Forbes v. . HalseyForbes v. . Halsey
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Davies
This is an action of ejectment brought to recover two village lots in the town and village of Ithaca. The wife of the plaintiff claims the premises as the heir-at-law of her father, Stephen B. Munn, junior, who died October 13, 1840, intestate, being the owner of and seised in fee of said lots: that he left him surviving the wife of the plaintiff and a son, his heirs-at-law: that the said son had since deceased, leaving a son his only heir-at-law. The defendant was in possession of the premises, and claimed to hold the same by title derived as follows:
On the 31st of October, 1840, the surrogate of the county of Tompkins duly appointed Stephen B. Munn, of the city of New York, and Horace Mack and Jeremiah S. Tourtellot, of Ithaca, administrators, c., of Stephen B. Munn, Jun., deceased. A bond was given by the said administrators in the usual form with sureties, and approved by and filed with the surrogate, November 11, 1840, and on the same day, letters, in the usual form, were duly issued by said surrogate to the said administrators. The inventory of the personal estate of said deceased was made and appraised, and said appraisement duly verified and filed in the office of said surrogate on the 3d day of December, 1840, by which it appeared that said personal estate amounted to the sum of $26,674.42. On the 5th of June, 1841, the said administrators presented their petition to said surrogate, duly verified, setting forth that they had filed an inventory of the personal estate of said deceased, and had discovered that the sum was insufficient to pay his debts. That the outstanding debts of the deceased, due and unpaid, as near as the same could be ascertained, amounted to about the sum of $60,000. That said deceased died seised of certain parcels of real estate, among others that described in the complaint in this action: that his heirs-at-law, the wife of the plaintiff, and his said sons, were minors under the age of twenty-one years. The petitioners prayed that they might have authority granted to them, pursuant to the Revised Statutes, to mortgage, lease or sell so much of the real estate of the deceased as should be necessary to pay his debts. On the seventh of June, 1841, an order was made by the surrogate appointing a guardian ad litem for the said infants, for the purpose of appearing for and taking care of their interest in said proceedings; and said order recited, that due notice of the application for the appointment of said guardian had been served on said minors. A disinterested freeholder was thereupon appointed to take charge of the interest of said infants. Letters of guardianship were issued to said guardian, by said surrogate, on the 7th of June, 1841, reciting all said proceedings and duly appointing him guardian for the purpose aforesaid. On the 15th June, 1841,
On the 26th July, 1841, the surrogate made an order or decree, declaring that on satisfactory proof he adjudged and decreed that the said deceased was indebted to the several persons therein named, in the sums set opposite to their respective names, which included a debt due to the said Stephen B. Munn, one of said administrators, the total of which amounted to the sum of $35,213.41. On the 19th of August, 1841, the said surrogate made an order for the sale of the real estate of the said deceased, for the payment of his debts, which recited the above-mentioned proceedings and the facts aforesaid. Due notice of the time and place of the said sale of said real estate
An answer was put in by Forbes on his own behalf, and as guardian of his wife, admitting all the allegations of the complaint, and submitting to such decree as the court might think proper to make in the premises, and the cause was regularly brought to a hearing on complaint and answers, and a notice to the defendants, and a judgment or decree was made therein on the 26th of November, 1850, at a special term of said court, wherein and whereby it was ordered, adjudged and
The plaintiffs raised the following objections to the matters urged and put in evidence to sustain the defence:
1st. That the surrogate had acquired no jurisdiction in the proceedings to sell said real estate, for the reason that the petition was not accompanied with and did not contain an account of the personal estate of said deceased, nor of the debts against him, nor the names of his creditors, nor the consideration of the debts against him.
2d. That there was no evidence that ten days’ notice of the appointment of a guardian ad litem had been served on said minors.
3d. That it appeared by said judgment record that, at the time such guardian was appointed, the said Mary B. Forbes was under the age of fourteen years, and there was no evidence of the service of notice of such appointment on some person of suitable age and discretion, having the care and custody of said infant.
4th. That there was no evidence of the service of the order to show cause on the minors.
5th. That there was no evidence of the service of said order on the guardian.
6th. That there was not sufficient evidence of the publication of the order to show cause.
7th. That the affidavit of Mack and Tourtellet was inadmissible, having no effect to remedy the previous defects and insufficiency; and it was of itself insufficient, as it only accounts for personal property which came to the hands of said two administrators.
8th. That there was no sufficient proof of the publication of the notice of sale.
9th. That the judgment in the Supreme Court in favor of the said administrators, against these plaintiffs, had no effect to affirm and render valid the proceedings before the surrogate, 1st, because the record contained no evidence of the appointment of a guardian for the said Mary B. Forbes; 2d, that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to render such a judgment; 3d, that it could not operate as an estoppel against the said Mary B. Forbes, she being an infant.
The said justice then decided that, in consequence of the introduction of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it became unnecessary for him to rule or decide the several points raised as to the proceedings before the surrogate, and therefore declined so doing, to which the plaintiff‘s counsel excepted.
He further decided that the plaintiff‘s counsel could not, in this form, take advantage of the want of an appointment of a guardian ad litem to said suit for said infant defendant, Mary B. Forbes; to which decision the plaintiff‘s counsel also excepted.
The said justice also held and decided that the said judgment in the Supreme Court must be regarded as affirming and rendering valid the proceedings before said surrogate, and that the jurisdiction of said Supreme Court, in rendering said judgment, could not be questioned in this form; to which the plaintiff‘s counsel also excepted.
The said justice further decided that the said Mary B. Forbes was estopped by said judgment in the Supreme Court, from questioning the validity of the proceedings before the surrogate; to which decision the plaintiff‘s counsel also excepted.
The plaintiffs then offered to prove that William H. Munn bid off the premises in question as the agent and for the benefit of the said Stephen B. Munn, which offer was overruled by the said justice, and the plaintiffs also excepted.
The jury, under the direction of the said justice, found a verdict for the defendant, and directed the said exceptions in
It is objected, in the first place, to the title acquired by the defendant under the proceedings for the sale of the real estate of Stephen B. Munn, 2d, that the surrogate acquired no jurisdiction in the proceedings to authorize said sale, for the reason that the petition was not accompanied with and did not contain an account of the personal estate of the said deceased nor of the debts against him, nor the names of his creditors, nor the consideration of the debts against him.
An examination of the provisions of the Revised Statutes will show that no such requirements are therein contained. I apprehend that to give the surrogate jurisdiction, it must appear to him that administrators have been duly appointed; that they have made and filed an inventory of the personal estate of the deceased, appraised and verified according to law; that such inventory may be regarded as the basis of their subsequent action, and is to be considered in all subsequent proceedings before the surrogate, at least until the contrary affirmatively appears, to be a true and perfect inventory of all the goods, chattels and credits of the intestate. Such personal property is to be sold, if necessary, to pay the debts of the deceased. (2 R.S., p. 87, § 25.) The amount of the personal property, therefore, which comes to the hands of the administrators, will be assumed to be the amount of the inventory as returned and filed. And in the settlement of their account the administrators are to be charged with the amount of such inventory, and all increase or income thereupon, and also all personal property of the intestate which may be proven to have, subsequently to the making of the inventory, come to their hands. They are, on such final accounting, to be credited with all just and legal payments made by them as such administrators, and with any losses happening on the sales thereof, when such sales have been made in good faith. When, therefore, this inventory was filed in the case of this intestate, showing the amount of his personal estate to be $26,674.42,
The onus of proving the matters stated in the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth objections, since the passage of the act of March 23, 1850 (Laws of 1850, ch. 82, 117), rested clearly upon the party seeking to impeach those proceedings, and the sale and conveyance made in pursuance of them.
By the provisions of section first of that act, all sales made by order of the surrogate, of the real estate of testators or intestates, for the payment of their debts, are to be deemed and held to be made by a court having original general jurisdiction; and the said provisions were to apply as well to sales theretofore as thereafter to be made. This act but declares that surrogates’ courts, acting in the ordering of such sales, are to be deemed courts of general jurisdiction, and it follows that all intendments, as to the regularity of their proceedings, and their jurisdiction in the premises, are to be the same as if they were courts of original general jurisdiction. The cases of The Syracuse City Bank v. Davis (16 Barb., 190), and of Chandler v. Northrop (24 id., 129), and the cases referred to in the opinions therein, fully sustain, in my judgment, the constitutionality of this law and its application to the present case. This statute made it incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show affirmatively the several matters, which they allege the defendant had not shown by sufficient evidence to exist, and until these matters thus distinctly appear, the regularity of the proceedings will be assumed. Several of these objections are hypothetical and not warranted by any facts appearing in
I am unable to arrive at the conclusion that the defendant‘s case is strengthened by the judgment in the Supreme Court in favor of these administrators against these present plaintiffs. The defendant in this action was not a party to that suit, and in no way concluded or affected by anything done therein. He is not estopped from setting up any rights he might otherwise have by any adjudication therein, and consequently he cannot claim that the defendants therein, as between him and them, are estopped from setting up or claiming any of their rights, by reason of anything adjudicated in that suit.
There remains to be considered the offer made by the plaintiffs to show that William H. Munn bid off the premises in question as the agent, and for the benefit, of the said Stephen B. Munn, and which evidence was excluded.
It is now well settled in this State, that a guardian, trustee or other person, standing in the relation of a fiduciary capacity, cannot deal with or purchase the property, in reference to which he holds that relation. (Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N.Y., 327.) The usual and ordinary right and remedy of the cestui que trust is, to affirm the sale and claim its enhanced value, or to hold the fraudulent trustee to the sale. He has his election within a reasonable time to do either. The sale is not therefore void, but voidable only at the election of the cestui que trust. But in reference to sales of the character now under consideration, we have an emphatic and clear expression of the will of the legislature, and which I see no way of overcoming in the present case. (2 R.S., p. 104, § 27.) This section declares, in reference to sales by executors or administrators of the real estate of testators or intestates, directed to be made
In the case of executors, he has selected those in whom he confides, and upon whom the law imposes a duty of fidelity and impartiality. In the event of administrators being appointed, certain classes from which the selection is to be made are designated by law, and when selected the same duty is imposed upon them. The characters of purchaser and seller are utterly incompatible in such cases, and the law has wisely interposed its mandate, that they shall not co-exist. No man should thus be tempted, or be permitted thus to be tempted. Infants are peculiarly the objects of the watchful care and protection of the courts, and they cannot permit a salutary provision of the statute, especially made to secure their interests, to be disregarded. If an executor or administrator was permitted, directly or indirectly, to purchase at a sale, initiated and conducted and made by him, or to be interested in any such purchase, it is obvious that the temptations would be frequent to cause such sales to be made, and at inauspicious periods, and under circumstances when the lowest price would be obtained therefor, in violation of his duty, would
All the judges were for reversal, on the ground stated as the conclusion of the opinion; Denio, Ch. J., and Smith, J., expressed concurrence with the opinion in respect to the act of 1850; Sutherland and Allen, Js., were of a contrary opinion; and the other judges did not express themselves upon that point.
Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.