In re: Albert G. STEVENS, Edelgard Stevens, Debtors. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Albert G. STEVENS, Edelgard Stevens, Defendants-Appellees, Barnee C. Baxter, Trustee-Appellee.
No. 96-9390.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 12, 1997.
1027
Vincent M. Davison, Jr., Augusta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Barnee C. Baxter, Augusta, GA, pro se.
P. Matthew Sutkо, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, Jennifer H. Zachs and William Kanter, Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae.
Before COX and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HUNT*, District Judge.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Ford Motor Credit Company (“Ford“) appeals from the district court‘s order permitting the Chapter 13 Trustee (“the Trustee“) to recover from Ford alleged overpayments that Ford received from a confirmed Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
Albert and Edelgard Stevens (“the Debtors“) filed a Chapter 13 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Among their assets was a 1992 pick-up truck, in which Ford held a properly perfected security interest. Ford was also the named loss payee on an insurance policy covering the truck. As part of the Debtors’ confirmed Chapter 13 plan, the bankruptcy court allowed Ford‘s secured claim, in which it requested the amount of $18,586.72, plus interеst at a rate of 12% as provided by local bankruptcy court rule. Approximately one
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, we first consider the Trustee‘s motion to dismiss Ford‘s appeal in this case on grounds that the issues raised in the appeal became moot upon the Debtors’ discharge from the bankruptcy court. The Debtors’ discharge was entered on April 5, 1995. On July 10, 1996, however, the bankruptcy court reopened the case and revoked thе discharge for the purpose of correcting an administrative error. It appears that the case remains open. The Trustee argues that, notwithstanding the reopening of the case, Ford‘s appeal is moot because no relief would be available should Ford prevail. We find no merit in this argument, and deny the Trustee‘s motion to dismiss.
Turning to the merits, we first consider Ford‘s argument that the insurance proceeds it received as the named loss payee on the insurance policy covering the truck are not property of the bankruptcy estate, and that, thus, Ford was entitled to retain the amount reflecting the original contractual interest rate from the insurer. The property of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy estate is comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” which includes “proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate.”
Ford does not dispute that the truck and the insurance policy covering damage to the truck were property of the Debtors and, therefore, property of the Chapter 13 estate. The fact that the insurance policy is property of the bankruptcy estate, however, does not neсessarily mean that the proceeds from that policy are also property of the estate. In some circumstances, a creditor or beneficiary other than the debtor may be entitled to proceeds distributed pursuant to an insurance policy that is property of a bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., First Fidelity Bank v. McAteer, 985 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that proceeds from credit life insurance policy belonged to creditor and not to the bankruptcy estate); In re Louisiana World Exposition, 832 F.2d 1391, 1399 (5th Cir.1987) (holding that proceeds from Directors and Officers liability insurance policy held by bankrupt corporation were not property of bankruptcy estate). But cf. Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek), 51 F.3d 530, 534-35 (5th Cir.1995) (noting that Louisiana World Exposition might be limited to the narrow situation in which the debtor has no interest in the liability insurance proceeds).
Where the debtor has an interest in the insurance proceeds, however, the рroceeds are considered property of the bankruptcy estate and distribution of the proceeds is governed according to the terms of the bankruptcy plan. See, e.g., In re Feher, 202 B.R. 966, 970 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1996) (hold
The policy at issue in this case is intended to protect both the owner and the secured creditor in the event of the destruction of the seсurity (the truck). In the context of the insurance policy on the truck, therefore, the proceeds act as a substitute for the insured collateral. See Bradt v. Woodlawn Auto Workers (In re Bradt), 757 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir.1985) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 368 (1977)) (holding that broad definition of “proceeds” under
Ford, however, argues that it is entitled to retain the excess insurance proceeds reflecting the contractual interest rate, relying primarily upon the Third Circuit‘s decision in McAteer. In that case, McAteer purchased a truck using a bank loan. As security for the loan, McAteer purchased a credit life insurance policy under which, in the event of McAteer‘s death, the insurer would pay the bank the amount of debt remaining acсording to the schedule of indebtedness, plus up to two months arrearage. McAteer subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and under the terms of the confirmed Chapter 13 plan, the bank‘s secured interest in the truck was “crammed down” from $13,722.22 to just over $8,000.00, representing the bank‘s secured interest in the truck, plus 10% of its unsecured interest. When McAteer died, the bank recovered the full amount of its debt outstanding at the time of McAteer‘s death under the original indebtedness schedule. The bankruptcy court ordered all proceeds in excess of the bank‘s secured claim turned over to the debtor‘s estate. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the insurance proceeds were not property of the bankruptcy estate, the creditor bank could recover the full amount of its original loan from the insurer, rather than the limited “crammed down” amount. McAteer, 985 F.2d at 117-19.
McAteer, however, is not at all analogous. In this case the insurance proceeds flow from the destruction of the truck, and stand as the substitute for the collateral securing Ford‘s loan. In McAteer, the insurance proceeds flow frоm the death of the debtor, and have no relationship to the value or status of the truck. Nor would the proceeds in McAteer take the place of the truck, as the truck was still intact and retained the same value in the bankruptcy estate before and after the dеbtor‘s death. In other words, if the truck in McAteer — which was property of the bankruptcy estate — had been destroyed, it would not have triggered the disbursement of the insurance proceeds; conversely, McAteer‘s death did not affect the value of the truck, which remained in the bаnkruptcy estate.
We reject, however, the Trustee‘s argument that he acted properly to recover the overpayment by withholding funds owed to Ford by debtors in nearly 30 unrelated bankruptcy cases also administered by the Trustee. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the action of the Trustee, whose powers and duties are defined and delimited by statute. The powers and duties of a Chapter 13 trustee are set forth in
The Trustee‘s action was not only not authorized by the Code but also affirmatively violated the Trusteе‘s statutory obligations under the Code. A Chapter 13 trustee is obliged by statute to make payments to all creditors under the terms of the confirmed plan.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s holding that Ford is required to turn over the excess sum to the Trustee, we REVERSE the district court‘s holding that the Trustee acted properly in withholding the amount of the overpayment from payments owed to Ford in other unrelated plans, and we REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
