Ford-Evans v. SmithFord-Evans v. Smith
There is nothing, other than her assertions, to support Loggins‘s claim that the “other income” provision should be read to exclude other Nortel plans. The plan description does not specify the source of any of the specified categories of “other income,” and nowhere does it require that they be provided by someone other than Nortel.2 Loggins cannot point to any plan document suggesting various Nortel plans should be treated differently from other sources of insurance.
Loggins next argues that the “extra benefit” description in the BTA summary creates an ambiguity between the BTA and the LTD plans. This claim is of doubtful merit, as the BTA did provide her with an additional benefit of $189,940.20, even after the offset, because the lump sum payment is prorated over sixty months. Despite the partial offset here, the plan provides a significant additional benefit to many employees and is not merely “smoke and mirrors” as Loggins asserts.
Moreover, even if an ambiguity existed, it would be resolved in favor of the plan administrator. Under MacLachlan v. Exxon/Mobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir.2003), when, as here, a plan administrator has been vested discretionary authority to interpret a plan, courts review the administrator‘s decisions only for abuse of discretion. Given the doubtful evidence of even a slight ambiguity, the administrator‘s decision here was clearly within the wide discretion allowed.
Finally, Loggins‘s assertion that the interpretation expressed by Kimberly Pulliam, the Global Employee Services Department (“Global“) employee to whom she spoke regarding a potential offset, in a phone conversation and email proves the meaning of the provisions is simply false. Although employees are instructed to call that department with general benefits questions, employees also are told to contact the Claims Administrator for each specific plan for more detailed information. Global was not the administrator for either the BTA or the LTD, and Global employees clearly had no authority to bind Nortel.
CONCLUSION
The district court was correct in finding no genuine issue of material fact. We therefore AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.
William Russell Hamilton, III, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Miami, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this case, we decide whether the district court properly granted defendant-appellant United Space Alliance, LLC summary judgment on plaintiff-appellant Marilyn Ford-Evans‘s interference claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act. For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part and REMAND for further proceedings.
Plaintiff-appellant Marilyn Ford-Evans brought this action against her former employer, defendant-appellee United Space Alliance, LLC (“USA“), and against her former supervisor at USA, Daniel Smith.1 In her February 7, 2005 amended complaint (“complaint“), Ford-Evans brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA“),
Ford-Evans subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend judgment. In her motion, she did not contest the district court‘s granting of summary judgment as to her ADA claim, her FMLA retaliation claim, and her slander claim; instead, she asserted that the granting of summary judgment as to her FMLA interference claim was improper because USA had not moved for summary judgment as to this claim. The district court denied Ford-Evans‘s motion on the basis that her complaint did not adequately allege FMLA interference. Ford-Evans timely appealed. She appeals only the district court‘s grant of summary judgment as to her FMLA interference claim.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Riverwood Int‘l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 618 (5th Cir.1999)). The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant‘s response.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Only “[i]f the movant meet[s] this burden [must] the nonmovant go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). “[E]ven when the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, ‘simply filing a summary judgment motion does not immediately compel the party opposing the motion to come forward with evidence demonstrating material issues of fact as to every element of [her] case.‘” Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting Russ v. Int‘l Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir.1991) (per curiam)). Moreover, “[a] motion for summary judgment cannot be granted simply because there is no opposition, even if the failure to oppose violated a local rule.” United States v. Wilson, 113 Fed.Appx. 17, 18 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Hibernia Nat‘l Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir.1985)); see also John v. Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 1985).
USA contends that Ford-Evans did not adequately plead an FMLA interference claim. But it is clear that in her complaint Ford-Evans put USA on notice that she intended to pursue an FMLA claim not only for retaliation but also for interference. FMLA‘s interference provision makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,” any substantive FMLA right.
It is true that the complaint contained a dearth of factual details supporting Ford-Evans‘s FMLA interference claim. But USA chose not to challenge the sufficiency of her pleadings either in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or in a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement. Instead, USA ignored any pleading inadequacy, even though it knew that Ford-Evans intended to rely upon an FMLA interference theory of recovery.2
Although USA moved for summary judgment on all of Ford-Evans‘s claims, in its motion and brief it addressed only the ADA claims, the FMLA retaliation claim, and the state-law slander claim; it did not attempt to address the FMLA interference claim. With respect to this claim, USA did not discharge its initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and pointing to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact;3 consequently, to survive summary judgment on her interference claim, Ford-Evans was not obligated to respond.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED to the extent that it dismisses the FMLA interference claim. In all other respects, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings. Costs shall be borne by USA.