Lead Opinion
Thе sola question presented for decision by this appeal is whether or not the bill as last amended is multifarious. We are of the opinion that the trial court ruled correctly on the demurrer to the' bill as lаst amended.
Moreover, here оne of the respondents had no interest whatever in some of these accountings sought between the other two parties, and hence should not be lugged into the suit.
The rules of law as to multifariousness, so fаr as applicable to this case, have been frequently stated by this court, and may be summarized as follows:
The decisions as to what constitutes multifariousness are so exceedingly various as to make it difficult, if not impracticable, to educe any general rules by which to test the ■ objection, the courts seeming to regard what is convenient and just in the particular case, always discouraging the objection where, instead of advancing, it would defeat, the ends of justice. 3 Mayf. Dig. 288.
Multifariousness is incapablе of exact definition; it is frequently a matter of discretion; every case must be governed by its own peculiar facts, subject to certain equity jurisprudence; in determining this question multiplicity of suits should be avoided, as equity delights to do justice, and not by halves. It is left in a large measure to the sound discretion of the court. Sicard v. Guyllou,
, Multifariousness is generally understood to infect those cases where a party is brought in as а defendant as to matters with a large portion of which, or with the-case made by which, he had no connection whatever. It may be described as a joinder of different and distinct independent matters thеreby confounding them, or a uniting in one bill of several matters'perfectly distinct and unconnected against one defendant, or the demands of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants in the same bill. A. G. R. R. Co. v. Prouty,
“No general rule defining what causes of action may be properly joined and what may not caii be laid down. The question is always one of convenience in conducting a suit, and not of principle, and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. * * * If it appears that the causes of action or claims are so dissimilar or distinct in their nature that they cannot be heard and determined together, but must be heard piecemeal, first one and then the other, a clеar case of fatal misjoinder is presented; but where a complainant has two good causes of ac *73 tion, each furnis.hing the foundation of a separate suit, one the natural outgrowth of the other, or growirig out of the same subject-matter, * * * and the suit has a single object, that may be properly joined, and the objection of multifariousness or misjoinder will not be sustained.” Ferry v. Laible, 27 N. J. Eq. 146, 150, and authorities сited; Singer v. Singer,165 Ala. 145 -147,51 South. 755 , 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 819,138 Am. St. Rep. 19 , 21 Ann. Cas. 1102; 7 Mayf. Dig., 289, 290.
We are of the opinion that there was no error in sustaining the demurrer; and the decree appealed from must be affirmed.
There is nothing in this case to bring it within the influence of section 3095 of the Code.
Affirmed.
Addendum
Response to Application- for Rehearing.
Counsel for appellant in their application for a rehearing seem to labor under the impression that this court, on the appeal, has in some way or manner modified the decrеe of the lower court. That decree is in no wise changed, but in all things affirmed. Counsel surely overlook the first two sections and paragraphs in the opinion of which they complain.
The only judgment here is one affirming the decree appealed from sustaining a demurrer to the bill as last amended. The demurrer was overruled to the bill as it stood before the last amendment; and it is not decided that the bill was then subject to multifariousness, as counsel seem to apprehend. Nothing is intended to be intimated as to the correctness of the rulings, before the bill was last amended. If there be anything in the opinion that would seеm to indicate a decision upon matters not decided by the chancellor, it is dictum; it was not intended to intimate any holding contrary .to the decision below.
Counsel for appellant refer to the оpinion of the learned chancellor to show error in our opinion. The opinions of courts and of judges contain merely the reasons for the decision. We have no criticism for the opinion of the lower court, but, to the contrary, approve and affirm it, as well as we do the decision reached and the decree rendered. The chancellor said and decided that the accounting between the parties should be confined to matters and transactions relating to the common property sought to be apportioned; that it could not and should not be so extended as to include matters and transactions between the parties or tenants in common, in reference to the lands in question, occurring -before the relation of tenants in common subsisted, nor to matters оr transactions between them, having no relation to, or connection with, the common property sought to be partitioned or sold for division, which was and is the main equity of the original bill; the’ accounting bеing purely incidental to the main equity. The bill is one for partition or sale for division of lands belonging to tenants in common, and not one for an accounting. Were the main equity of the bill for an. accounting, thе decree on the demurrer might be different.
It was not intended to be decided or stated in the opinion that the mere fact that there was a partnership arrangement as to the cultivation or use оf the lands in question, or that one tenant was acting as the agent of the other in the purchase, use, occupation, or cultivation of the common property, would prevent an accоunting as to the purchase price, rents, income, or profits of the lands sought to be apportioned. But it was said and decided, and, we hold, correctly so, that matters and transactions between the parties relating to other lands in question should not be lugged into this suit; that is, that the accounting should be confined to the subject-matter of the suit, the lands sought to be apportioned.