Dеfendant appeals as of right a jury verdict awarding plaintiff $1,417,000. Plaintiff alleged that defendant committed fraud in connection with certain representations he made during discussions and mediation leading to the property settlement in the parties’ underlying divorce action. Defendant asserts that the elements of fraud were not established, and that the trial court erred in submitting the
Based on a judgment entered in July 2000, plaintiff and defendant were divorced after nearly twenty-two years of marriagе. As a result of mediation, the parties reached a property settlement in December 1999, which settlement was incorporated, but not merged, into this judgment. The primary marital assets were a Ford dealership owned and operated by defendant, the marital home, and a vacation home in northern Michigan referred to as the “Indian River” property. The property settlement was structured around defendant’s expressed intention to keep, and not sell, his dealership, as well as on the $1.7 million value attributed to the dealershiр by the mediator. Very shortly after the property settlement was reached, plaintiff learned from her son that defendant was going to “sell the dealership and move to the islands.” She then filed a motion challenging the agreement. At the hearing on that motion, defendant testified that the dealership was worth no more than $1.1 million and that he intended to continue operating it until he retired, which was at least eleven years. The court denied plaintiffs motion and ordered the parties to enter into the settlement agreement. Defendant undеrtook efforts to sell his dealership in August 2000, reaching agreement to sell it in the fall of 2000 for $6.6 million.
The Indian River property had been appraised in the early spring of 1999 for $1.25 million. After defendant represented through his lawyer that he wanted to keep this property for himself, that he loved every “nook and cranny” of the house, and that he could not bear to part with it, plaintiff agreed to let defendant buy out her share of the property. Defendant did so in October 2000, listed the property for sale within a matter of weeks, and sold it in June 2001 for $1,775 million, inсluding contents.
Plaintiff filed this action on December 7, 2002, alleging that defendant fraudulently induced her to enter into the property settlement and the amendment relating to the buyout of the Indian River property. Although plaintiff learned through a friend that the dealership had changed ownership, she did not file this litigation at that time. Rather, plaintiff testified that defendant provided the impetus for this litigation by moving to reduce his spousal support obligation. She testified that that action caused the trial judge in the divorce case to permit discovery of thе financial details of defendant’s transactions involving marital property. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff on her claim of fraud.
Defendant filed motions for summary disposition, directed verdict, and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), all of which were denied by the trial court. This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s denial of each of these motions, viewing the record and evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Dressel v Ameribank,
When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict, “this Court recognizes the unique opportunity of the jury and the trial judge to observe witnesses and the fact-finder’s responsibility
Defendant also moved for a new trial below. This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of that motion for an abuse of discretion.
Kelly v Builders Square, Inc,
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions because Michigan law does not recognize an independent cause of action for fraud arising from the divorce proceedings. We disagree.
Michigan law recognizes an independent cause of action for fraud where the fraud induced entry into a settlement agreement that was incorporated,
but not merged,
into the final judgment of divorce.
Grace v Grace,
Like this case,
Grace
involved a claim by the plaintiff that the defendant had committed fraud in connection with their property settlement, which was incorporated, but not merged, into the final judgment of divorce. The plaintiff filed her complaint alleging fraud in the inducement of the separation agreement.
Id.
at 361. Relying on
Nederlander v Nederlander,
We agree with plaintiffs contention that the law of the case doctrine applies аnd, consequently, we follow the prior panel’s holding that plaintiffs fraud claim is not barred under Nederlander.
The law of the case doctrine is discretionary and expresses the practice of the courts generally; it is not a limit on their power. The doctrine will not be applied if the facts do not remain materiallyor substantially the same or if there has been a change in the law.
We conclude that the law of the case doctrine requires us to follow the ruling of the prior panel that Nederlander is distinguishable from the present action and that plaintiff could, therefore, maintain her fraud claim. The prior panel ruled on a legal issue and there has been no change in the law or a material change of the facts to dispense with the law of the case doctrine. Further, defendant availed himself of his right to appeal the prior panel’s decision by seeking leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and that application was denied. Even if we concluded that the prior panel’s legal ruling was incorrect, the law of the case doctrine applies without regard to the correctness of the prior ruling. Accordingly, we hold that the law of the case doctrine applies here and we follow the prior panel’s determination that plaintiffs fraud claim is not barred by Nederlander. [Id. at 362-364 (citations deleted).]
Because the parties in Grace were directed by the order granting leave to address whether the plaintiffs claim was precluded by Nederlander, “while acknowledging that the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not operate as a limitation on our power as an appellate court,” the Grace Court proceeded to address thе merits of the issue. The Court explained:
We agree with the prior panel’s decision that the rule of Nederlander does not bar plaintiffs fraud claim. In Neder-lander, this Court held that if a party suspects that the other party has committed fraud during a divorce proceeding, MCR 2.612(C)(1)(c) and (2) (relief from judgment or order) allows the party to seek redress within one year after the judgment is entered, but the party is not permitted to maintain a separate action for fraud. Nederlander, supra at 126-127.
The prior panel distinguished Nederlander in its June 14, 1996, order. In the present case, the separation agreement was incorporated, but not merged, into the divorce judgment. The significance of this is explained in Marshall v Marshall,135 Mich App 702 , 712-713;355 NW2d 661 (1984), relied on by the prior panel in its order:
“When a property settlement agreement is incorporated and merged in a divorce judgment, it becomes a disposition by the court of the property. But, when not merged in the divorce judgment, the property settlement agreement may only be enforced by resort to the usual contract remedies and not as part of the divorce judgment.”
As the prior panel held, the claim of fraud related to the separation agreement and not to the judgment of divorce into which it was incorporated but not merged. Therefore, plaintiffs remedies sound in contraсt and, plaintiffs fraud claim is not barred by the holding of Nederlander. [Grace, supra, at 364-365.]
Despite the fact that the
Grace
decision addressed the merits of the issue, defendant relies on
McNally v Bd of Canvassers of Wayne Co,
We do not overlook the citations of defendant in this case from City of Detroit v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission,288 Mich. 267 , 299, 300 . .. [286 NW 368 (1939)], where some words appear to the effect that all that is necessary for a decision to be authoritative is to show application of the judicial mind to the subject. Such words are to be considered as explained or modified by the quotations immediately following... as to the matter being germane to the issue and the fullness of the discussion and actual submission by the parties. [McNally, supra at 557.]
In Detroit, supra at 301, our Supreme Court rejected the appellants’ argument that a question of law was not decided in a previous case, explaining:
There is no question that the point was before the court; that the court intended to declare the rule of law for a guide in the future; that there was an application of the judicial mind to the proposition and a thorough consideration of the subject; and that the majority of the court [reached a conclusion] with the clear intent and expressed purpose of determining this issue.
In such circumstаnces, the prior ruling constituted a binding resolution of the question of law. Id.
We observe that, while the law of the case doctrine is discretionary, expresses the practice of courts generally, and is not a limit on this Court’s power, the
Grace
case did not fall within the two narrow exceptions to the application of the doctrine explicitly recognized in our case law.
Freeman v DEC Int’l, Inc,
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence of the elements of a fraud claim to submit the issue
The general rule is that honest expressions of opinion may not be regarded as fraudulent. However, whether a specific representation is classified as an expression of opinion or an actionable statement of fact is contingent upon the circumstances of each case. See
McDonald v Smith,
“It is a settled and salutary general rule that a statement of value is a mere expression of opinion and cannot be made the basis of an action of fraud. But there are exceptions to all generalities. Where a false representation of value is intentionally made to a person ignorant of value, with the purpose that such statement is to be relied upon, the representation is in the nature of a statement of fact and will support an action of fraud.” [Poloms v Peterson,249 Mich 306 , 309;228 NW 711 (1930), quoting Gugel v Neitzel,248 Mich 312 , 317-318;226 NW 869 (1929).]
Moreover, a representation regarding what property will sell for in certain market conditions at a given price is a representation of fact.
Pratt v Allegan Circuit Judge,
We disagrеe with defendant’s assertion that his statements regarding the value of the dealership were merely statements of opinion. Indeed, case law provides that “[representations as to property value are mere expressions of opinion, especially where plaintiff can inspect the property before purchasing it.”
Kamalnath v Mercy Mem Hosp Corp,
Plaintiff, although ignorant of the facts, attempted to take measures to assess the value of the property. It was suggested that brokers be brought in to evaluate the property to determine an accurate value where the appraiser testimony between the parties diverged substantially. However, defendant adamantly opposed any attempt to bring in brokers, asserting that any such evaluation would have a detrimental effect on his business and, in turn, his ability to provide support to plaintiff. Defendant alleged that the stability of the dealership would be compromised by speculation of a sale as a result of the divorce, and personnel would leave the employment of the dealership if a broker evaluation occurred. In view of defendant’s intimate personal knowledge and representations regarding the intricacies of the nature of his business, Groening, supra, defendant cannot assert that his statements regarding value were mere opinions that are not actionable for fraud.
Defendant also contends that any reliance on defendant’s representations about the vаlue of the dealership by plaintiff and her counsel was unreasonable because plaintiffs counsel testified that she knew that the dealership was worth more than defendant was representing. Moreover, defendant asserts that detrimental reliance did not occur because plaintiff agreed to accept the valuation of the mediator, who valued the property at $1.7 million. We disagree with defendant’s contentions. Again, the elements of fraud are to be evaluated in light of all facts and circumstances, and direct proof of intent is not required. Detroit Trust, supra; McDonald, supra. Rather, actions and inferences arising from the acts may be considered. Detroit Trust, supra.
In support of his position, defendant directs this Court to examine plaintiffs acceptance of the valuation by the mediator. However, after review of all the facts and circumstances in context, there is no basis to disturb the jury verdict. Plaintiff retained an expert who valued the property at $4.0 to $4.9 million. However, it was acknowledged that the most accurate method of determining valuation was what the dealershiр price would be when placed on the open market. Additionally, a broker evaluation was determined to be an effective manner of determining accurate
There was also testimony by plaintiffs counsel, Harriet Rotter, that had she known that defendant wаs going to sell the dealership within such a short time after entry of the divorce judgment, she would have tied the amount plaintiff was to receive in the property settlement to the actual sale price of the dealership, and that she did not do so because she believed defendant’s representations. Similarly, plaintiff testified that she would not have been willing to reach the same agreement had she known that defendant planned to sell the dealership as soon as the divorce was final. Rotter and plaintiff both testified that the еntire settlement agreement was structured around defendant’s professed intent to keep the dealership. This testimony was sufficient, if believed, to allow the jury to conclude that defendant’s misrepresentations about his intention to keep the dealership defrauded plaintiff of an appropriate share of the proceeds of the sale. Testimony indicated that the sale of the dealership resulted'in a payment to defendant of in excess of $3 million after dealership debts and liabilities were discharged. We cоnclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the jury’s conclusion that plaintiff was defrauded of $1 million relating to the value of the dealership, as a result of defendant’s misrepresentations about his intent to sell the dealership and the effect of those statements on the treatment of the value of the dealership in the property settlement and the adoption of value by the mediator.
Regarding statements relating to his intent to continue operating the dealership until retirement, defendant further аsserts that such statements, being statements of future intent, are not actionable. We disagree. “A fraudulent misrepresentation may be based on a promise made in bad faith, without [the] intention of performance.”
Hi-Way, supra
at 337-338.
Next, with regard to the Indiаn River property, there was ample testimony that defendant, through his counsel, repeatedly represented to plaintiff that he wanted to keep the Indian River property and that he could not bear to part with it. Given that he listed the property for sale within a month of buying out plaintiffs interest in the property, the evidence presented supported an inference that defendant misrepresented his intentions concerning the property in order to induce plaintiff to sell her interest in it to him, and that he made these misreprеsentations for his own financial gain. Thus, we also conclude that there was sufficient testimony to support the jury’s award on this claim.
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because plaintiffs counsel appealed to the sympathy and passion of the jury during closing argument. While plaintiffs counsel did ask the jury to correct the inequities of the underlying divorce settlement, the jury was properly instructed on the elements of fraud, that it should base its verdict only on the evidence presented, about what constituted evidence, and thаt the state
ments of counsel are not evidence. The trial court noted that the jurors were instructed to preserve the integrity of their decision-making. Instructing the jury that the statements of counsel are not evidence is generally sufficient to cure prejudice arising from counsel’s improper remarks.
Tobin v Providence Hosp,
Affirmed.
Notes
We do not engage in independent fact-finding, but view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wiley, supra. Moreover, the acceptance of these facts is consistent with the jury verdict. Indeed, defendant provided a basis for the jury to conclude that plaintiffs version of events and witnesses were credible. While defendant could recite his opinion regarding the limited monetary benefits he derived from the sale of the dealership and recounted efforts he made to salvage his dealership before resorting to a sale, he could not recall his salary ($750,000), and there was no indication that he reduced his income to save the dealership. Curiously, defendant utilized an аppraiser in the divorce action to determine that the dealership was worth between $500,000 and $1.1 million. However, defendant consulted with his dealership accountant to arrive at the purchase price in excess of $6 million and did not utilize the appraiser’s opinion for purposes of sale.
The settlement agreement provided that defendant would make payments of $50,000 a year for eleven years. Plaintiffs trial counsel testified that the settlement agreement did not include an acceleration clause to govern the event of sale of the dealership because of defendant’s representations that a sale would not occur.