duty, the Act provided that “[njothing herein contained shall be taken as in limitation of the power of the state or of any citizen thereof to enforce the provisions of this act.” Id. ¶ 9. Intervеnors argue that, notwithstanding the actual language of the Act, this reservation was intended to restrict standing such that the United States Attorney General is the only person or agency that may sue to enforce the trust. We disagree. We understand the language regarding the Attorney General to simply and expressly trump the common law exclusion of the grantor from enforcement actions and to designate the agency within the federal government that is i'esponsible for bringing suit. See United States v. 41,098.98 Acres of Land,
{12} The limitation on standing to enforce a charitable trust “arises from the need to protect the trustee from vexatious litigation, possibly based on an inadequate investigation, by a large, changing, and uncertain class of the public to be benefitted.” Hardman v. Feinstein,
{13} Although the Enabling Act requires that trust income be used еxclusively to support the common schools, the Act does not specify how or to which schools this income should be distributed. See Enabling Act, § 10, ¶ 2. Ultimately, the amount of funding received by the individual public schools is determined by the district in which the school is located and the Department of Education. See NMSA 1978, § 22-8-4 (1988) (stating that state department of education responsible for controlling preparation of all public school budgets); NMSA 1978, § 22-8-10 (1993) (requiring local school boards to determine estimated yearly budget for school district). Insofar as a particular public school is not entitled to receive income directly from the Enabling Act trust, Plaintiff schoolchildren are likewise not entitled. Therefore, we conclude that the schoolchildren lack the “special interеst” necessary to sue to enforce the trust. See Restatement, supra § 391 cmt. c.
The Constitution
{14} As required by Section 2(1) of the Enabling Act, the State consented to be bound by all provisions of the Act in Article XXI, Section 9 of the New Mexico Constitution, and the Act became “fundamental law to the same extent as if it had been directly incorporated into the Constitution.” State ex rel. Interstate Stream Comm’n v. Reynolds,
{15} Plaintiffs argue that even if they lack standing as beneficiaries of the Enabling Act trust, as citizens threatened with a unique injury, they nonetheless have standing to mount a facial challenge to Land Office practices that violate articles XIII and XXI. However, as our Supreme Court made clear in Asplund, “[t]he constitutionality of a statute is not in itself a cause of action, nor a head of equity jurisdiction.”
{16} “The requirements for standing derive from constitutional provisions, enacted statutes and rules, and prudential considerations.” John Does I Through III v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese, Inc.,
Conservation Groups
{17} Plaintiffs argue that the conservation groups differ from the plaintiff in Asplund because the groups suffer a particularized harm when their applications to lease trust lands are denied. However, the conservation groups are not alleging standing in relation to a specific, adverse action by the Land Office, which clearly they would have standing as lessees to appeal. See NMSA 1978, § 19-7-67 (1912); see also Forest Guardians v. Wells,
{18} In their reply brief, Plaintiffs argue that they need not suffer actual injury to bring a facial constitutional challenge because New Mexico cases have held that the threat of injury is enough. See Am. Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) v. City of Albuquerque,
{19} Actual or threatened injury alone is not enough to maintain a particular cause of action. See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp,,
{20} The eases cited by Plaintiffs are consistent with our holding. In ACLU, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff parents and children had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance despite the fact that none of the plaintiffs had been arrested under the ordinance. See
{21} The conservation groups also lack standing to bring a complaint on behalf of them members.
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.
Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm’n,
{22} Our conclusion that the conservation groups lack standing is supported by prudential considerations. The purpose of limiting standing is tо avoid burdening the courts with multiple lawsuits over the same issue. To accomplish this purpose, we will limit standing to those parties whose interests will compel them to pursue a claim with the adversarial zeal necessary to clarify the issues. See John Does I Through III, 1996—NMCA-094, ¶ 37,
Schoolchildren
{23} Unlike the conservation groups, the schoolchildren are arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the Enabling Act and the school lands trust. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs must still show that the schoolchildren satisfy the three elements of standing: (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. John Does I Through III,
{24} Plaintiffs allege that the schoolchildren meet the “injury in fact” requirement because the Land Office’s policies and practices “directly and imminently threaten the amount of funding provided to public education in New Mexico.” Courts have defined the term “injury in fact” as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
{25} However, Plaintiffs must also show a causal connection between the injury alleged and the conduct of which they complain. “[T]he injury has to be fairly ... traee[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ ” Lujan,
{26} The income generated by the leasing of school trust lands does not go directly to individual schools or districts, but is deposited in a series of funds before being disbursed pursuant to a complicated school budgeting process. First, the income is deposited in a “state lands maintenance fund,” from which Land Office expenses are paid. See NMSA 1978, §§ 19-1-11 & 12 (1989). Once a month, any remaining balance attributable to the school trust lands is transferred from the maintenance to the “common school current fund.” See NMSA 1978, § 19-1-20 (1996). Money from the “common school current fund” is then transferred to either the “public school utility conservation fund,” NMSA 1978, § 6-23-7 (1997) or the “current school fund,” NMSA 1978, § 22-8-32 (1976). The current school fund also includes money receivéd from all fines and forfeitures collected under general laws as well as the proceeds of property coming to the state by escheat. Id. Once a month, any unencumbered balance in the current school fund is transferred to the “public school fund.” Id. The public school fund receives additional income from a variety of sources. See, e.g., § 22-8-12.1(0(2) (holding Department responsible for recommending legislative appropriations for public school fund). Finally, the public school fund is allocated to individual school districts through three distribution programs. NMSA 1978, § 22-8-14 (1988). Any money remaining in the public school fund at the end of a fiscal year reverts to a general fund. Id.
{27} The distribution of the public school fund among the various school districts is a complex process. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, §§ 22-8-1 through 42 (1953, as amended through 2000) (Public School Finance Act). Each local school board is required to prepare and submit estimated yearly budgets, using a manual compiled by the Department of Education (the Department). See §§ 22-8-5, -6, -10, 12.1. These proposed budgets are then reviewed, amended and approved by the Department, see §§ 22-8-11, -12, -12.1, which ultimately decides how public school funds are allocated to the individual school districts, see § 22-8-15(A). Therefore, the funds available to a school district or individual school are dependent not only on the amount of revenue generated by the school trust lands and other State programs, but also on Department policies and procedures as well as decisions by the Department and local school boards. Given the complexity of this process, we conclude that there is not a sufficient causal relationship between the Land Office’s actions and the amount of funding given to a particular school, much less the amount of funds devoted to a particular child’s education. Furthermore, we are convinced that a judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor could be rendered moot by the actions of local school board members and Department officials who are not a party to this lawsuit, but whose decisions and actions directly affect school funding. See Lujan,
{28} Plaintiffs cite to several out-of-state cases in support of their allegations that the schoolchildren suffer a redressable injury. See Jeffries v. Hassell,
{29} In Branson I, the plaintiff school districts and public schoolchildren sued to enjoin the enforcement of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that the plaintiffs alleged would violate the terms of the Colorado Enabling Act and would change the fiduciary duties of the State in managing school trust lands. See
{30} We are not persuaded by the Bran-son line of cases for several reasons. First, the plaintiffs in Branson sought to invalidate a constitutional amendment that “injected a series of conflicting interests into the management of the school lands trust.” Branson II,
{31} In addition, we note that a school district was a plaintiff in Branson. Although we are not clear that the law supports a holding that a school district satisfies the requirements for standing, we do note that by including the district as a plaintiff, the plaintiffs in Branson eliminated a third party whose independent actions might render the alleged injury incapable of redress by court action. See Lujan,
{32} Finally, given that New Mexico’s public school budget process is complex, we are in fact persuaded by the argument rejected by the Court in Branson I: that the injury of lost revenue could be made up by legislative appropriations. See
{33} Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that the schoolchildren’s constitutional right to a free education provides a legal basis for asserting standing was not raised below and therefore will not be considered on appeal. See Spectron Dev. Lаb. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co.,
Great Public Importance
{34} We agree with Plaintiffs that the doctrine of “great public importance” may be applicable to cases other than applications for writs of mandamus. It is unnecessary for us to reach this issue, however, because we conclude that the injuries alleged by Plaintiffs do not rise to the level of great public importance, as described by our Supreme Court. See State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson,
{35} Plaintiffs seek to compel the Commissioner to comply with his duties under the Enabling Act and the Constitution, alleging that the Commissioner’s administration of grazing leases on the school trust lands results in less income for the public schools. In Coll, our Supreme Court made it clear that “the fact that a case involves a duty that state officials owe to the general public as a whole is not sufficient to show that the case involves an issue of great public importance.” Id. ¶ 21. Instead, the doctrine is reserved for those cases involving “clear threats to the essential nature of state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their Constitution.” Id. Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Commissioner is infringing on the power properly belonging to another branch of govеrnment. See, e.g., Johnson,
Conclusion
{36} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
{38} I fully concur in the majority’s disposition of the conservation groups’ claims, but I cannot agree with denying standing to the schoolchildren. The majority opinion applies our standing case law too cautiously and in the process essentially voids that provision of Section 10 of the Enabling Act which rеserves the “power ... of any citizen [of the State] to enforce the provisions of this act.” If schoolchildren — the real beneficiaries of the Act — cannot bring suit as citizens, no citizen can. I believe the majority has been led into error by its definition of the harm asserted by the schoolchildren. That error in turn leads to difficulties in its discussion of the remedy sought or available.
{39} The core of the majority’s concern is that even if the Land Office increased income to the school land’s trust, there is no way to establish that there “would be an actual increase in the funds” given to schools. Given the complex process of budgetary allocation and appropriation — which the majority accurately describes — I agree that no one can assert thаt a dollar of increased income will result in a dollar of increased money appropriated to any particular school or child. But this uncertainty is not fatal to standing because it focuses on the wrong part of the process.
{40} The schoolchildren’s focus as stated in their complaint is on the amount of income generated by the trust lands; that is, on the amount of revenues provided to the complex process which results in specific appropriations. The final form of educational appropriation is a political process which the judiciary should not intrude upon. However, that process is of necessity affected by the total resources made available to it. To assert that increasing income from the trust lands is not a real remedy is an implicit assertion that the entity responsible for allocation of resources will not comply with the Enabling Act’s requirement that all trust fund income be applied for the support of the schools in New Mexico. If we are to engage in assumptions, I choose to assume that increased income will be applied positively. Thus, increasing income at its source is a real remedy which can be provided through the exercise of conventional judicial process, depending, of course, on proof. Focusing on the source of income as the object of the litigation obviates all of the majority’s concerns as to causation and remedy.
{41} The majority’s focus on the political processes leading to appropriation in any event proves too much. Given the complexities of the process and the impossibility of predicting or tracing income to allocation, an argument could be made that the State Attorney General and the United States Attorney do not have proper standing to make the same challenge the schoolchildren are attempting to bring here. After all, the uncertainty relied upon by the majority would infect their efforts to increase income also. I do not believe such a challenge would be successful were a claim to be brought by the Attorney General or the United States Attorney. Similarly, I do not believe it should deny these schoolchildren the ability to make them case.
{42} Finally, the majority expresses some comfort in the notion that there are other parties who can bring these claims. I do not understand why the theoretical availability of other persons who may have standing should defeat efforts by the schoolchildren to get the same issues heard. Despite their assumed ability to do so, no state or federal agency to date has raised the claims made by the schoolchildren here. I see no judicial economies or societal efficiencies to be gained by deferring to entities who to all appearances have no intention of acting in the foreseeable future. It is odd indeed to refuse standing here because the Attorney General — who is defending this ease vigorously— has the power to make the claim these schoolchildren are already making. Fearing that the issues will never be heard, I respectfully dissent.