*1 Georgia. man, Bar, Assistant General Counsel State for State Bar of S95G1892. FORD et al. v. UNIROYALGOODRICH TIRE
COMPANYet al. S95G1897. FORD v. UNIROYALGOODRICH TIRE COMPANY
et al. 565) Presiding Justice. Fletcher, parents separate products III, Franklin Ford and his filed liabil- ity against Uniroyal Company Goodrich Tire and NTW for injuries received when a car hit their stalled van on an interstate highway. begin The trial court ordered the two actions to on the same day separate juries empaneled for each case to hear all common juries Uniroyal evidence. compensatory damages, only both found liable and awarded jury in Franklin Ford’s case found Uniroyal liable for The trial court instructed that jury percent any punitive damages paid that 75 award would be treasury jury into the state and the returned a substantial verdict. The Court of reversed in both actions and ordered a new grounds.1 trial on several (1) granted
We the writ of certiorari to consider: whether agree required who do not to consolidation of related cases try (2) together separate juries, the cases before whether the percent § in OCGA 51-12-5.1 that 75 dam- ages paid proper subject awards be to the state is a for a instruc- (a) issue, tion. On the first § we hold that OCGA 9-11-42 proceedings separate juries simultaneous before in the same court- many room because a dual trial has attributes of a consolidated action or trial. On the issue, second we hold that instruction was because the distribution of a ages injects prejudicial pur- issues thаt are irrelevant to the pose punitive damages. We conclude that the trial court committed ordering reversible error in trial without the consent of prejudicial History
Procedural Uniroyal trial, Prior to moved to consolidate the two actions (a), opposed under OCGA 9-11-42 but the the motion. The 1 Uniroyal Ford, Goodrich Tire Co. v. 218 empaneling juries
trial сourt then ordered the two to hear substan- tially the same evidence in the time, same courtroom at the same Uniroyal opposed. trial, which After the dual awarded compensatory damages $150,000 in Claudia Ford and the second compensatory damages, awarded Franklin Ford million in pain suffering. testimony Following million for $12.6 *2 arguments punitive damages, gavе and the follow- ing charge jury: Franklin Ford statutory Georgia provides law of in a tort case in product liability, of
which the cause action arises from sev- enty-five percent any of amount awarded as ages, proportionate part litigation, a less the cost of of attorneys’ paid fees, reasonable shall be into the treasury of the state.
The parties appealed. returned a of verdict million in The Court of a issued in fractured decision which six eight participating judges opinion. majority wrote an A reversed grounds allowing the trial court erred in evidence Uniroyal study recall notices of other tires an and internal in and giving jury charges warranty on breach of and the distribution of Among remaining issues affirmed was mandating Although eight participating order trial. all judges agreed combining that the trial court in erred joint proceedings Uniroyal’s’ objections, only actions over four judges found the error On was harmful.2
charge, judges percent charge six held that the 75 appeals reversible error.3 Franklin in Ford Case No. S95G1892 and appeals Ford in Claudia Case Nо. S95G1897. (no App. (plurality opinion) See 218 Ga. at 249-251 reversible error since defendants (no prejudice procedure); J., (McMurray, dissenting) did not show id. at P. revers jurisdiction County); (Ruffin, J., proper error since
ible venue in Fulton id. at 262-263 (reversible concurring specially) prove prejudice join error since do have defendants if plain statute); language (Beasley, J., cоncurring part der violates & at C. id. (harmless dissenting part) joint apply proceeding error does not when liti violates consent). gant’s statutory right to withhold J., (plurality); (Ruffin, concurring specially); See 218 Ga. at 254 id. id. (Beasley, J., concurring however, dissenting part). majority, C. A different present held that the evidence was sufficient the issue of at a trial. new J., dissenting). (Pope, id. Jury Trial
Dual joint provides trials and Act Practice 1. The Civil § 9-11-42 states: of actions. OCGA involving ques- a common When actions Consolidation. pending court, if the before the of law or fact are hearing any may joint or trial consent, the court order may all the actions; order issue in all the matters may make such orders concern- consolidated; and it ing proceedings tend to avoid therein as delay. costs or “uniting Dictionary “consolidation” as act
Black’s Law defines judgment. . . all the actions into trial and where several actions pending parties, court, and involv- the same are between the same ing substantially subject-matter, issues, A and defenses.”4 the same persons “joint . two or more . . con- trial” is defined as “trial of the frаmework of one trial.”5 ducted within that the trial court in this case ordered we conclude proce- trial, action nor a it mandated neither consolidated *3 action, Like a consolidated that has attributes similar both. dure pending in and involved sub- actions were the same court Fords’ joint stantially subject-matter, issues, and Like a same defenses. within whose claims tried trial, this case had two were proce- primary disparity of one trial. The between framework (a) specified 42 and the dual trial that two in section dures juries, one, rendered the verdicts. rather than (a) preclude 42 from This distinction is insufficient to section employed governing procedure First, ordered here. the trial court plain- as after the the dual trial an alternative consolidation joint Second, tiffs refused to consent trial. — — judicial employed administration same rationale efficient supports Third, trial the consolidation of actions or issues. both litigants legislative intent to contravene courts and would be able (a) requirement if that the sec- of section 42 we ruled the consent apply jury procedure. Instead, we hold tion did not to the dual (a) procedures the dual trial and other section combine proceedings.6 separate joint court provision patterned rule, the after the federal state (5th 1979). Dictionary ed. Black’s Law 5 Id. at 753. dissenting (Beasley, J., concurring Uniroyal, Ga. C. (section “governs combining proceedings”). pаrt) for the court cases way: requires parties’ differs from the rule in it federal con- Relying plain sent to either consolidation or a trial. lan- guage consistently parties statute, of the this Court has held that the join trial must consent before a consolidate or related actions for trial.7 history legislative of House Bill which became the Civil Assembly adopted
Practice Act consent nally shows that the General despite requirement opposition origi- from the Senate. As approved by Representatives, introduced and the House of sec- (a) required parties, consent of the but the Senate by deleting requirement.8 bill amended the Conference recommended that Committee the Senate recede its amend- (a) approved language ment, and both houses “if section with the parties year Assembly rejected consent.”9A later the General proposal state bar to amend the section to remove the consent requirement.10 legislature Thus, the intended to limit the trial court’s by giving discretion to decide on its how cases docket arе to be tried litigants join control over the decision to actions that have com- questions mon law fact. Uniroyal opposed case,
In this
the dual
trial. Since the trial
procedure
parties,
court ordered the
without the consent of all the
(a).
statutory rights
party
violated OCGA 9-11-42 When the
aof
are
injury.
presumes
Requiring
party
violated, the law
harm
show
requirement
from consolidation would eviscerate the consent
of sec
(a)
legislature’s
tion 42
and contravene the
intent that the
Therefore,
control the issue.
we conclude that the trial court commit
ordering
ted
reversible error
trial without the consent
of the
reverse the Court
on this issue.12
reversing,
party
3. In
we note that the
consent in
general
section
conflicts
intent
objective
give
rule. “That
how
tois
the court broad discretion to decide
cases on its docket are
so that
tried
the business of the
(1971);
Witherspoon,
Herring McLemore,
Carter v.
425) (1982).
Ga.
8
*4
812;
1966 Ga.
1966
S.J.
Ga. H.J. 1837.
9
1283;
2151;
1966,
609,
pp.
Ga.
1966
S.J.
1966 Ga. H.J.
L.
see Ga.
654.
10
Leverett,
E.
Georgia
Freeman
The 1967 Amendments to the
Civil
&
Practice Act
(1967).
Appellate
Act,
383,
Procedure
3 Ga. St. B.J.
403-404
11
(260
18) (1979)
Crowell,
v.
(presuming
parties
Hill
Punitive
Georgia
1987,
Act of
General
of the Tort Reform
As
pur-
Assembly
enacted new Code section
damages
penalize,
pose
punitive
punish,
“to
or deter” defend-
is
recovery
places
§
limitations on the
51-12-5.1
several
ant.16OCGA
damages:
prove
punitive
wilful con-
must
the defendant’s
liability
convincing
evidence; the
clear and
issues of
duct
damages
bifurcated;
awarded are
and the amount to bе
arising
products
cap
$250,000
actions not
there
liability
tort
products
specific
addition,
to harm.17 In
liabil-
or
intent
multiple
ity
prohibits
awards of
the act
regardless
arising
omission,
same act or
of the number of
from the
may
percent
arise,18 and
of the
the
causes
punitive damages
action that
allocates
treasury.19
award to the state
Given
may
punished only one time for acts or omissions that
defendant
liability
places
products
action,
limit on the
in a
the statute
no
result
be recovered in that action.20
amount of
challenge
percent
rejecting
alloca-
In
a constitutional
to the 75
Assembly’s
length
provision,
intent
we discussed
General
legislature
enacting
provision.21
passed
the 75
(2d
Procеdure,
Miller,
Wright
§
Alan
Federal Practice &
ed.
Charles
Arthur
1995).
Leverett,
See E. Freeman
Civil Practice Act
Ga.
Comments
St. B.J.
J., dissenting).
Uniroyal,
(Pope,
218 Ga.
(c).
51-12-5.1
§
OCGA
(410
(b), (d),
Shortt,
(g);
Bagley
51-12-5.1
see
v.
plaintiff does not receive the full award.”23 analysis, Relying instructing on this hold we the Franklin jury punitive damages Ford about the distribution of thе was award repeatedly purpose punitive states, error.24As the statute ages punish compensate defendant, to and deter the not to vic- previously As stated, tim.25 we have was enacted allocation generate purpose, to fulfill this not to additional state unquestioned purpose revenue.26 Given the of the jury money necessary statute, sole amount issue for a is the to punish the Therefore, defendant deter future misconduct.27 it is compensated by irrelevant will who be the award or how much the plaintiff utory improperly ultimately By instructing will receive.28 on the stat- allocating award,
scheme for jury’s question shifted the focus from the critical of the inappropriate question plaintiff’s defendant’s conduct to the compensation. 11 concluding
5. In
that a
instruction based on a similar stat-
Supreme
Oregon
error,
ute was reversible
Court of
identified two
problems
informing
that arise about the distribution of
right
“right
provisions
I,
I,
violate
to a
trial or
choice”
under Art.
Sec.
(114
Georgia Constitution),
denied,
2101,
Pars.
& XII
XI
cert.
concur. concurring. Justice, Sears, majority opinion, given I in the am constrained For reasons majority’s holding agree to that the erred in con- with trial court parties. ducting I the dual trial without the consent of all separately, first, for its sensible and write to commend trial court practical attempt process urge and, second, to streamline the trial Assembly § 9-11- to remove the from OCGA General Honeywell, P2d at 1021-1022. Burke, (finding size of award indicated F3d persons sought “engage not before a social reallocation of resources” benefit court). (Or. 1993) Irish, 1021; Honeywell, Holger see P2d 797 P2d also plaintiff (prejudicial and another to instruct about the effect of settlement between law). defendant, although description of correct instruction was like must consent action that taken trial litigation Handling complex imposes this case. formidable litigants judges problems requires alike, trial and for often trial judges possess employ organizational keen and innovative procedures hаndling spring such skills. Effective cases will not fully only born, head, like Athena from forth through ticipants Zeus’s but will evolve par-
the efforts and resourcefulness of trial courts and other litigation process. experiment urge I courts, therefore trial where appropriate, hopefully new, effective, meth- litigating complex ods for cases. 7, 1996
Decided Octobеr 31, 1996. Reconsideration denied October Murphy, Murphy Murphy, Garner, & Walker, B. Thomas Hul- Gray Byrd, Byrd, bert, Jr., Walker, Smolar, & Lawrence C. W. Charles Brantley Barry Roseman, Smolar, Seifter, Roseman, & Yehuda L. G. Brantley, Rice, I. Grant James Thomas A. Seifter, William B. Herndon, Graves, Stolz, Calvin S. Stolz, Jr., Gambrell & Irwin W. appellants. Purdom, Seaton D. Attorney Bowers, General, J. Hobbs,
Michael Michael E. Senior Attorney Byrd, Cоnley Ingram, General, Assistant Alston & G. Cynthia Wayne Thorpe, Willingham, Daryll Counts, L. Love R. *7 Willingham, Gillespy, Love, Gilleland, Allen S. Clark S. A. John Rob- Monyak, Stephen appel- Johnson, Penna, Kane, ert Kane & R. lees. Craig Boone, Jones, Wilson, Jr.,
David W. T. James O. William R. Waldrop, Raymond Hollings- Pond, Doumar, Lawrence J. J. James D. worth, amici curiae.
S96Y0424. IN THE MATTER OF LINDA M. HOWARD. Per curiam. Investigative probable upon finding Based cause, Panel’s Investigative Panel, and at the Notice of professional direction of the State Bar issued a Discipline charging Linda M. Howard with violations of (d),
standards under Bar Rule 4-102 Stan- 3, 4, 21, 23, 44, dards Investigative facts which the finding probable
Panel’s cause is based involve How- agreement against represent ard’s her client in his claims law- two yers Jersey legal malpractice, subsequent her New failure to client, claim, with her of his communicate abandonment and her