70 Wis. 19 | Wis. | 1887
The following opinion was filed June 1, 1887:
At the time of the testator’s death, and for several years immediately prior thereto, his residence and domicile were in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. As stated, he left personal property, and large amounts of valuable lands in Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri. His widow and little boy, Marcus C., and his three brothers and Hamilton College, are the sole objects of his bounty. The will is unique. It is said to have been drawn by the testator himself. It may be doubtful whether it would have presented more intricate questions for solution had it been drawn by a skilful lawyer with that end in view. Its validity is challenged as a whole and in parts, and a construction is demanded. The language employed seems to be sufficiently clear to indicate the purposes intended. The difficulties arise in applying the law to such purposes. Before proceeding to make such application it may be well to state a few general rules of law applicable to the case, readily deducible from the authorities and virtually conceded by all.
1. The validity of every devise or disposition of real estate by will must be governed by the law of the place where the land is situated, and this includes not only the form and mode of the execution of the will, but also the lawful power and authority of the testator to make such disposition. Story, Confl. Laws, § 474, and note; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 670; 1 Redf. Wills, 398, subd. 8; Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608; White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. 144. The importance of this proposition in considering the validity of a will covering lands in so many different states will be appreciated by all.
3. The same rule, as to the law of the testator’s domicile, governs in the interpretation or construction of wills. Story, flnnfl. Laws, §§ 479®-479c; Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis. 510. In the words of Mr. Justice Story: “The language of wills is not of universal interpretation, having the same precise import in all countries and under all circumstances. They are supposed to speak the sense of the testator according to the received laws or usages of the country where he is domiciled, by a sort of tacit reference, unless there is something in the language which repels or controls such a conclusion.” Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 504; Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh (N. S.), 502; Enohin v. Wylie, supra;
With these general propositions in mind, we may, without infringing any rule of interstate comity, venture to ascertain, if we can, the intention of the testator as disclosed in this will, and also its validity, at least as to certain portions of the property.
4. The papers coming from the county court must be taken as the will of the testator. Thornton v. Curling, 8 Sim. 310; Price v. Dewhurst, supra. They consist in what has been called the will, with Schedules A and B therein mentioned and thereunto attached. In construing the will, we are to consider these three papers as one instrument in law, and together constituting the will of the testator. Ackerly v. Vernon, Com. 381; S. C. affirmed on appeal, 3 Brown, Parl. Cas. 91; Hill v. Chapman, 1 Ves. Jr. 401; Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. Jr. 204; Jackson v. Babcock, 12 Johns. 394; Loving v. Sumner, 23 Pick. 102; Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 381; Fickle v. Snepp, 97 Ind. 289; S. C. 49 Am. Rep. 449.
5. It is claimed on the part of the executor that, under the directions of the will, all the personal property and all the real estate outside of Missouri must, for the purpose of determining the validity of the will or some of its provisions, be regarded as converted and permanently invested in lands in Kansas City, Missouri, under the well-known doctrine of equitable conversion. That doctrine is firmly established ; and if it applies, or in so far as it applies, it must be enforced. It may be well to restate it, with some of its limitations. As long ago as the time-of Lord Chancellor Thublow it was observed by him “ that nothing was better established than this principle: that money directed to be
In Pennsylvania it has been held “ that the equitable conversion of realty into personalty, by force of a direction in a deed or will to sell, only takes place where the direction is positive and absolute; . . . that if a proposed sale is contingent or eventual in a deed or will, equitable conversion does not follow.” Neely v. Grantham, 58 Pa. St. 487.. But the better opinion seems to be as in effect held in Dodge v. Williams, supra, that whenever a direction
6. Having thus stated some of the principles and some of the facts upon which the doctrine of equitable conversion rests, it becomes necessary to consider the application of those principles to some of the provisions of this will.
{a) The lands in Iowa are nowhere mentioned or referred to in the will or either of the schedules. This being so, it is manifest that the doctrine of equitable conversion has no application to them. They must therefore be regarded as lands in Iowa; and the validity of the will respecting such lands be determined by the laws of Iowa.
(b) The several pieces of land specifically described in Schedule B are all situated in Kansas City, Missouri. Considering that schedule in connection with subdivision 5 of
(o) By the sixth subdivision of the will, the testator expressly directs that all moneys, notes, bonds, mortgages, or other evidence of indebtedness to him from any and all parties, except his brothers, “shall, as soon as practicable-after ” his death, “ be used either in the purchase of property'in Kansas City, or for improving properties in said city then on hand.” This clause of the will relates particularly to the $30,000 of personal property in dispute; and which, for the purposes of these appeals, is assumed to be the property of the estate. The direction to so convert is not prevented from being imperative by adding “as soon as practicable after ” his death, and thus giving some discretion as to the time or times of such, conversion. If such permanent investment of such personal estate in lands in Kansas City can be lawfully made, and then lawfully held as lands in Kansas City during the time and for the purposes expressed in the will, then there can be no doubt but what, subject to the widow’s rights therein as hereinafter stated, the doctrine of. equitable conversion is applicable to such personal estate, and in that event the same is accordingly to be regarded as lands in Missouri from the time of
(d) The several pieces of land specifically described ■ in Schedule A consist of the homestead in Madison, Wisconsin, and lands in Michigan and Kansas. As the directions in relation to the homestead differ from the directions in relation to the other lands, the homestead will be considered by itself hereafter. Considering Schedule A in connection with subdivision 4 of the will, of which it forms a part, as we must, and the directions thereby given as to the several pieces of land in Michigan and Kansas are to the effect that each and all of said pieces of land “ shall be converted, as soon as practicable, after ” the testator’s death, “ at schedule •prices, or as much better as may be, . . . into good rentable ‘ inside ’ property in Kansas City, Mo.” The testator manifestly had an exalted opinion of the present and future of Kansas City. The scheme of his will indicates an intention to have his lands in Michigan and Kansas sold as soon as practicable, and the proceeds thereof invested in real estate in Kansas City. He directs, in effect, that the several pieces of land mentioned shall be so converted as soon as practicable after his death. Is such purpose to be frustrated merely by adding “ at schedule prices, or as much better as may be ” ? On the contrary, were not those words added as a guide to his executors, or for the purpose of stimulating purchasers to pay a larger price ? It seems to us that such was his intent, for, apparently with the same view, he added to the schedule price of each piece a still larger estimated value. Of course, it may turn out to bo impossible to ever sell some of the pieces at the schedule price; and yet there is nothing in the will indicating that he
(e) In regard to the homestead, the directions are, in effect, that it shall be converted, as soon as practicable after his death, into good rentable “ inside ” property in Kansas City, Missouri, “at schedule price” which is $10,000, or as much better as may be; and then, by subdivision 7 of the will, the testator directs, in effect, that his wife shall have the use of his homestead, furniture, and appurtenances so long as she may desire to live in it as her home; and that in case she at any time ceases to desire it as her home, he di
Can we hold that the direction in the will to sell the homestead and invest the proceeds as indicated, works an equitable conversion of the estate into Missouri lands? As observed, there is no such direction to convert until the
7. Before determining such validity, and to aid such determination, it becomes necessary to ascertain, if we can, more fully the intention and meaning of the testator as disclosed by the language employed in other parts of his will. Undoubtedly the legal title to the personal property belonging to the estate is vested in the executor. Scott v. West, 63 Wis. 555, 556. Of course he holds the same for the benefit of the cestui-que-trusts, including the rights of the widow as indicated in the sections of the statute cited above. So far as the law will permit, the executor, by virtue of the will, has acquired all the rights therein given, and is charged with all the obligations therein imposed. Ibid. The several directions in the will are addressed to him and his successors in office and his subordinates, whether by ancillary administration or otherwise. He and they are to execute the will so far as the law will permit. He and they are to pay the testator’s lawful debts and funeral expenses from moneys on hand at his death, and, if they are insufficient, then the balance from the income of the estate. He and they are to pay the necessary expenses of carrying the estate from year to year from the income thereof. The will impliedly excludes the whole of the
By the election of the widow to take under the statute instead of the will, the bequest to her in the eighth subdivision of the will of “ one quarter of the net annual income of the remainder ” of the “ estate during her natural life,” which by the twelfth subdivision was to be kept up to $1,500 from the share of the income given to the son, becomes inoperative. By such election a portion of the home property not included in the statutory homestead nor the widow’s right of dower in the balance, might be the source of a trifling income to the estate; but this would be dependent upon the validity of the provision in the will for the future conversion of the homestead, of which we shall presently speak. By the direction in the ninth subdivision of the will the son is to have one quarter of the net annual income of the estate (exclusive of the homestead) until, under the provisions of the will, he comes into the possession of the entire estate, except as the same may be sooner terminated by his death. By the direction in the tenth subdivision of the will the brother Edward Irving is to have one quarter .of the net annual income of the estate (exclusive of the homestead) during his natural life. By the direction in the eleventh subdivision of the will the brothers Joseph. O. and Henry T. were “each” to have one eighth of the net annual income of the estate (exclusive of the homestead) during their natural lives. Such bequests annually from the “net annual income” of the estate are clearly severable, as each is independent of the other and almost necessarily must terminate at a different time than any of the others. Since the annual share of each such legatee is each year confined to such “ one quarter ” or “ one
By the will Marcus is to have no portion of the corpus of the estate, except as he becomes entitled to it under the direction in the twelfth subdivision of the will, and by such direction he is only to become the owner in fee of a portion of the corpus of the estate when he “ reaches his majority,” and then additional instalments of such corpus from time to time until he reaches the age of forty years, when “ the remainder ” of the “ estate ” is to become his.
If either the wife or one of the brothers shall become the only surviving legatee, then lim that event” the fifteenth subdivision of the will directs that the “estate at that time be divided as nearly as may be into two equal parts as regards value and renting power, and said wife or brother shall then choose between the incomes of said two properties, and have and enjoy the same during his or her natural life; ” and “ the other part ” of the “ estate shall at that date become the property of Hamilton College;” and “at the death of said wife or brother the remaining part” of the “estate shall become the property of Hamilton College.” The words “ my only surviving legatee,” as used in this last subdivision of the will, imply, at least, that all other legatees named in the will and living at the time of the testator’s death, including Marcus, shall, previous to the time of such sole survivorship, have died leaving some portion of the corpus of the estate which had not before passed to the widow, to Marcus, or for the benefit of such child or children by segregation, as indicated. It may occur that all three brothers die before Marcus, or that the widow and two of the brothers die before Marcus, and then, after reaching his majority, Marcus dies, leaving one or more such children him surviving. In that event, the words, “ my estate at that time be divided as nearly as may be into two equal parts,” as used in the last subdivision of the will, manifestly mean only so much of the estate as may then remain after setting apart the $40,000 worth of the estate for the benefit of such child or children, as provided in the thirteenth subdivision of the will.
Such are the provisions of the will we are called upon to consider: Undoubtedly the will created in the executor an express trust, within the meaning of sec. 2081, E. S. In
The will throughout deals with the estate'of the testator. It uses the words “ my estate,” or their equivalent, some sixteen different times. It is such estate that the executor and his successor and subordinates are charged by the will with managing, converting, renting, improving, gathering, and dividing and paying over the income annually, and from time to time segregating, and finally dividing the corpus of the estate, and then giving up the residuum. Subject to such segregations from time to time, they are required to so hold and manage the corpus of such estate until the same finally passes wholly to the son, at the age of forty (should he live so long), twenty-eight years after the testator’s death. Should he die after reaching his. majority and before becoming forty, leaving one or more such children, then such executor, etc., is required to set apart the $40,000 worth of said estate, which may include the Wisconsin land or even the whole of the remainder of the estate, and hold and manage the same until such children severally become of age. The time for such setting apart may commence soon after Marcus becomes twenty-one, or not until just before he reaches forty, and then continue twenty-one years thereafter. No one can tell how many of
Thus, according to the will, the estate, including the Wisconsin land,.is liable to be so tied up from thirty to forty-eight years after the testator’s death. But even if Marcus does not so die leaving such children, still, by the fourteenth .and fifteenth subdivisions of the will, the estate, including the Wisconsin land, is liable to be so tied up until Marcus .and the widow and the three brothers are all dead save one, either the widow or one of the brothers, as the “ only surviving legatee.” In other words, at least four, if not all, of these five persons, living at the time of the testator’s death, must die before either of those subdivisions of the will can become operative. During such periods, or large portions of them, it is impossible t.o tell where the corpus of the estate will finally go by the terms of the will. If Mar■cus lives long enough, then all is to go to him. If he dies during the nest nineteen years after he becomes of age, leaving children, then a large portion of it and possibly the whole may go to them. If he survives all the other legatees named, and then dies during that period, then a portion of it will probably go to Hamilton College; but no one can tell how much, nor, for certain, whether any. If he dies under twenty-one, even though he leave children him surviving, yet neither he, nor such children, nor his heirs at law, are to have any of such corpus. But even then such corpus is, by the will, to remain tied up during the times and for the purposes named, and only go to Hamilton College upon the occurrence of the events mentioned.
The necessity of the corpus of the estate being held by a trustee during such several periods and awaiting such several contingencies and possibilities, seems to be absolute. Scott v. West, supra. Such trustee or executor is directed to sell some lands and buy others, but he has no authority .under the will to pervert or alienate any portion of the
Under this will and our statutes, can we hold that there is no unlawful suspension of the power of alienation as to this Wisconsin land? As indicated, upon the death of the testator the widow took under'the will a present life estate in that land; and she has now substantially the same under the statutes. According to the will, the executor, as trustee, took a future estate in trust in the same land, for it was “limited to commence in possession, at a future day.” Sec. 2034, R. S.; Scott v. West, 63 Wis. 570. “Future estates,” under our statute, “are either vested or contingent.” Sec. 2037, R. S. “They are vested when there is a person in being who would have an immediate right to the possession of the lands, upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate.” Ibid. By the terms of the will, the trustee or executor was to take such future vested estate in the homestead. As to the other property he took a present vested estate. Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 302, 303. But neither Marcus nor Hamilton College had anything more than a contingent interest therein; for the statute expressly declares that such “ future estates . . . are contingent while the person to whom, or the event upon which, they are limited to take effect, remains uncertain.” Sec. 2037. “ These definitions of vested and contingent remainders,” said Savage, O. J"., “ are very different from the common-law definitions of those estates.” Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 301. They took no vested interest in the land, and could convey none. Secs. 2086, 2089, R. S.; De Wolf v. Lawson, 61 Wis. 475, 476. Under our statute, “ every future estate,” whether vested or contingent, is “ void in its
To avoid all uncertainty, one of the same sections declares that such “absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or' condition whatever,” and the other declares that “such power is suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.” Since the trustee cannot, under the will, relinquish the trust, which includes the “ possession,” until the purposes of the trust are fulfilled as the several periods for such fulfilment transpire; and since persons are liable to be born who by the terms of the instrument will be entitled to a large' portion, and possibly the whole, of what may then remain of the estate, including this homestead,— it is very obvious that “ there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed,” within the meaning of the statutes; and since this state of things must, under the will, continue for a longer period than two lives in being at the creation of the estate, such suspension, as to this homestead, must be adjudged contrary to the statute, and therefore absolutely void. Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 317-324; Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 121, 122, 164, 165, 174-179.
It is impossible to escape this conclusion by speculating as to the probabilities of Marous and his unborn children eventually getting this Wisconsin land under the will. We have no authority to speculate upon the chances. The rule is universal that such suspension of the power of alienation must necessarily terminate, under any and all circumstances, within the period prescribed by the statute, or the disposition will be void. Schettler v. Smith, 41 N. Y.
8. It is strenuously urged, in effect, that, as the testatoi’’s residence and domicile were in this state at the time of making his will and his death, he could thereby create no valid trust except such as are sanctioned by the laws of this state. In other words, that he could not by such a will, under the doctrine of equitable conversiop, cause his personal property and his lands in Michigan and Kansas to be converted into lands in Kansas City, Missouri, and there held as his estate, and the power of the alienation thereof suspended beyond the time authorized by our statutes, even though such suspension would be valid under the laws of Missouri; and that the question as to the validity of such suspension is properly determinable by this jurisdiction. I frankly confess that I was deeply impressed upon the hearing with the plausibility and force of this argument. The will was here admitted to probate. The executor here qualified and received his commission from the county court. He is directly accountable to and subject to the orders of that court. There may, necessarily, be ancillary administrations in other states, but they will in law be subordinate to this, which must be regarded as the principal administration. But in such intricate matters of title and jurisdiction impressions are of no value unless supported by the logic of the law, if not by authority.
In Curtis v. Hutton, 14 Ves. Jr. 537, cited by counsel, the
In Attorney General v. Mill, 2 Dow & C. 393, the testator by his will, made in England where he was at the time domiciled and so remained until his death, gave his personal and real estate (none of the latter being in England or Scotland, but in the West Indies) to trustees, to be laid out in the purchase of lands or rents of inheritance in fee simple, for a charitable purpose, at Montrose, in Scotland; and it was held by the Elouse of Lords, affirming the decree of the Chancellor, “ that the bequest was void by the statute of mortmain, it not appearing from the will that the testator intended that the trustees should have the option
In Fordyce v. Bridges, 2 Phil. 515, Lord Chancellor Cot-tbnham, speaking of this subject, said: “An objection was made that the bequest of a fund to be invested in a regular Scotch entail was void as a perpetuity. The rules acted upon by the courts in this county with respect to testamentary dispositions tending to perpetuities, relate to this country only. What the law of Scotland may be upon such a subject, the courts of this country have no judicial knowledge, nor will they, I apprehend, inquire; the fund being to be administered in a foreign country is payable here, though the purpose to which it is to be applied would have been illegal if the administration of the fund had been to take place in this country. This is exemplified by the well-established rule in cases of bequests within the statutes of mortmain. A charity legacy void in this country under the statute of mortmain is good and payable here if for a charity in Scotland. . . . The objection raised upon the ground of perpetuity cannot be maintained.” This seems to be peculiarly applicable to the personal estate here,
It is said that Freke v. Lord Carbery, L. R. 16 Eq. Cas. 461, is to the contrary. In that case the testator was a domiciled Irishman in Ireland, who, after disposing of personal estate in trust, “gave his leasehold house in Belgrave square, England, to the same trustees, upon trust to sell” as directed, and to apply the proceeds in discharge of any incum-brance on the same, and the residue to invest in government or real securities, and hold the same upon such trusts as declared. “ The validity of the trusts for accumulation was not disputed, so far as they related to the testator’s government stocks and funds and other pure personalty. But the question was raised whether these trusts were valid as to
In the celebrated case of Hawley v. James, 5 Paige, 337, 16 Wend. 74, 381, and 7 Paige, 213, the testator was domiciled in Albany, New York. By his will he directed all his lands outside of New York city, Albany, and Syracuse, including 40,000 acres in the state of Illinois, to be sold, and the proceeds thereof to be invested in lands in the three cities named, upon trusts which, under the statutes like ours cited, were held void. But in respect to anj'- lands of the testator situated in the state of Illinois or elsewhere outside of the state of New York, the decree which was entered by the court of errors stated that it was not to be deemed a decision upon the title of the said trustees to those lands, or their power over them (16 Wend. 281), which question ■was thereby remitted for further consideration to the court of chancery. Upon the cause being remitted to the chancellor, an application was made for further directions in pursuance of such decree. Upon a full hearing, the learned chancellor said: “ This court has no jurisdiction to make a decree which will directly affect either the legal or equitable title to lands situated in another state. And if the legal title to the lands now in question was in any of the-infant parties according to the laws of Illinois, or if those-who had the legal title were out of the jurisdiction of this court, so that it would he impossible for it to operate upon them personally to compel them to execute the trust or to>
In Burrill v. Sheil, 2 Barb. 457, the testator, domiciled in New York, directed lands in that state to be sold and a portion of the proceeds invested in England; and, as no law was thereby violated, it was held that the courts of New York had no power to divert the investment from England and direct the same to be made in New York, except with the consent of all the parties interested; and, as some were infants, such consent could not be obtained.
In Bascom v. Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584, a bequest by a New York testator was made to five such persons as the supreme court of Yermont should appoint to be trustees, to found, establish, and manage an-institution for the education of females, to be located at Middlebury, Yermont, and it was held ineffectual for any purpose, since the object of the bequest was unlawful in the state of the testator’s domicile. This is in harmony with the second proposition announced in this opinion.
In Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 424, the testator was domiciled in the state of New York, and, among other things, he bequeathed a certain amount to the “ Centenary
This case of Chamberlain v. Chamberlain is in harmonj7' with subsequent decisions in the same state, in which it has been held, in effect, that, in the absence of any equitable conversion, the question as to the unlawful suspension of the power of alienation of lands in Hew York must be
It is unnecessary to look -further into the authorities. The difficulty in holding that the laws and courts of this state may interdict the conversion of personal property into lands in Missouri, or lands in Michigan or Kansas into lands in Kansas City, is apparent when we remember that the laws of this state have no extra-territorial force, and the courts of Wisconsin have no extra-state jurisdiction. The principles of law thus indicated are in strict harmony with the rulings of this court in Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, 59 Wis. 510, 511.
We must therefore disclaim jurisdiction to determine the title to any of the lands outside of Wisconsin, or the legality of accumulations of rents and profits therefrom. It follows that the validity of the proposed conversion of personal property into lands in Kansas City must be determined by the laws and courts of Missouri. So the question of the validity of the proposed conversion of lands in other states into lands in the same city would seem to be determinable by the same jurisdiction, but of this we have no authority to decide. Such questions of the validity of such conversions should be determined at an early day by instituting the proper suit in the proper jurisdiction.
The costs and disbursements of all parties in this court and the circuit court are payable out of the estate. The county court will make such allowance to the respective
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed on each of the four appeals, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in accordance with, and to the extent indicated in, this opinion, but leaving open for further action the questions as to the validity -of such conversions, suspensions, and accumulations, until authoritatively determined by the rightful jurisdiction.
Motions for a rehearing, made by each of the several parties, were denied November 22, 1887.