Paul R. Forehand appeals from a jury verdict for defendant in a suit for damages resulting from a rear-end automobile collision.
The evidence shows that plaintiff was driving to work in the southbound lane of Brennan Road in Columbus, Georgia. In order to reach his destinаtion, he was required to make a left-hand turn off Brennan Road. Approximately 150 yards before he was scheduled to turn, he noticed a vehicle following him and put on his left-hand turn signal after traveling another 50 yards. When he slowed down and stopped to allow oncoming traffic to clear, he was struck in the rear by defendant’s vehicle. The investigating police officer testified thаt the weather was overcast as it had been raining most of the day and at *683 the scene of the accident it was still "sprinkling just a littlе, not very much,” but there were no puddles of water standing on the roadway. No skid marks were visible because the road was wet. The officer determined that plaintiff and defendant were driving the vehicles involved in the accident and that plaintiffs automobilе had been struck in the rear by the front of Pace’s vehicle. He interviewed both drivers at the scene and defendant stated thаt "he was going approximately twenty miles an hour at the time of the impact” and that "his brakes failed.” In his answer to plaintiffs cоmplaint, defendant denied the allegations of negligence and asserted the defense of unavoidable accident. At trial, however, he did not testify or present any evidence.
1. Plaintiff asserts on the general grounds contending that the verdict was сontrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it. Defendant claims that the evidence was sufficient to suрport his defense of unavoidable accident and that from the police officer’s testimony the jury could have fairly drаwn the inference that either the brake linings on his vehicle had become wet thereby impairing their ability to stop his vehicle оr that wet road conditions caused the brakes to fail to stop his automobile after they were applied. In an action for negligence, "[t]he burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff to establish the negligence of the defendant and its causal relation to the claimed injury and damage. Code § 38-103; [Cits.]”
Maloy v. Dixon,
In thе present case, the evidence was undisputed that it was only sprinkling rain, that no water had collected upon the roadway, that plaintiffs vehicle was damaged when he stopped to make a left-hand turn after signaling his intention, that he was struck in the rear by defendant’s automobile, and that defendant claimed his brakes failed. Plaintiff therefore has met his burden of proof as "[n]egligence may be shown by circumstances as well as by direct testimony. If, considering all the surroundings and accompanying circumstаnces, an event is such 'as in the ordinary course of things would not have occurred if the defendant had used ordinary care, negligence may be presumed, and place upon the defendant the burden of explaining the cause of the occurrence.’ [Cits.]”
McCann v. Lindsey,
supra. While this court has previously recognized that an accident in the legal sense may result from sudden brake fаilure or from road conditions
(Cartey v. Smith,
2. The trial court also erred in charging appellee’s instruction on accident. There was no evidence of accident
*685
that would support such a charge.
Davenport v. Little,
3. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Code Ann. §§ 68A-310 and 68A-801 do not define precisely what constitutes following too closely оr driving at a prudent speed and merely furnish a general rule of conduct. He claims that when this instruction was given with the charge that the leading vehicle has no absolute legal position superior to that of the one following the negligence per se effect of the statutes was weakened and left to the jury to determine whether such conduct constitutes negligence. In intеrpreting a similarly worded statute, this court held that the statute was too uncertain and indefinite in its terms to be capable of enforcement, but that the measure of care laid down in the Act was not too indefinite to furnish a civil rule of conduct which was similar to ordinary care.
Strickland v. Whatley,
Judgment reversed.