313 F.3d 144 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
Before: ALITO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and(cid:13) OBERDORFER,*District Judge(cid:13) (Filed: December 11, 2002)(cid:13) LLOYD G. PARRY (Argued)(cid:13) Davis, Parry & Tyler(cid:13) 14th Floor, 1525 Locust Street(cid:13) Philadelphia, PA 19102(cid:13) Counsel for Appellants(cid:13) SHERYL S. CHERNOFF(cid:13) SUSAN F. BURT (Argued)(cid:13) Burt-Collins & Chernoff(cid:13) P.O. Box 237(cid:13) Merion Station, PA 19066(cid:13) Counsel for Appellees(cid:13) OPINION OF THE COURT(cid:13) ALITO, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) This action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 arises out of a police(cid:13) shooting in Lower Merion Township, Pennsylvania.(cid:13) Defendants John Salkowski and Craig McGowan, two police(cid:13) officers, appeal from an order of the District Court denying(cid:13) their motion for summary judgment based on qualified(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) * The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, Senior District Judge for the(cid:13) District of Columbia, sitting by designation.(cid:13) 2(cid:13) immunity. In denying that motion, the District Court held,(cid:13) without elaboration, that the plaintiffs had raised genuine(cid:13) issues of material fact regarding their Fourth Amendment(cid:13) excessive-force claim. The scope of our jurisdiction to(cid:13) review the decision of the District Court depends upon the(cid:13) precise set of facts that the District Court viewed as subject(cid:13) to genuine dispute. Because the District Court did not(cid:13) identify this set of facts, we find that we are greatly(cid:13) hampered in deciding this appeal. Accordingly, we remand(cid:13) the case to the District Court so that the facts found to be(cid:13) in dispute can be specified. We also announce a(cid:13) supervisory rule to be followed in all subsequent cases in(cid:13) which a summary judgment motion based on qualified(cid:13) immunity is denied on the ground that material facts are(cid:13) subject to genuine dispute. So that we can carry out our(cid:13) review function without exceeding the limits of our(cid:13) jurisdiction under Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995),(cid:13) we will henceforth require the District Courts to specify(cid:13) those material facts that are and are not subject to genuine(cid:13) dispute and explain their materiality.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) In the early-morning hours of January 10, 2000, Mr. Erin(cid:13) Dudley Forbes concluded his shift working as a security(cid:13) guard and stopped at an A-Plus convenience store in Bryn(cid:13) Mawr, Pennsylvania. Shortly thereafter, the clerk(cid:13) telephoned 911, reporting that Forbes had robbed the store(cid:13) and beaten the clerk over the head with "what looked like(cid:13) a billy jack." The clerk told police that the assailant was not(cid:13) otherwise armed and described Forbes and his car.(cid:13) Dispatchers transmitted the description of the fleeing(cid:13) suspect on police radio and announced that a robbery had(cid:13) occurred.(cid:13) Police caught up with Forbes in Lower Merion Township(cid:13) after an automobile pursuit, and at least some of the events(cid:13) that followed were captured on a grainy police videotape(cid:13) that is part of the record of this case. The parties agree that(cid:13) the officers surrounded Forbes’s car and shouted(cid:13) commands and that Forbes then extended his middle finger(cid:13) and bolted from the car, brandishing a heavy wooden staff.(cid:13) Here the parties’ accounts diverge. The officers claim that(cid:13) 3(cid:13) Forbes charged "right at" police and motioned to attack a(cid:13) retreating Salkowski. By contrast, the plaintiffs claim that(cid:13) Forbes darted away from the officers, but they appear to(cid:13) concede that the trajectory of his footpath triangulated(cid:13) towards the direction in which Salkowski also ran.(cid:13) Salkowski fired one shot, felling Forbes.(cid:13) After Forbes was shot, he lay on the ground,(cid:13) "mumbl[ing]" or "moan[ing]," still clutching the staff, with(cid:13) one hand obscured. McGowan then kicked the staff aside(cid:13) and ordered Forbes to show his hands. Whether Forbes(cid:13) suffered from delirium or fading consciousness or simply(cid:13) intended to resist police, he did not comply. McGowan then(cid:13) sprayed him once with pepper spray, called paramedics,(cid:13) and minutes later shackled his hands with the help of(cid:13) another officer. The defendants claim that Forbes fought(cid:13) the handcuffing, but according to the plaintiffs, Forbes(cid:13) offered "no resistance to the handcuffing" and was(cid:13) "motionless" by that point. After Forbes was restrained,(cid:13) police began administering first aid. Doctors pronounced(cid:13) Forbes dead roughly a half hour after the shooting.(cid:13) Forbes’s parents filed this action against Salkowski and(cid:13) McGowan under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that the officers(cid:13) violated Forbes’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and(cid:13) Fourteenth Amendments. The officers moved for summary(cid:13) judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims were defeated(cid:13) by qualified immunity, but the District Court denied(cid:13) summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment(cid:13) excessive-force claim on the ground that genuine issues of(cid:13) material fact existed regarding that claim. The Court did(cid:13) not specify which material facts it viewed as subject to(cid:13) genuine dispute, however, and this appeal followed.(cid:13) II.(cid:13) Although 28 U.S.C. S 1291 ordinarily limits appellate(cid:13) jurisdiction to "appeals from . . . final decisions of the(cid:13) district courts," certain collateral orders merit interlocutory(cid:13) review because they "finally determine claims of right . . .(cid:13) too important to be denied review and too independent of(cid:13) the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be(cid:13) deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen v.(cid:13) 4(cid:13) Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).(cid:13) When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on(cid:13) qualified immunity, the denial of the motion may be(cid:13) appealed immediately under the collateral-order doctrine(cid:13) because "[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather(cid:13) than a mere defense to liability[ ] and . .. is effectively lost(cid:13) if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v.(cid:13) Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985). However, this right(cid:13) to interlocutory review is limited "to the extent that [a claim(cid:13) of qualified immunity] turns on an issue of law." Id. at 530.(cid:13) For instance, we may "review whether the set of facts(cid:13) identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a(cid:13) violation of a clearly established constitutional right," but(cid:13) we may not "consider whether the district court correctly(cid:13) identified the set of facts that the summary judgment(cid:13) record is sufficient to prove." Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia,(cid:13) 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002). When a defendant argues(cid:13) that a trial judge erred in denying a qualified-immunity(cid:13) summary-judgment motion because the judge was(cid:13) mistaken as to the facts that are subject to genuine(cid:13) dispute, the defendant’s argument cannot be entertained(cid:13) under the collateral-order doctrine but must instead await(cid:13) an appeal at the conclusion of the case. See Johnson, 515(cid:13) U.S. at 313-16.(cid:13) Qualified immunity insulates from civil liability(cid:13) government officials performing discretionary functions(cid:13) insofar as "their actions could reasonably have been(cid:13) thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have(cid:13) violated." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).(cid:13) In assessing a claim of qualified immunity, we must review(cid:13) the law relevant to the official’s behavior and ask whether(cid:13) the official could have believed that his or her actions were(cid:13) justified by law. See Good v. Dauphin Cty. Soc. Servs., 891(cid:13) F.2d 1087, 1094 (3d Cir. 1989). The second part of this(cid:13) inquiry contains two components. To overcome the defense(cid:13) of qualified immunity, (1) the facts, "[t]aken in the light(cid:13) most favorable to the party asserting the injury,[must](cid:13) show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,"(cid:13) Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), and (2) "[t]he(cid:13) contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a(cid:13) reasonable official would understand that what he is doing(cid:13) violates that right." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.(cid:13) 5(cid:13) Qualified immunity is defeated if an official "knew or(cid:13) reasonably should have known that the action he took(cid:13) within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the(cid:13) constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the(cid:13) action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation(cid:13) of constitutional rights or other injury." Wood v. Strickland,(cid:13) 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). The doctrine aims to exclude "the(cid:13) plainly incompetent" and "those who knowingly violate the(cid:13) law" while accommodating reasonable "mistaken(cid:13) judgments." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)(cid:13) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If an(cid:13) official could have reasonably believed that his or her(cid:13) actions were lawful, the official receives immunity even if in(cid:13) fact the actions were not lawful.(cid:13) III.(cid:13) In this case, the District Court denied Salkowski’s and(cid:13) McGowan’s summary-judgment motions without identifying(cid:13) the set of material facts that the Court viewed as subject to(cid:13) genuine dispute. As a consequence, we are greatly(cid:13) hampered in ascertaining the scope of our jurisdiction. If(cid:13) the District Court had specified the material facts that, in(cid:13) its view, are or are not subject to genuine dispute, we could(cid:13) "review whether the set of facts identified by the district(cid:13) court [as not subject to genuine dispute] is sufficient to(cid:13) establish a violation of a clearly established constitutional(cid:13) right," Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 61, but based on the District(cid:13) Court’s spare comments in denying the defendants’(cid:13) summary-judgment motion, we are hard pressed to carry(cid:13) out our assigned function. We do not fault the District(cid:13) Court for not specifically identifying the genuinely(cid:13) disputable material facts because our prior qualified-(cid:13) immunity cases have not imposed the requirement.(cid:13) However, we find that the lack of such a specification(cid:13) impairs our ability to carry out our responsibilities in cases(cid:13) such as this.(cid:13) In analogous situations where clearer statements of law(cid:13) or references to the record are necessary to facilitate(cid:13) meaningful appellate review, this Court has announced(cid:13) supervisory rules regulating important procedural matters.(cid:13) For example, in Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers, 903 F.2d 253(cid:13) 6(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1990), we reviewed a grant of summary judgment(cid:13) whose reasoning was not apparent from the record and(cid:13) which did not provide any indication of the grounds on(cid:13) which it was based. We noted that a requirement that(cid:13) District Courts accompany such orders with some(cid:13) articulation of their reasoning would not impose a serious(cid:13) burden, would assist parties in crafting appellate briefs(cid:13) responsive to dispositive issues, and would clearly frame(cid:13) appellate review. Thus, we exercised our supervisory power(cid:13) "to require the district courts in this circuit to accompany(cid:13) grants of summary judgment hereafter with an explanation(cid:13) sufficient to permit the parties and this court to understand(cid:13) the legal premise for the court’s order." Vadino, 903 F.2d at(cid:13) 259. Other situations in which we have established similar(cid:13) supervisory rules include, e.g., Sowell v. Butcher & Singer,(cid:13) Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a court(cid:13) entering a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50 should "set(cid:13) forth an explanation sufficient to permit this court to(cid:13) understand the legal premise for the court’s order") (citation(cid:13) and internal quotation marks omitted); Quality(cid:13) Prefabrication, Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 81(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1982) (ruling that "a dismissal of a complaint with(cid:13) prejudice as a Rule 37 sanction must be accompanied by(cid:13) some articulation on the record of the court’s resolution of(cid:13) the factual, legal, and discretionary issues presented"); and(cid:13) Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360,(cid:13) 364 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that entry of final judgment on(cid:13) a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to Rule 54(b)(cid:13) should "clearly articulate the reasons and factors(cid:13) underlying [the] decision to grant 54(b) certification"). "It is(cid:13) essential . . . that a reviewing court have some basis for(cid:13) distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at(cid:13) after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors,(cid:13) and mere boiler-plate approval phrased in appropriate(cid:13) language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or(cid:13) analysis of the law." Protective Committee for Indep.(cid:13) Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson , 390 U.S.(cid:13) 414, 434 (1968).(cid:13) At least one other Circuit has encountered the same(cid:13) difficulty in the qualified-immunity context that motivates(cid:13) us to act in a supervisory capacity here. See Beck v.(cid:13) Schwartz, 992 F.2d 870, 871 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that(cid:13) 7(cid:13) it was "error" for "the district court[to] overrule[ ](cid:13) appellant’s motion for summary judgment without reference(cid:13) to th[e] [qualified immunity] defense"). Our approach differs(cid:13) from Beck’s. We cannot hold that the District Court’s denial(cid:13) of summary judgment constituted error here because in the(cid:13) absence of a clear supervisory rule, the Federal Rules of(cid:13) Civil Procedure do not impose on trial courts the(cid:13) responsibility to accompany such an order with conclusions(cid:13) of law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact and(cid:13) conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions(cid:13) under Rule . . . 56. . . ."). We instead exercise our(cid:13) supervisory power to require that future dispositions of a(cid:13) motion in which a party pleads qualified immunity include,(cid:13) at minimum, an identification of relevant factual issues and(cid:13) an analysis of the law that justifies the ruling with respect(cid:13) to those issues.(cid:13) Having concluded that a supervisory rule is necessary in(cid:13) this context, it falls upon us to determine the appropriate(cid:13) disposition of the instant appeal. In Vadino, we limited our(cid:13) supervisory rule to future cases and proceeded to address(cid:13) the merits rather than remand the case to the District(cid:13) Court. See 903 F.2d at 259-60. That approach is common(cid:13) when the record provides sufficient guidance for an(cid:13) appellate court seeking to retrace the analytical steps taken(cid:13) by the District Court. See also, e.g. , Quality Prefabrication,(cid:13) Inc. v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 1982);(cid:13) Solomon v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043,(cid:13) 1048 (3d Cir. 1973). By contrast, in Allis-Chalmers, we did(cid:13) not address the merits of the appeal with finality and(cid:13) "remanded only for a statement of reasons so that this(cid:13) Court may properly determine" whether the original(cid:13) decision was proper. 521 F.2d at 367 n.16 (emphasis(cid:13) removed). Such a remand is favored when the record omits(cid:13) key information, e.g., Gould v. Members of the New Jersey(cid:13) Div. of Water Policy and Supply, 555 F.2d 340, 341 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 1977), or when the lack of sufficient articulation for the(cid:13) decision renders appellate review unduly speculative.(cid:13) Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir. 1982). In(cid:13) this case, although we are satisfied with the record’s(cid:13) completeness, we are persuaded to remand by our desire(cid:13) not to conduct a narrower or more expansive review than is(cid:13) required by the precise contours of the District Court’s(cid:13) 8(cid:13) order. Since we are unable to identify those contours, we(cid:13) proceed to detail the parameters of the articulation(cid:13) necessary for us to conduct a meaningful review.(cid:13) IV.(cid:13) We are familiar with the various factual disputes between(cid:13) the parties and would find it helpful in deciding this appeal(cid:13) for the District Court to identify which such disputes it(cid:13) found genuine and material.(cid:13) The plaintiffs, as noted, assert that Forbes bolted away(cid:13) from the officers as they converged on him, and they(cid:13) therefore dispute Salkowski’s argument that he shot Forbes(cid:13) in self-defense. A diagram depicting the position of Forbes’s(cid:13) body relative to the street and cars appears to constitute(cid:13) one of the plaintiffs’ principal items of evidence on this(cid:13) question. The plaintiffs also refer to the police video(cid:13) recording and cite an examiner’s report on the trajectory of(cid:13) the bullet through Forbes’s body. We are interested to know(cid:13) whether the District Court found that these items of(cid:13) evidence were sufficient to raise genuine factual disputes(cid:13) regarding Forbes’s location, the direction in which he was(cid:13) facing, or his direction of movement at the moment of the(cid:13) shooting, and, if so, whether the plaintiffs’ allegations are(cid:13) sufficient to establish a violation of a constitutional right.(cid:13) Appellants dispute the materiality of Forbes’s location(cid:13) and direction, arguing that Salkowski could reasonably(cid:13) have believed himself legally entitled to fire his weapon in(cid:13) any event. Pennsylvania law empowers police officers to use(cid:13) deadly force when "(i) such force is necessary to prevent(cid:13) [an] arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and(cid:13) (ii) the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a(cid:13) forcible felony or is attempting to escape and possesses a(cid:13) deadly weapon." 18 PA. CONS. ST. S 508(A)(1) (2002). The(cid:13) officers argue that a reasonable person in Salkowski’s(cid:13) position, in reliance on that statute, could have believed it(cid:13) lawful to act as Salkowski did. Consequently, another(cid:13) important question is whether the District Court found that(cid:13) a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Forbes’s(cid:13) wooden staff was or might reasonably be perceived as a(cid:13) deadly weapon. During oral arguments, Appellees(cid:13) 9(cid:13) maintained that a factual issue existed regarding this(cid:13) question but conceded that the statute did not implicate(cid:13) any other material issues.(cid:13) The parties do not propose a statutory framework that(cid:13) covers McGowan’s conduct, so we are even more hesitant to(cid:13) surmise what factual issues the District Court may have(cid:13) identified or considered material. At minimum, it would aid(cid:13) us to know if the District Court concluded that the(cid:13) Appellees raised genuine issues regarding whether Forbes(cid:13) posed any danger to the officers after being shot or whether(cid:13) police could reasonably assume that he might. If the(cid:13) District Court considered any other factual issues bearing(cid:13) on whether McGowan’s conduct was objectively(cid:13) unreasonable or whether it interfered with a clearly(cid:13) established constitutional right, a description and analysis(cid:13) of those issues would likewise assist us considerably.(cid:13) The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and we(cid:13) remand the case for reentry of judgment in accordance with(cid:13) the supervisory rule announced herein. This panel shall(cid:13) retain jurisdiction and proceed to decide any questions(cid:13) properly within our jurisdiction after the District Court(cid:13) provides the requested specification.1 (cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. Judge OBERDORFER concurs in the result and in parts I, II, and IV(cid:13) of the opinion. As a visiting judge he expresses no opinion about the(cid:13) supervisory rule established for the Circuit in part III.(cid:13) 10