37 Ark. 91 | Ark. | 1881
This cause was decided in the court below upon the ground that the mortgage had not been acknowledged for registration in accordance with the statute, and therefore gave no lien upon the lands subsequently purchased by Jackson and Wells.
The question resolves itself into this: Have the words any distinctive significance, or does the use of one or ■either, substantially imply all that is contained in the other?
The legislature has seen fit to prescribe the use of both, from which we must infer that some substantial evidence was supposed to exist, and we think this is implied also in the ordinary significance of the words, as used in connection with legal instruments. In ordinary parlance the considerations which prompt an action, may not be easily distinguished from the purposes sought to be effected. But with regard to legal instruments and in the connection in which it is used in the statute, the word ‘ ‘ (consideration ’ 5 has a more limited and technical meaning, distinct from motives ■or purposes. It means something of value in the eye of the law; something in the way of price or compensation, which may be of value to the obligor or of detriment to the obligee. Whereas “purposes” evidently means the effect which the instrument is intended to have upon the rights of the contracting parties and the status of the subject matter.
To illustrate in case of a mortgage. The loan is the consideration; but the purpose of the mortgage is to create a certain and definite security for the repayment, either by bill in equity or sale under a power. The words have a distinctive meaning and are each substantial. The legislature having required the use of both, the Court did not err in holding the certificate to be insufficient.
The law may seem very technical and vigorous, yet it is the duty of the Court to give it effect until repealed or modified.