Forbes v. HubbardForbes v. Hubbard
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Stone
delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellee filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook county seeking mandamus against certain officials of the village of River Forest to compel them to issue to him a permit for the construction of a two-story brick and terra cotta store building upon real estate owned by him in that village. It is conceded that the proposed plans and specifications strictly comply with the requirements of building ordinances of the village, but the defense was made that to use appellee’s premises for commercial or business purposes was
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment order on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence and for errors in the rulings of the chancellor as to the admissibility of certain evidence.
On April 3, 1922, the village passed a comprehensive zoning ordinance, creating thereby four different use districts : “A” restricted to single-family dwellings; “B” re-
stricted to apartment buildings and those permitted in “A” district; “C” restricted to stores or commercial buildings and those permitted in the “A” and “B;” and “CC,” industrial or unlimited use district. Appellee’s property is included by the zoning ordinance in the “A use” district. The ground of appellee’s petition is, that in so far as the ordinance purports to prevent the proposed structure on his property it is arbitrary, unreasonable and void.
River Forest is a village of approximately 9000 inhabitants. It is a suburb of Chicago, located about ten miles west of the loop district. Immediately adjoining River Forest on the east, between it and the city of Chicago, is the village of Oak Park, with a population of approximately 63,000. Harlem avenue extends north and south along the boundary line between the villages of River Forest and Oak Park. It is a through street, extending throughout the boundaries of these villages and for many miles north and south thereof, forming a part of one of the principal highways of Cook county. Appellee’s property is located in
There is little, if any, controversy as to the facts. It is conceded that the highest and best use of the property here involved is for commercial or business purposes. The evidence shows it worth from $350 to $500 per front foot for business purposes and from $40 to $50 per front foot for single-residence purposes. Harland Bartholomew, professor of civic designing at the University of Illinois, who qualified as an expert of wide experience in matters of zoning and preparation of zoning ordinances, described the method of his investigation of the zoning ordinance of River
Jacob L. Crane, Jr., also qualified as a zoning expert of wide experience and testified that the zoning ordinance applied to the locus involved is not logical or proper zoning of the property but is unreasonable and unsound. He gave
Five other witnesses who qualified by years of experience in handling real estate, one of whom had served as member of the zoning commission of Oak Park, testified that commercial use of the locus in question would not result in any substantial injury to residence property to the west, but would,
In defense, appellants offered proof of the length of time consumed in preparing the zoning ordinance, the fact that appellee had in 1923 petitioned for a re-zoning of his property, which was denied, and certain testimony and exhibits showing the uses of the property of the village, none of which disputes or contradicts the evidence of appellee. There was also introduced by appellants a table showing a survey of a number of cities and villages in the vicinity of Chicago as to the number of feet frontage actually used for business in those cities and villages, and an exhibit showing the acreage of the village, its public and church grounds and the boundaries of the various districts as zoned by the ordinance. The record contains no evidence disputing that of appellee concerning the highest or best use of the property involved or the opinions of the witnesses offered as experts. It is conceded that the ordinance is a serious invasion of appellee’s property. Counsel for appellants argue that this suit is but an attempt on the part of appellee to destroy the zoning ordinance of the village for his personal benefit; that he purchased the property after the zoning ordinance was passed and is gambling on the possibility of making a large profit on it if the zoning ordinance can be destroyed. The evidence shows that appellee paid $350 per front foot for this property, which is seven times the highest value placed on the lot as residence property.
The public welfare is a dominating consideration in cases of this character. Where it appears that the restrictions of a zoning ordinance bear substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, such a consideration is determinative regardless of the fact that individuals may suffer
Counsel for appellants argue that as appellee purchased this property after the passage of the zoning ordinance he should not now be heard to complain that that ordinance is invalid. We know of no rule of law that creates an estoppel against attack by such purchaser on the validity of a zoning ordinance unless there be in his acts or the acts
It is also argued that it was error to admit evidence of the zoning ordinance of Oak Park and of the uses to which the property on the east side of Harlem avenue is put. In support of this contention it is said that River Forest is a separate municipality, and should have power, subject to the organic law of the State, to regulate its own affairs, and should not be required to re-zone real estate located within its borders simply because the zoning of real estate on the opposite side of the street, in another municipality, did not conform to the original zoning of the village of River Forest. It was,’ as we have seen, the opinion of the expert witnesses of appellee that property cannot be disassociated from
It is clear from the undisputed evidence in this case that appellee’s property is not characterized by the residence area lying west of it but rather by the business district which it faces. This not only clearly appears from the undisputed
Counsel for appellants argue that whether the restriction of appellee’s property to single-residence use is arbitrary and unreasonable is at least a fairly debatable question, and under those circumstances the court will not disturb the judgment of the village board, exercised after consideration. As has been more than once announced by this and other courts, the judgment of the legislative department will not be disturbed merely because the court, if it were establishing zoning districts, would not have established them as was done by the city council or village board. The rule is, that where the question of reasonableness is fairly debatable, courts will not interfere with the legislative judgment; (Michigan-Lake Building Corp. v. Hamilton, supra; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, supra;) but it has likewise been many times held that the governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of property owners by restricting the character of the use of their property is not unlimited, and such restrictions cannot be imposed if they do not bear substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. (City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N. W. 743; Nectow v. Cambridge, supra; Bjork v. Safford, 333 Ill. 355; City of Aurora
In deciding whether the invasion of property rights under a purported police power is unreasonable and confiscatory, the degree in which the values incident to the property are diminished by the provisions of the zoning ordinance must always be
Counsel for appellants also argue that in this case there is no necessity for these premises as business property since a sufficient amount of space has been allotted to that use by the zoning plan. The only evidence offered by appellants in support of this argument is a statement of the amount of space so used by surrounding cities and villages. No evidence of the sufficiency or distribution of such space appears.
Counsel argue that the fact that 15,000 feet of frontage have been allotted by the ordinance for business uses, of which but about 2400 feet have been so used, indicates that there is ample room for business development in the village without the use of appellee’s property for that purpose. We think, however, that the undisputed evidence of appellee’s witnesses referred to, coupled with the undisputed fact that there is a demand for the locus involved for commercial uses at a value of $350 to $500 per front foot, most strongly indicates that the failure to occupy for business use the property zoned to such use finds its reason rather in the want of proper distribution than in the lack of need for space.
Counsel further argue that unreasonable damage to property on Bonnie Brae will occur by reason of the use of appellee’s property for commercial rather than single-family residence purposes. The record does not so indicate. It was the opinion of all witnesses testifying on that subject that while the Bonnie Brae property now has the benefit of vista over this property as vacant property, which would be lost by building upon it, and while the building of a store building might thus to some extent affect values on the east side of Bonnie Brae back of this property, yet by reason of the depth of both lots and the physical condition of trees and shrubbery the injury would be but slight, if any, and that in the opinion of these witnesses, as we have seen, restriction to single-family residence would in all probability prevent the development of this property into a desirable home district, but it would be more apt to degenerate into what the witnesses characterized as “taxpaying” properties, and that such injury to the property on Bonnie Brae would be very little,
We are of the opinion that the invasion of the property of appellee involved here is clearly unreasonable, unnecessary to the public good of the village of River Forest and amounts to the taking of property against constitutional inhibitions. The circuit court was therefore right in ordering the mandamus to issue, and its judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.