Fordeley v. FordeleyFordeley v. Fordeley
OPINION
Matthew C. Giannini, 1040 South Commons Place, Suite 200, Youngstown, OH 44514 and Louis E. Katz, 70 West McKinley Way, Suite 16, Poland, OH 44514 (For Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant).
James J. Crisan, Martin F. White Co., LPA, 156 Park Avenue, N.E., P.O. Box 1150, Warren, OH 44482 (For Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee).
{1} This matter is before us on the appeal of Mark Fordeley (“Husband“) and the cross-appeal of Christina Fordeley (“Wife“) from the trial court‘s entry, following remand from this court, declaring the parties’ prenuptial agreement invalid and incorporating the previously issued final divorce decree. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
{2} The parties met in early 1993 when Wife was a senior in high school. Husband was 30 years old and had beеn operating his own vehicle cleaning business, Buff-N-Stuff, for more than a decade. He also owned multiple tracts of land throughout Trumbull County, including the Buff-N-Stuff property, as well as a majority interest in Fordeley‘s Finest Pre-Owned Auto, a small used-car lot that he operated with his father.
{3} After Wife‘s graduation from high school in spring 1993, the parties began dating, and she began working for Husband at his two businesses. She soon became involved in maintaining the books for his businesses.
{4} Within a few months after they started dating, the parties became engaged, but Husband consistently told Wife that he would not marry her unless she signed a prenuptial agreement. In December 1993, Wife became pregnant. Four months later, the parties went to Las Vegas where they planned to be married. The ceremony did not proceed, however, becаuse Husband was unable to locate an attorney to draft a valid prenuptial agreement.
{5} In July 1994, Husband hired a local attorney to write a prenuptial agreement. Attached to the prenuptial agreement were two schedules of assets, one for each party. Wife‘s schedule included four items of separate property, totaling $13,250. Husband‘s schedule listed 42 items of separate property, with a total value of $438,300. His schedule did not, however, include values for his businesses.
{6} On July 27, 1994, Husband drove Wife to his attorney‘s office to pick up the prenuptial agreement that the parties eventually executed. Wife was eight months pregnant and had never seen the agreement. After retrieving the agreement, Husband drove Wife to a second attorney‘s office. According to Wife, she did not make the appointment to see the second attorney and did not pay his fee. Before she went into the second attorney‘s office alone, Husband again told her that he would not marry her unless she signed the prenuptial agreement.
{7} After reading the entire agreement together, the second attorney told Wife that the terms were not favorable to her and advised her not to sign it. Despite this, Wife signed the agreement. Wife explained that she signed the agreement because Husband told her to sign it; she did not want her child to be illegitimate; and she did not want to bring shame upon her family. The second attorney then prepared a written waiver stating that he explained some of his concerns about the terms and advised her to give it careful consideration bеfore executing it. The waiver further provides that Wife understood she would not receive any separate compensation for work she performed for Husband‘s businesses during their marriage. Wife signed the waiver.
{8} When Wife‘s appointment with the second attorney concluded, Husband returned to his attorney‘s office and executed the prenuptial agreement. Two days later, the parties married. On August 23, 1994, their first child was born. During
{9} Through the years, the parties purchased multiple tracts of land in both of their names, including the marital residence. The funds used to buy the tracts were supplied solely by Husband. In addition, he purchased other tracts in his name. Moreover, at some point, he formed a third business, Fordeley Rentals, LLC. This entity also owns multiple tracts of land and receives rental income on some of the property.
{10} Wife filed for divorce in August 2012. Husband subsequently moved the trial court to declare the prenuptial agreement enforceable, and Wife moved to have the agreement deemed unenforceable. {11} The trial court held a two-day hearing regarding enforceability and ruled that the agreement was unenforceable for two reasons: (1) Wife signed the agreement while under duress; and (2) Husband engaged in coercion and overreaching.
{12} Thereafter, trial was held on 13 separate days throughout 2017. Both sides presented expert testimony as to the value of certain assets, including the businesses and some tracts of property. In distributing the marital assets, the court awarded Husband all the businesses, including Buff-N-Stuff. The court awarded Wife various properties valued neаrly equal to the assets awarded to Husband, finding that she would be able to generate sufficient income from the properties distributed to her. No spousal support was awarded.
{13} Husband appealed, challenging various aspects of the final divorce decree, including the conclusion that the parties’ prenuptial agreement is not enforceable. Fordeley v. Fordeley, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2018-T-0006, 2020-Ohio-5380, ¶ 1. This court reversed the trial court‘s ruling as to the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement on the basis that “the facts cited by the trial court are insufficient to establish duress, coercion, or overreaching.” Id. at ¶ 32. This court remanded the matter for the trial court to “conduct further proceedings including, but not limited to, considering and ruling on [the] other arguments regarding the validity of the prenuptial agreement, and thеreafter, distributing the parties’ assets and liabilities accordingly, and awarding spousal support, if any.” Id. at ¶ 34.
{14} On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Husband testified and was cross-examined; Wife was cross-examined. The parties stipulated that the court would review the transcripts of the prenuptial attorneys’ previous testimony. On April 9, 2021, the trial court again declared the prenuptial agreement invalid for two reasons: (1) Husband failed to meet his burden of full disclosure of the nature, value, and extent of his property; and (2) the terms of the agreement promote divorce and the profiteering therefrom. The trial court further held that “all prior orders of this court are in full effect.”
{15} From this entry, Husband assigns six errors for review; Wife assigns nine. We first consider Husband‘s assigned error pertaining to the prenuptial agreement:
[1.] The trial court abused its discretion in determining that the parties’ prenuptial agreement is invalid and unenforceable.
{16} A prenuptial, or antenuptial, agreement is a contract entered into in contemplation and in consideration of a future marriage wherein the property rights and economic interests of either prospective spouse, or both, are determined and set forth. Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d 99, 102, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984). “It is well settled in Ohio that public policy allows the enforcement of prenuptial
{17} In reviewing a trial court‘s ruling as to the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement, an appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence, but instead must uphold the trial court‘s factual findings when they are supported by competent evidence. Fletcher at 468, citing Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 414 N.E.2d 426 (1980). “In addition, we will indulge all reasonable presumptions consistent with the record in favor of lower court decisions on questions of law.” Fletcher at 468, citing In re Sublett, 169 Ohio St. 19, 157 N.E.2d 324 (1959).
{18} Prenuptial agreements “are valid and enforceable (1) if they have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; (2) if there was full disclosure, or full knowledge and understanding of the nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse‘s property; and (3) if the terms do not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.” Fletcher at 466, quoting Gross at paragraph two of the syllabus. “These conditions precedent to the enforcement of a prenuptial agreement arise in part from the fact that parties who have agreed to marry stand in a fiduciary relationship to each other.” Fletcher at 466, citing Gross at 108 and Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{19} The trial court based its unenforceability ruling upon the latter two prongs of the Gross test, and Husband challenges both conclusions.
{20} Regarding the second prong: “When an antenuptial agreement provides disproportionately less than the party challenging it would have received under an equitable distribution, the burden is on the one claiming the validity of the contract to show that the other party entered into it with the benefit of full knowledge or disclosure of the assets of the proponent.” Fletcher at paragraph one of the syllabus; accord Juhasz at paragraph three of the syllabus (the spouse defending the agreement must show full disclosure of the nature, extent and value of his or her property or that the other spouse had full knowledge thereof without such disclosure).
{21} Here, there is no dispute that the prenuptial agreement provides disproportionately less to Wife than she would receive under an equitable distribution, as she renounced her claim to any future accumulation of assets Husband would receive during the marriage, including earnings and proceeds of sale. Accordingly, the agreement is enforceable only if Husband demonstrates that Wife entered into the agreement with the benefit of either his full disclosure or her full knowledge of his assets.
{22} The trial court held that Husband did not meet this burden because the prenuptial agreement failed to assign monetary values to Husband‘s businesses, Buff-N-Stuff and Fordeley‘s Finest Pre-Owned Auto, and there was insufficient evidence that Wife, as a 19-year-old recent high school graduate, possessed an “advanced business acumen” such that she “had a
{23} Husband testified that the values of these two businesses, of which he was the sole proprietor, were merely the assets listed on his schedule attached to the prenuptial agreement, which included bank account balances, shop equipment, and the building. Husband‘s prenuptial attorney testified that no appraisals were obtained to value the businesses. The trial court, unpersuaded, summarily stated that this “is not a complete picture of a business value.”
{24} There is “no requirement that the parties to such an agreement itemize their various assets and their worth.” Hook v. Hook, 69 Ohio St.2d 234, 238, 431 N.E.2d 667 (1982). And Husband relies on opinions from many of our sibling districts, holding that a spouse‘s general knowledge of the nature and extent of the other‘s wealth and assets, even without detailed itemization as to value, is sufficient to satisfy the disclosure test. See Millstein v. Millstein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 79617 et seq., 2002-Ohio-4783, ¶ 84; see also Gates v. Gates, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 06 CO 60, 2007-Ohio-5040, ¶ 63 (“full disclosure does not require that a listing of the property * * * be attached to the prenuptial agreement“); Johnson v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2010 CA 2, 2011-Ohio-500, ¶ 47 (not every minor interest must be disclosed for a prenuptial agreement to be valid); Leach v. Leach, 2016-Ohio-8569, 80 N.E.3d 1044, ¶ 32 (5th Dist.) (when the agreement does not purport to provide an exclusive list of all assets, the fact that property is not identified in the agreement is not determinative of validity); Heimann v. Heimann, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-21-11, 2022-Ohio-241, ¶ 33 (disclosure need not be “drastically sweeping“; i.e., “the spouse need not know the other‘s exact means“). But see Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 9th Dist. Medina Nos. 11CA0103-M & 11CA0104-M, 2013-Ohio-1222, ¶ 12-13 (declining to reach the issue of whether this approach to the disclosure test is valid).
{25} Here, Husband‘s failure to provide the value of his businesses in the schedule of assets was not, as in the above cases, a minor interest or unexacting disclosure. It is more similar to that described in In re Estate of Bishop (May 8, 1997), Muskingum App. No. 96-0039, unreported. There, “the prenuptial disclosure listed several pieces of real property, several savings accounts, partial ownership of a machine shop, several vehicles, insurance policies, and other items. Specific values were ascribed to the savings accounts, but not to the real property or the machine shop, nor was the extent of the husband‘s interest in the machine shop disclosed. The prenuptial agreement provided that the wife got nothing in event of death or divоrce.” Johnson at ¶ 45. “The Fifth Appellate District held that, under the facts presented, the extent of the husband‘s assets had not been fully disclosed to the wife prior to entering the prenuptial agreement, and therefore the agreement was invalid and unenforceable.” Id. Further, in Vlad, this court held that “the lack of a comprehensive list of assets and their values at the time of the marriage * * * did not meet the requirements set forth by the court in Gross for full disclosure of assets” and rendered the prenuptial agreement unenforceable. (Emphasis added.) Vlad, 2005-Ohio-2080, at ¶ 61-62.
{27} Both parties testified that Wife began working for Husband in April or May 1993, just prior to her high school graduation. Wife did well in school; Husband testified that she graduated fourth in her class. Husband testified that he had started the businesses approximately 10 years prior. The parties became engaged that summer and married the following summer, in July 1994. Both parties testified that during this period of time, for approximately 15 months prior to executing the prenuptial agreement, Wife did the bookkeeping and banking for the businesses, wrote checks and paid the bills, dealt with the accountant, met with vendors and business associates, answered the phone and performed other secretarial tasks, and helped deliver cars to patrons. Husband testified that Wife worked with him all day, every day, Monday through Saturday. Wife also had access to the business records, but neither party testified whether she in fact accessed them. {28} The trial court found that this was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Wife had full knowledge of the value of Husband‘s businesses. There was no testimony here that Wife had any independent knowledge thereof—of the nature and extent, yes; of the value, no. See, e.g., Zimmie v. Zimmie, 11 Ohio St.3d 94, 98, 464 N.E.2d 142 (1984) (where the wife testified that no one explained to her the undisclosed value of husband‘s corporate assets, the wife did not have full knowledge of the husband‘s financial worth). Although there is no requirement that a spouse have an “advanced business acumen” in order to understand the value of a business, the fact that expert testimony was necessary in this case to value the businesses for purposes of division of assets further supports the trial court‘s conclusion.
{29} Given our standard of review, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in invalidating the prenuptial agreement under the second prong of the Gross test. This holding renders moot Husband‘s challenge to the trial court‘s conclusion on the third prong of the Gross test, i.e., that the terms of the prenuptial agreement promote divorce and the profiteering therefrom.
{30} Husband‘s first assignment of error is without merit.
{31} We next consider Wife‘s second assignment of error, in which she challenges the duration of the marriage as set by the trial court:
[2.] The trial court erred by using December 1, 2014 as the end date for the term of “during the marriage” of the parties.
{32} “A court in a divorce action may set the marriage duration as something other than ‘the period of time from the date of the marriage through the date of the final hearing,’ if using the actual marriage dates ‘would be inequitable.‘” Walsh v. Walsh, 157 Ohio St.3d 322, 2019-Ohio-3723, 136 N.E.3d 460, ¶ 3, fn. 1, quoting
{33} “A trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the dates
{34} The first day of the final hearing was February 13, 2017. On the second day of the final hearing, after testimony on asset values had begun, Husband moved the trial court to determine a de facto termination date of the marriage. Wife opposed. After hearing testimony on the issue, the court determined that it “cannot accept the first date of trial as requested by [Wife] as this case has been pending over four years.” In the final divorce decree, the court concluded, “taking into account all matters equitable,” that December 1, 2014, was the de facto end date of the marriage.
{35} Wife maintains that the trial court should have used the final hearing date as the end date of the marriage. She contends that the trial court did not fully explain why the mere passage of time rendered the final hearing date inequitable, “especially in light of the fact that almost all of the delay was caused by [Husband].” Wife‘s appellаte brief cites to nothing in the record that supports this allegation. She further argues that the trial court used different and inconsistent dates in determining the amount of the parties’ debts. It appears this allegation may refer to certain statement dates of the parties’ debts, but neither the divorce decree nor Wife‘s appellate brief set forth when the debts were acquired.
{36} Wife has not set forth a convincing argument as to why the date of December 1, 2014, is inequitable, and we discern no abuse of discretion.
{37} Wife‘s second assignment of error is without merit.
{38} Next, Husband‘s third assigned error challenges the trial court‘s valuation of his car detailing business:
[3.] The trial court committed prejudicial error and abused its discretion in adopting a methodology to evaluate the Buff-N-Stuff business, solely on net profits, at a value of $125,713.00, without making an adjustment for the salary of the sole proprietor and considering the rent and equipment required to run the business.
{39} Each spouse presented expert testimony as to Buff-N-Stuff‘s fair market value, each side offering significantly different appraisals. The trial court adopted the value assigned by Wife‘s expert, finding his valuation to be more credible, accurate, and reliable. Husband maintains that the appraisal of Wife‘s expert is completely unreliable and that the trial court failed to give credence to the qualifications of his own experts. Specifically, Husband argues that in evaluating a business for its fair market value, it is improper to base the value of the business on its net profits without factoring in the sole proprietor‘s salary, ownership or rental of the property, and the cost of equipment and supplies. {40} “The valuation of property in a divorce case is a question of fact. * * * Consequently, the trial court‘s judgment will not be reversed as long as it is supported by some competent, credible evidence.” Davis v. Davis, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G-3018, 2013-Ohio-211, ¶ 40, quoting Covert v. Covert, 4th Dist. Adams No. 03CA778, 2004-Ohio-3534, ¶ 6.
{41} “As to the
{42} Wife‘s expert, William Leicht, is a CPA, has a Certificate in Valuation, and is the owner of an accounting and valuation practice. He has been a certified appraiser since 2003 and has performed almost 200 business evaluations. Mr. Leicht initially gave a valuation based on the duration of the marriage ending on the first day of the final hearing. He returned to court and gave an updated valuation after the trial court determined the de facto end date of the marriage. For this valuation, Mr. Leicht reviewed income tax returns for 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. He used the “income method” for his valuation and performed a nоrmalizing adjustment to the amounts claimed for legal and professional fees. Mr. Leicht determined the average income for that four-year period was $40,046.00. He ultimately valued the business at $125,713.00 based upon a capitalization rate of 31.17% with a marketability discount of 5%.
{43} Husband‘s experts, Alan Friedkin and Thomas Kelly, appraised the fair market value of Buff-N-Stuff significantly lower.
{44} Mr. Friedkin owns Friedkin Realty LLC, a commercial real estate brokerage, and A.S. Friedkin and Associates, a business brokerage and property management company. As a business broker and business transfer specialist, Mr. Friedkin has experience helping people buy and sell businesses; he is not an accountant or a certified business valuation analyst. Mr. Friedkin testified that he took information from Husband as to how the business оperates, how he is paid, his involvement in the business, and the assets of the business. He was also provided with income tax returns for 2013, 2014, and 2015. He valued the business by reviewing all of this information and using an Industry Rule of Thumb from a business reference guide used by business brokers. Mr. Friedkin testified that the “Rule of Thumb” for an auto detailing shop is 40-45% of annual sales plus inventory, but that he instead took 50% of the three-year average of net profit for the years 2013 through 2015. He also did not consider the business assets or inventory to determine value. He ultimately valued the business at $9,250.00.
{45} Mr. Kelly is a commercial real estate and business broker and consultant. He brokers businesses and investment properties for sale, is a licensed real estate appraiser, and is certified as a business analyst. Mr. Kelly valued the business by reviewing bank statements and tax returns from 2011 through 2016, as well as the initial appraisal of Wife‘s expert. He testified that his approach was basically the “income method” but he did not apply a capitalization rate because the imputed information led to a negative income. Specifically,
{46} In finding that the fair market value of Buff-N-Stuff was $125,713.00 as of December 1, 2014, the de facto termination date of the marriage, the court concluded that Mr. Leicht‘s valuation was more credible, accurate, and reliable. The court based this conclusion on the experts’ differing quаlifications and experience and also found that Mr. Kelly‘s valuation was not supported by evidence that the business had been profitable over the four-year period analyzed. Because the trial court‘s findings are supported by some competent, credible evidence, Husband has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion as to valuation of his Buff-N-Stuff business.
{47} Husband‘s third assigned error lacks merit.
{48} We next consider Husband‘s fourth assigned error:
[4.] The trial court committed prejudicial error and abused its discretion in failing to recognize and award Appellant‘s father equitable ownership of six automobiles titled in the name of Wheelz Gone Wild LLC.
{49} Husband and his father, Frank Fordeley (“Frank“), formed a partnership registered as Wheelz Gone Wild LLC (formerly Fordeley‘s Finest Pre-Owned Auto). Husband maintains that Frank personally bought and paid for certain vehicles and their liсense plates, repairs, and maintenance, but that they were titled to the LLC for insurance purposes. Husband contends, therefore, that these vehicles should not have been included in the marital value of the LLC and that the trial court was equitably required to award them to Frank.
{50} The parties do not dispute that the vehicles at issue are titled to Wheelz Gone Wild LLC. Therefore, because title to an automobile is proof of its ownership, Wheelz Gone Wild LLC is the presumptive owner of the vehicles. See
{51} “A person * * * claiming an interest in property * * * out of which a party seeks a division of marital property, a distributive award, or an award of spousal support or other support, may be made a party defendant.” (Emphasis added.)
{52} Here, Frank was not made a party to the divorce action. Thus, the trial court was not required to address any interest, equitable or otherwise, that he may have in the vehicles titled to the LLC. The trial court appropriately allocated the marital value of the LLC between the only parties to the action, determining their respective rights in the property, and neither recognizing nor negating any interest Frank may have in the property. See Galloway v. Khan, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-140, 2006-Ohio-6637, ¶ 22, citing Donnelly at ¶ 42. But see Koval v. Koval, 129 Ohio App.3d 68, 71, 716 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Dist.1998) (where the wife and her mother jointly owned shares of stock, the trial court‘s decision to declare the stock a marital asset was error without first joining the mother as a necessary party to the action and providing her an opportunity to be heard).
{53} Husband‘s fourth assigned error lacks merit.
{54} Husband‘s and Wife‘s remaining assigned errors challenge the trial court‘s classification and division of assets and obligations.
{55} “In divorce proceedings, the court shall * * * determine what constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property. * * * [T]he court shall divide the marital and separate property equitably between the spouses, in accordance with this section.”
{56} “A trial court is vested with broad discretion when fashioning a division of both marital property and marital debt.” (Citations omitted.) Calkins v. Calkins, 2016-Ohio-1297, 62 N.E.3d 686, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.). “However, a trial court‘s discretion is not unbridled. The award need not be equal, but it must be equitable. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court‘s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Internal citations omitted.) Bisker v. Bisker, 69 Ohio St.3d 608, 609, 635 N.E.2d 308 (1994); Holcomb v. Holcomb, 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 131, 541 N.E.2d 597 (1989) (a trial court‘s division will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion). “‘When applying this standard of review, we must view the property division in its entirety, consider the totality of the circumstances, and determine whether the trial court аbused its discretion when dividing the spouses’ marital assets and debts.‘” Calkins at ¶ 22, quoting Baker v. Baker, 4th Dist. Washington No. 07CA24, 2007-Ohio-7172, ¶ 28, citing Briganti v. Briganti, 9 Ohio St.3d 220, 222, 459 N.E.2d 896 (1984).
{57} We next consider Husband‘s second assigned error:
[2.] The trial court committed prejudicial error and abused its discretion in awarding Appellee one-half of Appellant‘s premarital
businesses, and evaluating them in excess of their fair market value.
{58} Husband argues that the trial court incorrectly classified Buff-N-Stuff and Wheelz Gone Wild, businesses he commenced eight years prior to the marriage, as marital property in their entirety. Wife concedes in her brief that “even though the businesses may have been started before the parties married, that portion of the value of the businesses that appreciated and grew from the effort of the parties during their marriage is marital property, of which [she is] entitled to her equitable share.” (Emphasis added.)
{59} By statute, “marital prоperty” does not include any “separate property.”
{60} “Separate property” includes, in relevant part, “any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property that was acquired by one spouse prior to the date оf the marriage“; and “passive income and appreciation acquired from separate property by one spouse during the marriage.”
{61} “Marital property” includes, in relevant part, (i) all real and personal property currently owned by one or both of the spouses that was “acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage“; (ii) all interest that one or both of the spouses currently has in any real or personal property that was “acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage“; and (iii) “income and appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind cоntribution of either or both of the spouses that occurred during the marriage.”
{62} It is undisputed that the businesses were commenced years prior to the 1994 marriage of the parties. The parties met after the businesses were in full operation, and Wife began working for Husband prior to their marriage. Thus, the businesses themselves could only be classified as separate property because they were acquired by Husband рrior to the date of the marriage. See
{63} Husband‘s second assigned error is well taken. On remand, the trial court must determine the active appreciation value of the businesses, if any, and then provide an equitable distribution to the parties as marital property.
{64} We jointly consider Husband‘s fifth assigned error and Wife‘s first assigned error, in which both parties argue and agree that the trial court‘s division of real estate was an abuse of discretion:
[Husband 5.] Thе trial court committed prejudicial error and abused its discretion in the division of the parcels of real estate between the parties.
[Wife 1.] The trial court committed an error of law by awarding the same parcel of real estate to both parties.
{65} The trial court divided between the parties 36 parcels of real estate. Many of these parcels that are contiguous to one another (e.g., one parcel holds a building and the adjoining parcel holds the parking lot) were split between the parties without reason or explanation. One parcel was distributed to both parties; one parcel was not distributed to either party. The result of this division is that neither party will be able to put the real estate to its best use, the value of the properties will be depreciated, and Husband will be unable to continue doing business at the real estate he was awarded. We conclude that the trial court‘s division and distribution of these properties was arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.
{66} Husband‘s fifth assigned error and Wife‘s first assigned error are well taken. On remand, the trial court shall reevaluate the equitable distribution of all marital assets, taking into consideration the best contiguous use and value of these parcels of real estate.
{67} Wife‘s fourth assignment of error states:
[4.] The trial court erred by making, without explanation, an unequal division of property.
{68} Wife argues that the trial court erred by awarding to Husband over $5,000.00 more of marital property without supporting findings of fact as to why this was equitable. Based on our holding in the previоus assigned error, resulting in a remand for a new distribution of marital assets, we conclude this assigned error is moot.
{69} Husband‘s sixth assigned error states:
The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to address and adjust the marital division of property to require Appellee to contribute one-half of the joint marital debt incurred and paid by Appellant during the pendency of the divorce proceedings and also after the date of the de facto termination of the marriage set by the trial court.
{70} During the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Husband was required to pay certain joint obligations of the parties, including mortgage payments,
{72} Husband was obligated to make these payments while Wife continued to live in the marital home. He does not contend that he paid these obligations with separate property, but he did continue to make these payments even after the de facto termination date of the marriage. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to consider and address the issue in the final decree of divorce.
{73} Husband‘s sixth assigned error is well taken and shall be addressed by the trial court on remand.
{74} Wife‘s sixth assigned error states:
[6.] The trial court erred by providing a full credit to Mr. Fordeley for the Chase credit card obligation.
{75} We agree the final divorce decree contains an inconsistency in this regard. The trial court found the amount owed on the Chase credit card was $8,352.17 and awarded Husband a credit of one-half that amount. However, in the division of assets and liabilities, the trial court listed a full credit to Husband for the amount owed. Accordingly, Wife‘s sixth assigned error has merit and shall be addressed by the trial court on remand.
{76} Wife‘s seventh assigned error states:
[7.] The trial court erred by making contradictory provisions as to the Discover Card obligation.
{77} Evidence was provided to the trial court as to two Discover Card obligations. Wife prоvided evidence of a Discover Card with an outstanding balance of $10,000.00. The trial court ordered Wife to pay and hold Husband harmless on this
{78} Wife‘s remaining assigned errors state:
[3.] The trial court‘s judgment that Mrs. Fordeley solely pay the Discover Card, Visa, and Kohl‘s debt is error.
[5.] The trial court erred by failing to account for the real estate sold in violation of the mutual restraining order.
[8.] The trial court erred in ruling that the debts owed to Rose Skravis and Barb Dirufalla are the sole obligation of Mrs. Fordeley.
[9.] The trial court erred by failing to compensate Mrs. Fordeley for the dissipation of marital assеts by her husband for the amount he spent on attorney fees.
{79} “An appellant ‘bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error on appeal. It is not the obligation of an appellate court to search for authority to support an appellant‘s argument as to an alleged error.‘” State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2019-P-0015, 2019-Ohio-3729, 144 N.E.3d 1010, ¶ 85, quoting State v. Herron, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2009-L-119, et al., 2010-Ohio-2050, ¶ 16.
{80} Wife has not affirmatively demonstrated under these assignments of error that the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, Wife‘s third, fifth, eighth, and ninth assigned errors are without merit.
{81} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this court‘s opinion on Husband‘s second, fifth, and sixth assigned errors and Wife‘s first and sixth assigned errors.
JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
concur.